Shortly after 6:00 AM Moscow time on February 24, 2022, a dozen Russian Army teams started advancing into Ukraine in a serious escalation of the long-running Russo-Ukrainian Battle. Russian Army digital warfare (EW) belongings have been deployed alongside infantry, armor, and artillery. EW performs a distinguished function within the Russian Armed Forces, notably within the military. ‘Attrit a 3rd, jam a 3rd, and the ultimate third will collapse’ is an aphorism attributed to Soviet and Russian Army doctrines. The military deploys an impartial EW brigade inside every of Russia’s Western, Southern, Central, and Jap Army Districts. Every of the military’s tactical maneuver formations is believed to have an EW firm. Upwards of 30 EW firms might equip the military’s motorized rifle and tank brigades and divisions.
EW is integral to Russian Army efforts to interrupt enemy command and management (C2), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. C2 depends on radio and satellite tv for pc communications (SATCOM). Break these hyperlinks and the enemy can not distribute orders and accumulate situational studies. Army EW additionally targets hostile ground-based, naval, and airborne radars. Radar performs a key ISR function in detecting and monitoring targets. Jam a radar and you may render it ineffective, depriving the enemy of ISR information. Russian EW additionally targets hostile GNSS (International Navigation Satellite tv for pc System) alerts. GNSS jamming can deprive the enemy of place, navigation, and timing data transmitted by satellite tv for pc constellations just like the U.S. International Positioning System (GPS).
Official Russian Ministry of Protection video displaying the Murmansk-BN long-range communications jamming system throughout coaching within the Arctic:
Civilian targets of use to the army are additionally targets for Russian EW techniques. These embody civilian cellphone networks and traditional telecommunications. Networks could also be jammed or used because the conduits for false or demoralizing textual content messages despatched to cellphones belonging to troops or civilians alike. Clearly, Russian Army EW capabilities are very important for its wider prosecution of data warfare. EW jamming alerts may carry cyberattacks. Relatively than blasting a radio or radar with interference, a jamming sign can convey malicious code. This might discover its approach right into a hostile C2 community by way of an enemy radio unknowingly receiving the sign and infecting the community.
Russian Army EW firms are anticipated to offer tactical EW at ranges of as much as 50 kilometers (31 miles) throughout the entrance line. In the meantime, EW brigades present theater-level protection over tons of of kilometers. The latter will be extensively distributed to assist smaller operations that may not want full brigade EW capabilities. Evidently most Russian Army EW techniques are designed for use when stationary. As such, it seems that Russian EW doctrine rests on offering a ‘bubble’ of EW protection below which the maneuver power can work.
The Russian Army clearly embraces the ideas of electromagnetic superiority and supremacy (E2S). ES2 focuses on preserving one’s freedom of maneuver within the electromagnetic spectrum to initially scale back an adversary’s freedom of maneuver, gaining superiority. Electromagnetic superiority is in flip a prerequisite for electromagnetic supremacy. That is when the enemy can now not meaningfully intrude in a single’s personal use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
For NATO, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine is a vital alternative to understand the results of a decade’s price of EW modernization within the Russian Army. The invasion shouldn’t be the primary outing for Russian Army EW for the reason that launch of the ‘New Look’ protection reform in 2008. These reforms noticed a serious injection of funding to arrest the decline of Russia’s armed forces for the reason that finish of the Chilly Battle. EW shaped an vital a part of this modernization.
Ukraine bought an early style of Russian Army EW capabilities again in 2014 throughout Moscow’s first invasion, when it had severe results on the Ukrainian Army. EW was used closely from the beginning of the battle. Ukrainian sources argue that Russia’s EW plan was to harness jamming to trigger dislocation, to exhibit presence in particular areas, and to safe E2S.
Russian Army models initially used EW to assault Ukrainian army communications in theater, reducing them off from the Ukrainian command. This was helped by Russian Spetsnaz particular forces models reducing standard telecommunications. One infamous EW system deployed by the Russian Army was the RB-341V Leer-3 which makes use of unmanned aerial automobiles (UAVs) to jam mobile networks. It performed an vital function in jamming cellphones utilized by Ukrainian troops and civilians. The RB-341V was thought for use for sending false and demoralizing textual content messages to Ukrainian troops, and to trace their actions. This latter data was translated into targets for Russian artillery.
Apparently, the RB-341V may have been the mechanism by which malware was loaded into Ukrainian Army’s Android-based artillery fireplace management techniques. Russian Army jamming was additionally thought liable for attacking UAVs flown by the Group for Safety and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). These drones have been tasked with monitoring ceasefire preparations. Different missions for Russian Army EW models in Ukraine included attacking Ukrainian army communications and radio frequency (RF) activated ordnance fuses. Russian EW models have been agile, repeatedly altering their location to keep away from retaliatory fireplace. In brief, Russian Army EW proved itself to be a potent functionality throughout Russia’s preliminary forays into Ukraine.
At this stage within the battle, a definitive evaluation of Russian Army EW employment throughout the newest invasion of Ukraine is fraught with threat. Accessible data is fragmentary. It might be biased and is unimaginable to independently confirm. Nonetheless, some broad observations will be made courtesy of reliable data within the public area.
The Russian Army employed EW from the beginning of the battle on February 24 till the top of its first section when the Russian authorities withdrew its forces surrounding Kyiv on April 7. As famous on this evaluation of that first section of the warfare, EW was used closely in help of those opening levels. Initially, EW assisted Russian efforts in opposition to the Ukrainian Air Power’s built-in air protection system. This included jamming Ukrainian radars and radio communications in help of the Russian airborne operation at Hostomel Airport, round six miles northwest of Kyiv. Capturing the airfield was crucial for ferrying in troops and tools to assist Russia’s advance on Kyiv. Whereas Russian forces did seize the airfield, it was vacated in late March because the strategic focus of the warfare switched from Kyiv to jap Ukraine.
Apparently, evidently Russian airborne models started discussing their plans for the airport’s seize utilizing clear (unencrypted) radio days earlier than the assault occurred. Such intelligence was clearly precious to Ukrainian forces. This underscores the shortage of emissions management (EMCON) by Russian troops witnessed all through the warfare and presumably represents the Russian Army’s first main EW failure within the battle.
Russian Army EW efforts have been equally energetic on the tactical degree from the beginning of the invasion. An article within the Small Wars Journal mentioned it was “vicious and efficient originally of the Battle for Kyiv.” The place Russian EW was efficient, notably in opposition to Ukrainian army communications, old-style strategies like runners and dispatch riders got here again to the fore. These have been ways anticipated on the eve of the battle. Likewise, Ukrainian Army coaching earlier than the invasion emphasised that Russian Army EW could be working laborious and that the power must battle in a severely contested electromagnetic spectrum. The Russian Army additionally suffered EW ‘pleasant fireplace’ when making an attempt to jam Ukrainian Army communications. This could possibly be another excuse for the shortage of Russian Army EMCON. Russian jamming efforts have been additionally hindered by the Ukrainian Army’s use of U.S.-supplied SINCGARS radios. Shorthand for Single-Channel Floor and Airborne Radio System, SINCGARS radios have been remarkably immune to Russian jamming.
Elsewhere within the spectrum
Russian EW efforts weren’t confined to Ukrainian Army and Ukrainian Air Power radar and radio communications within the first section of the battle. Russian Army techniques able to attacking GNSS alerts just like the R-330Zh Zhitel additionally supported the invasion. On March 4, the RF information analytics firm Hawkeye 360 revealed GNSS interference it had documented in Ukraine. The corporate had recorded GNSS interference from components of jap Ukraine managed by pro-Russian cadres since November 2021.
GNSS interference continued into February 2022 when additional jamming was detected emanating from Ukraine’s border with Belarus. The corporate additionally documented GNSS jamming close to the Chornobyl nuclear plant, northern Ukraine, because the warfare bought underway. Chornobyl was captured by the Russians on the primary day of the invasion. Whereas GNSS jamming was a priority, it seems to have been largely localized and never brought on bigger outages throughout the nation. The relative ease with which Ukrainian forces have deployed UAVs just like the TB2 Bayraktar signifies that GNSS jamming might have been desultory. Most UAVs depend on GNSS for navigation. It’s also potential that Russian GNSS jamming has been unable to have an effect on encrypted military-grade ‘M-Code’ GPS alerts.
The same pattern was noticed relating to cellphone protection. Throughout Russia’s invasion of 2014, the military’s RB-314 Leer-3 system had proved notably efficient at jamming and exploiting cellphone networks. Localized mobile community jamming appears to have been skilled throughout section one of many battle. Social media posts reported cellphone jamming concentrated within the Donbas and Crimea areas. However it’s potential that Ukrainian cellphone networks might have been left largely untouched for a number of causes. Firstly, the Russian Army might depend on these networks for communications. The deployment of Russia’s encrypted ERA mobile community is assumed to have been a failure. This will likely have resulted from Russian forces bodily concentrating on components of the Ukrainian cellphone community. Secondly, the Leer-3 could also be efficient at jamming a neighborhood cellphone community, however the Russian Armed Forces might lack enough techniques to focus on Ukrainian mobile protection nationally.
SATCOM has come below assault within the Ukraine theater of operations, though primarily by way of cyberattack versus Russian Army EW. Actually, common reside information broadcasts from Ukraine to media shops world wide point out that SATCOM appears largely unaffected.
A number of Russian Army EW techniques could possibly assault SATCOM alerts, together with the Leer-3, Zhitel, and the RP-377L/LA Lorandit, to call simply three. Nonetheless, it seems the Russian Armed Forces have as a substitute carried out cyberattacks in opposition to satellite tv for pc communications in Ukraine. Personal sector SATCOM agency Viasat revealed a cyberattack skilled by its KA-SAT community initially of the warfare. The corporate mentioned this affected customers in Ukraine and round Europe. It’s thought this assault was geared toward the usage of the KA-SAT community by the Ukrainian army. Equally, SpaceX’s Starlink SATCOM terminals have been focused by Russian cyberattacks. SpaceX’s founder and chief government officer Elon Musk famously ordered the distribution of 1000’s of Starlink terminals to offer broadband SATCOM protection throughout Ukraine. In each instances, these cyberattacks have been ameliorated comparatively rapidly by way of software program fixes.
Russian Army EW efforts have accompanied the primary section of the warfare however have maybe not been as decided or widespread as initially feared. It’s unimaginable to present definitive causes as to why this can be the case. The Ukrainian Army appears to have discovered precious classes from the 2014 invasion. It’s relying much less on the electromagnetic spectrum and understands this spectrum will probably be contested. Questions should even be requested as to the extent Russian Army EW tools is match for its goal. It proved efficient in opposition to the Ukrainian Army within the wake of Russia’s first invasion, again in 2014. Nonetheless, it could merely not be as succesful in opposition to the vastly improved power the Ukrainian Army has turn into within the intervening years. Logistical issues might have held up elements or alternative components for broken or unserviceable Russian Army EW techniques. Maybe Russian Army EW personnel coaching is insufficient for the form of warfare the nation now finds itself in.
Are Russian Army EW C2 techniques match for goal? Maybe not. An article within the Russian journal Army Thought printed in early Could highlighted issues: “At the moment, the management system for digital warfare troops doesn’t totally meet the true wants of the digital warfare troops and the armed forces as a complete.” These EW C2 techniques have “numerous systemic and technological shortcomings.” Likewise, evaluation noticed that highway congestion prevented the military from transferring EW models ahead to help maneuver formations throughout the drive in direction of Kyiv.
Shortly after the invasion, an nameless U.S. protection official mentioned that “we don’t consider that the Russians have employed the complete scope of their digital warfare capabilities and it’s not precisely clear why.” Will this example persist on this new section of the warfare? Preliminary assessments trace that the Russian Army has upped its EW recreation. A report printed by the Washington Put up in early June warned that ranges of EW lately witnessed in jap Ukraine have been intense. Of specific concern is the impact that this might need on Ukrainian UAV operations. Canadian UAV agency Volatus Aerospace acknowledged in a press launch in late Could that Russian jamming was having a unfavourable impact on small drones. This may be as a result of these plane lack encrypted radio or GNSS hyperlinks which might assist protect them from digital assault. Likewise, a report printed by Related Press in early June warned of an upsurge in Russian jamming. This has been blamed on shorter and safer provide traces which let the military transfer EW models nearer to the motion.
It’s unimaginable to say what impact this can have on Ukrainian forces because the warfare drags on into this new section. Ought to Russia definitively seize and maintain E2S in Ukraine, this may be a serious setback for Ukraine. It might be unlikely to unilaterally precipitate an outright Russian victory no matter that will seem like. Nonetheless, it’s laborious to see how Ukrainian forces might problem Russia’s invasion except they’ll problem Russian Army efforts to personal the spectrum.
NATO and allied nations should not misinterpret the battle. Russian Army EW might have appeared lackluster within the first section of the warfare, however this may occasionally change because the battle enters a brand new dimension. Complacency for both NATO, its allies, or Ukraine shouldn’t be an possibility.
Dr. Thomas Withington is an award-winning analyst and author specializing in digital warfare, radar, and army communications.
Contact the editor: Tyler@thedrive.com
