After three weeks of battle, it’s clear that the Russian offensive has been stalemated by Ukraine. With its present forces, it has in all probability been pressured to achieve its fruits level prematurely. The chance of an absolute victory may be very low. Nonetheless, after main regrouping and induction of extra forces, Russia should still power a face-saving victory.
There are a lot of classes to be learnt from the battle in Ukraine. India has a relative functionality differential in China’s favour alongside its northern borders and in its personal favour within the west with Pakistan. The problem for India could be to efficiently utilise the Ukraine mannequin to stalemate China with out substantial lack of territory and to defeat the identical mannequin when it’s adopted by Pakistan. The exploitation of nuclear brinkmanship would additionally should be factored in.
Moral assessment of capabilities
It’s apparent that Russia overestimated its army functionality and underestimated that of Ukraine. In a totalitarian democracy, a delusional army capabilities in a cocoon with none oversight. The intervention in Syria was incorrectly seen as a mannequin for achievement. Russia’s army hierarchy has failed to present trustworthy and goal recommendation to President Vladimir Putin.
Being a parliamentary democracy, we do have the standard oversight mechanism, nonetheless, it has remained dysfunctional. We have now been cavalier with respect to assessing our personal and our adversaries’ army capabilities and finishing up reforms. Politically, our method to nationwide safety is pushed by emotional rhetoric. Quite than giving dispassionate recommendation, the army hierarchy has joined the politicians to mislead the nation. Failures are defined away by bombast. We don’t also have a formal nationwide safety technique.
Nuclear weapons don’t enable a serious battle within the subcontinent and safeguard us from a decisive defeat and main territorial losses. Under the nuclear threshold, for any type of battle, we don’t have the technological army functionality to defeat Pakistan or keep away from a army embarrassment by China. India should perform an moral strategic assessment to evolve a proper nationwide safety technique and rework its army, and till we accomplish that, it will be prudent to rely on diplomacy.
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Caveat for Aatmanirbharta
As a precept, Aatmanirbharta in defence cannot be challenged. The impact of the battle between Russia and Ukraine — two of our principal suppliers of 60 to 70 per cent of weapon methods and spares — and the sanctions on the previous have created a severe void in {our capability}. It might be a take a look at for our diplomacy to get the waivers from the US. However what use is Aatmanirbharta if we don’t produce state-of-the-art weapons and assist methods?
Ukraine has a greater defence industrial base than India by all yardsticks. But, its success story to blunt the Russian mechanised forces and airpower is constructed on imported and donated, man-portable second/third era anti-tank and air defence guided missile methods like NLAW (Subsequent Technology Mild Anti-tank Weapon), the Javelin, the Stinger and armed drones just like the Bayraktar TB2. The induction of Switchblades drones is on the playing cards.
It might take a decade earlier than Aatmanirbharta comes of age. Within the interim interval, selective import of high-end army know-how is inescapable.
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‘Man behind the gun’
Poor management and high quality of troopers have been the bane for the Russian army in Ukraine. Regardless of the perfect know-how out there, its largely-conscripted troopers lack the self-discipline, motivation, and high quality coaching to carry out in battle. Ukraine has made higher use of the same system with greater motivation and higher coaching.
Russian greater army planning violated the cardinal ideas of focus, financial system of power, and logistics. It additionally fell sufferer to its very personal ‘Rasputitsa’ or ‘Basic Mud’. Working on exterior strains on 4 axes, it failed to pay attention requisite forces on any single axis for a decisive victory.
The Indian army should not be in a rush to implement ‘the three-year obligation’ idea to save lots of on pensions. Quick Service Fee for officers and Quick Service Engagement for troopers of 5 years (extendable as much as 10 years) with out pension however duly coated by a contributory pension scheme, gratuity, and an ex-serviceman standing are extra pragmatic strategies. The consumption by way of this mannequin have to be restricted to 50 per cent of the entire power.
We additionally must relook on the skilled army schooling and coaching of our officers and troopers. They’re tailor-made for the wars of a bygone period. The mental army schooling of the officers requires a radical revamp. Ideas of speedy response and chilly begin are contingent on the prime quality of human useful resource.
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Logistics
“A military marches on its abdomen”, mentioned Napoleon, automobiles transfer on gas, and weapon methods are ineffective with out ammunition, shells, and missiles. After 72 hours of battle, the Russian military was woefully wanting meals, gas, and ammunition. Logistics did not hold tempo with the battle. On restructuring its divisions into mixed arms brigades and battalion tactical teams, the centralised assets of the Mixed Arms Army grew to become too meagre and lacked inherent safety. The Russian military additionally failed to guard its susceptible tail from Ukrainian formations working from the flanks and the actions of particular forces and partisans.
As our armed forces restructure into Built-in Battle Teams, we should not make the identical mistake. Rear space safety is as vital because the battle. Within the mountains and in high-altitude areas, our logistic installations and contours of communications are extraordinarily susceptible to cruise missiles, air and particular forces actions. Logistic installations should go underground or tunnel into mountains. There’s a want for a number of roads with tunnels to the borders. The safety of bridges from floor and air motion and the event of alternate routes is extraordinarily vital. The logistics of the Individuals’s Liberation Army (PLA) are equally susceptible to related motion, and we should exploit it to the hilt. Special Forces, Scout Battalions based mostly on native inhabitants and Particular Frontier Drive can do to the PLA precisely what Ukraine did to the Russian military.
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Excessive-end army know-how
Out of the plethora of movies and pictures of the Ukraine battle, there’s a conspicuous absence of shut fight. Attacking forces have been destroyed from stand-off ranges with high-technology weapon methods. Fastened defences invite destruction by precision guided munitions (PGMs). Small cellular groups with state-of-the-art weapon methods have destroyed the bigger forces arrayed for battle.
Shut fight is passé; the longer term is with agile items making imaginative use of high-end kinetic and knowledge warfare know-how. The PLA is already having such capabilities, and Pakistan is sure to imbibe this lesson. The Army must assessment its techniques and induct state-of-the-art weapon methods. Our techniques are attritionist, positional and targeted on shut fight. A radical shift is required in the way in which we battle.
Combating in built-up space
Till now, our expertise has been restricted to preventing in small villages as they existed 50 years in the past. I don’t visualise main metropolis battles in our context. Nonetheless, if the Ukraine battle is something to go by, within the subsequent battle, villages which have remodeled into semi-urban areas will likely be developed into ‘porcupine defences’ with cellular parts working within the flanks.
We must also exploit the defence potential of villages and concrete areas near the border. Imaginative defence works have to be created in peacetime with the cooperation of the inhabitants. We should additionally refine our techniques to deal with such defences.
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Data Warfare
Data warfare — together with cyber, digital, and psychological warfare — has performed a serious function in Ukraine. The nation gained the battle of notion by permitting free entry to the media and exploiting it to its benefit. Its psychological warfare marketing campaign has been glorious. Distinction it with our expertise of airstrikes/air battle following the Pulwama terrorist assault and the border friction/skirmishes in jap Ladakh. Internationally, we misplaced the notion battle, and even at dwelling, to the discerning eye our false narratives seemed comical at finest.
The most important lesson is how Ukraine defeated the superior info warfare functionality of Russia. Ukraine’s political and army command and management largely remained intact, and so did its public digital communications. The main points should not identified, however it’s possible that within the final eight years, it has laid out an elaborate optical fibre cable community and proofed its communications and weapon methods in opposition to cyber and digital assaults with the assist of the US. We have to comply with go well with. Our info warfare items lack cohesion and don’t have the requisite functionality. The earlier we treatment this, the higher it is going to be.
Militaries that put together for the final battle invariably come to grief. Sadly, now we have been busy doing simply that. The Narendra Modi authorities and the army should research the Ukraine battle intimately and re-energise our nationwide safety and transformation.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served within the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Put up-retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are private.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)
