After six months of conflict in Ukraine, some observers have insisted that “we’re seeing the very nature of fight change” and that tanks, together with fighter jets and warships, “are being pushed into obsolescence.”
However it’s too quickly to jot down off the tank, and we should always resist leaping to different sweeping conclusions about the way forward for warfare primarily based on a battle whose classes will not be but clear. There’s nonetheless a lot about this conflict that isn’t identified from open sources, and there’s good purpose to suppose that the situations that marked its early phases won’t essentially be related to future conflicts. In consequence, particular weapon methods could seem to be ineffective primarily based on how and the place they’re employed, not essentially on account of their inherent shortcomings.
The obtainable knowledge from Ukraine, in addition to the latest conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, point out that tanks are nonetheless important in fashionable warfare and their vulnerabilities have been exaggerated. Russia’s heavy tank losses may be defined by employment errors, poor planning and preparation, inadequate infantry help, and Ukrainian artillery. The usage of Javelins and different gentle anti-tank methods in Ukraine has not demonstrated that the tank is out of date any greater than the Sagger anti-tank guided missile did within the 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict, as mentioned by David Johnson in these pages.
Russian Missteps and Tank Losses
Russia’s preliminary operation prioritized velocity and secrecy above all different components. As a result of they anticipated little resistance, Russian forces made minimal makes an attempt at executing a coherent combined-arms operation, which might have required cautious coordination and planning between air, floor, and naval forces. Russian floor items merely drove towards cities, unprepared for a struggle. As well as, Russian forces got inadequate time to organize for such a fancy operation. This choice was doubtless made on the political stage, for the reason that Russian navy’s doctrine, workouts, and former conflicts all prioritized mixed arms. In consequence, the opening part of this conflict is probably not an excellent indication of how efficient tanks and different methods would show to be in a better-organized navy operation. Lots of the supposed weaknesses of manned floor, aerial, and naval platforms had been a results of these errors, not a mirrored image of their technical relevance in fashionable warfare.
Of the 994 Russian tank losses documented by the Oryx weblog, an internet site that makes use of open supply instruments to rely destroyed Russian gear, at the least 340 — or 34 % — had been deserted. (The determine jumps to 38 % if broken tanks are included.) This share was highest throughout the first month of the conflict when Russia’s tank losses had been the best. At first of April, for instance, 53 % of Russia’s recorded tank losses had been deserted. As well as, lots of the tanks listed as destroyed had been first deserted by their crews and destroyed by Ukrainian troopers who both couldn’t or selected to not seize them. Which means that as many as 50 % of Russia’s documented misplaced tanks could have been first deserted by their crews. In different phrases, the tanks themselves weren’t the issue — they had been merely employed poorly, which led to their excessive losses.
Three key points clarify Russia’s tank losses: lack of warning and preparation, poor technique that exacerbated logistics points, and inadequate infantry to guard them. Tanks are among the many most logistics-intensive items of kit. They require routine upkeep, spare elements, and substantial gas to maintain them operational. Due to these necessities, logistics planning is extra vital for tank battalions and regiments than almost another kind of navy unit, however Russia’s disorganized invasion exacerbated these logistical challenges. Russia’s operation was marked by excessive efforts at compartmentalization and secrecy, with most troopers discovering out that they had been going to conflict only some hours earlier than the invasion. In consequence, commanders and logisticians got inadequate warning to plan and put together. Tank items didn’t have sufficient time to schedule correct upkeep or to obtain enough spare elements, gas, and different objects obligatory for a traditional conflict that will contain long-distance actions.
Furthermore, Russia’s plan concerned too many axes of advance, lots of which weren’t mutually supporting, and Russian Floor Forces items had been tasked with advancing at a particularly fast fee. In consequence, Russian forces usually moved past artillery, digital warfare, and air protection protection, additional exacerbating logistics points. The fast advance additionally meant that Russia had longer and extra uncovered provide traces, and its logistics convoys weren’t ready to deal with ambushes from territorial protection forces. It isn’t shocking that tank items carried out comparatively poorly at first of the conflict, since they require larger preparation and planning than lighter items.
Logistics issues had been additionally evident in the kind of tanks Russia misplaced at first of the conflict. Most of Russia’s tank power consists of T-72 or T-90 variants, which use diesel engines. Nevertheless, Russia nonetheless has numerous T-80 variants in service as nicely, usually primarily based in extraordinarily chilly areas the place their gasoline turbine engines are simpler to function than diesel engines. The next share of T-80 tanks had been deserted than T-72 or T-90 variants. Of the 85 T-80U-series tanks that Russia misplaced, in keeping with Oryx’s knowledge, 50 (59 %) had been deserted or captured. Of the 34 T-80BVM tanks that had been misplaced, 19 (56 %) had been deserted or captured. In comparison with the extra quite a few T-72 and T-90 tanks in Russian service, T-80 tanks have increased gas consumption and use a special kind of gas. The upper share of T-80 losses means that gas was a important issue of their abandonment or seize.
Sure Russian items confronted far increased tank losses than others. Within the first few weeks of the invasion, the 4th Tank Division’s two tank regiments misplaced greater than 40 % of their T-80U-series tanks. The Northern Fleet’s 2 hundredth Motorized Rifle Brigade misplaced numerous T-80BVM tanks, whereas the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division’s 1st Tank Regiment reportedly misplaced 45 of its 93 T-72B3M tanks within the first three weeks of the conflict. The notably heavy tank losses from the first Tank Army’s 4th Tank Division and 2nd Motorized Rifle Division counsel that this was a unit problem. It doesn’t seem that Russia’s Southern Navy District or Japanese Navy District sustained related tank losses. This can be partially defined by the stiffer resistance that the Western Navy District confronted in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts at first of the conflict, however it might additionally replicate poorer management and preparation. Certainly, Western Navy District Commander Col. Gen. Alexander Zhuravlyov and Chief of Workers Lt. Gen. Alexey Zavizion had been each reportedly relieved, as was the commander of the first Tank Army, Lt. Gen. Sergey Kisel.
Not Simply Javelins
Of the tanks that had been broken or destroyed, lots of them had been misplaced as a result of Russia’s preliminary invasion was not carried out as a combined-arms operation, and it lacked enough infantry to help its tank items. That is another excuse why Russia misplaced so many tanks throughout the first few weeks however far fewer after the primary part. Greater than half of the Russian tank losses recorded by Oryx occurred within the first 50 days of the conflict, which can be when the first articles had been being printed questioning the worth of tanks. One of many well-known weaknesses of tanks is that they require infantry to guard them from opposing infantry forces with anti-tank weapons, notably in city terrain. Russia selected to scale back the energy of motorized rifle battalions on BMP Infantry Combating Autos from 460 to 345 servicemen, and lots of the battalions that invaded Ukraine had been solely at two-thirds to three-quarters energy. In apply, this meant that Russian motorized rifle items lacked enough dismounts for combating in city terrain. Russia additionally selected to scale back the motorized rifle battalion in every tank regiment to a single firm, which was clearly inadequate to help the 2 battalion tactical teams that every tank regiment ought to be capable of generate. Thus, it’s no shock that Ukraine had success in concentrating on Russian tanks with anti-tank groups. With enough infantry help and unmanned methods and floor reconnaissance to find anti-tank groups, Russia’s tank fleet would have fared a lot better.
Regardless of their effectiveness, fashionable anti-tank guided missiles weren’t the first killers of Russian tanks. In accordance with an adviser to Ukraine’s most senior navy officer: “[A]nti-tank missiles slowed the Russians down [during the advance towards Kyiv], however what killed them was our artillery. That was what broke their items.” Certainly, numerous movies posted by the Ukrainian navy have confirmed this, together with these exhibiting the ill-fated offensive by Russia’s sixth Tank Regiment in Brovary in mid-March. Along with artillery, many Russian tanks had been destroyed or disabled by Soviet-era methods, resembling TM-62 anti-tank mines. Javelins, subsequent era gentle anti-tank weapons, and Ukrainian-made Stugna-P anti-tank methods have been efficient, however they’re only one part of Ukraine’s anti-tank efforts. Certainly, they doubtless destroyed a comparatively smaller share of Russia’s tanks throughout its offensive within the Donbas, the place Russia carried out a extra coherent combined-arms operation. It is usually vital to notice that public sources could not present a consultant view of how Russian tanks had been broken. Russian tanks struck by Stugna-P or Javelins are more likely to be filmed and uploaded to social media than tanks broken by mines, which is probably not recorded as steadily. After all, artillery battalions will not be low-cost, so the obtainable proof relating to tank losses in Ukraine doesn’t notably help the argument that we’re seeing a “swing in favor of smaller and cheaper defensive weapons.” Ukraine has additionally suffered heavy tank losses, dropping 244 tanks as documented by Oryx, of which 128 had been destroyed. It doesn’t seem most of those losses had been from anti-tank guided missiles both.
For all these causes, we needs to be cautious about drawing broader classes from the efficiency of Russian tanks and different weapons throughout February and March. There’s little threat that NATO militaries, and even China, would ever launch an offensive conflict with out conducting a combined-arms operation. If something, the early levels of the conflict merely affirm key elements of U.S. navy doctrine resembling unity of command, mass, decentralized execution, mixed arms, mission-type orders, and correct preparation.
Tanks within the Second Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Equally, heavy Armenian tank losses throughout the Second Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in 2021 have pushed debate about their continued relevance. In that conflict, Armenia and its ally, the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, misplaced a considerable share of their tanks. However to attribute this to the tank’s obsolescence is a misinterpretation of the information.
In accordance with Oryx’s knowledge, Armenia misplaced 255 tanks, of which 146 (57 %) had been destroyed. Of those 146 tanks, 83 (57 %) had been destroyed by TB2s, the now well-known Turkish-made drones. Others had been broken by TB2 strikes or destroyed by artillery and anti-tank guided missiles that had been positioned by TB2 drone. Lots of the different Armenian tanks had been destroyed by loitering munitions. These tank losses occurred after Azerbaijan reportedly destroyed 60 % of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’s air defenses and 40 % of its artillery within the first hour of the conflict. As soon as Azerbaijan achieved air superiority, its TB2s then targeted on concentrating on tanks, artillery, and different armor. After a few weeks of heavy losses, Armenia used its tanks far much less steadily due to the persistent menace posed by the TB2. This made it far tougher for Armenia to strengthen its positions or to counterattack. The one exception was throughout the Battle for Shusha, when overcast climate prevented the TB2 from enjoying a big function. For a number of days, Armenia used tanks and armored automobiles in counterattacks on town, however it was too late to retake it.
As an alternative of demonstrating the obsolescence of the platform, Armenia’s losses confirmed how vital tanks are in fashionable warfare. As soon as Armenia was unable to successfully make use of its tanks, it was at a big drawback. These heavy tank losses preceded Azerbaijan’s breakthrough. Certainly, tanks had been important to Azerbaijan’s success in penetrating Armenian defensive traces and exploiting that success. Baku solely had restricted success in assaulting Armenian defenses alongside many of the line of management, largely composed of mountainous or elevated terrain. It’s no coincidence that Azerbaijan’s breakthrough got here within the south the place the terrain was flatter and the place Baku may maximize its benefit in armor. Azerbaijan’s capability to guard its tanks and make use of them successfully, and Armenia’s incapacity to take action, was one of many fundamental components that defined Azerbaijan’s success within the conflict. The conflict didn’t reveal that tanks had been out of date. As an alternative, it demonstrated that Armenia’s air defenses had been inadequate to defend its tanks and artillery from Azerbaijan’s airpower.
The Enduring Significance of Tanks
The wars in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh each present that cellular armored platforms with firepower are nonetheless vital. In addition they reveal that tanks should be employed with enough combined-arms help. In any other case, tanks, like all armament, will likely be susceptible. Russian tank items lacked enough infantry, which left them susceptible to anti-tank groups, and Armenia’s getting old air defenses failed to guard its tanks from Azerbaijan’s TB2s, which led to their excessive losses. Certainly, the conflict in Ukraine has disproven the arguments that drones rendered tanks out of date in Nagorno-Karabakh. TB2s have been efficient in Ukraine, however they haven’t significantly threatened Russia’s tank fleet. Moreover, tank items require important logistical help to function successfully. These are well-known classes that had been understood by tank commanders way back to World Conflict II.
Whereas the threats going through tanks have grown, so have countermeasures. Though many articles have been written about Russian tank design flaws, there are many examples from Ukraine of Russian tanks being struck by anti-tank weapons, together with anti-tank guided missiles, by which the crew survives. Oryx’s record, which solely consists of noticed losses, undoubtedly undercounts the variety of Russian tanks that had been broken however finally recovered by Russian forces. Strikes could disable the tank’s weapons or capability to maneuver, however the survivability of tanks is much larger than that of different armored automobiles. With out tanks, a navy concerned in a large-scale floor conflict must depend on armored personnel carriers and infantry combating automobiles to fill that very same function, which might result in a larger share of catastrophic losses and heavier casualties. Certainly, a Russian conflict correspondent argued that Russia wanted extra BMO-T heavy armored personnel carriers primarily based on a T-72 tank chassis as a result of its BMP infantry combating automobiles didn’t have enough armor.
In truth, each Russia and Ukraine have seen the worth in using tanks on this conflict. Russia continues to ship tanks from storage depots to equip items in Ukraine and to lift new volunteer tank battalions. Likewise, Ukraine continues to ask for extra tanks and armor from Western international locations, and it has used tanks in counterattacks and to cease Russia’s advance within the Donbas. Though Russia has developed quite a lot of unmanned floor automobiles, they’ve solely been used to clear mines removed from the entrance traces in Ukraine, which demonstrates that they don’t seem to be prepared to interchange tanks on the battlefield.
Whereas the Russian navy would have been higher served in Ukraine by having extra infantry and fewer tanks, tanks will proceed to be vital methods in floor warfare. They continue to be a key floor part of combined-arms warfare, with out which different arms are extra susceptible. Infantry are susceptible when making an attempt to grab defensive positions, that means tanks nonetheless play a important function throughout offensive operations. Anti-tank guided missiles definitely can’t exchange the tank’s function in supporting maneuver.
Crucially, NATO tanks usually have higher crew safety than Russia’s, and NATO militaries can be unlikely to eschew mixed arms because the Russian navy did within the early levels of its invasion. So not all classes from this conflict instantly apply to NATO. Drawing related sweeping conclusions primarily based on Russian tank losses from this era would even be a mistake. The proof from Ukraine reveals that tanks are nonetheless very related in fashionable warfare.
Rob Lee is a senior fellow within the International Coverage Analysis Institute’s Eurasia Program. He’s a Ph.D. pupil researching Russian protection coverage at King’s Faculty London’s Conflict Research Division and a former Marine infantry officer.
Picture by Ministry of Inside Affairs of Ukraine
