Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps colonel with appreciable command expertise, and is the writer of “Past Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Technique within the Twenty-First Century.”
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America’s Navy has confronted robust management challenges of late, starting from suicide to shipboard sabotage to coaching associated accidents. Though ships’ captains are chargeable for the whole lot that occurs or fails to occur aboard, they usually do not get a lot assist from beneath within the management division.
Within the Marine Corps and the Army, regimental and battalion commanders have platoon and firm commanders beneath them to soak up most of the lower-level management challenges. They catch many issues with people, corresponding to interpersonal disputes, troops with issues at dwelling, and disconnects inside teams, earlier than they grow to be main command points. Subordinate commanders have the discretion to manage minor punishments to right conduct earlier than they arrive to the eye of a lieutenant colonel or colonel.
The Navy would not empower midlevel officers in that approach.
Aboard Navy ships, division officers answerable for areas corresponding to engineering, communications and gunnery are primarily thought of employees officers and managers, however they aren’t chargeable for the whole lot their subordinates do or fail to do. If the weapons don’t hearth or the engines are usually not working correctly, the division officer is accountable — not a lot within the case of sailors who fail to point out up for responsibility on time, commit minor insubordination or get into brawls in native bars.
Most of this kind of self-discipline — in need of court-martial or nonjudicial punishment — is left to chief petty officers, which leaves lots of variability based mostly on persona. Which means simmering personnel and private points are sometimes missed or buried till they grow to be a serious incident. The captain could have had no concept of such an issue till it lands in his lap.
There’s a top-down difficulty, as properly. Most Navy officers don’t have any command expertise till they take over a destroyer, nuclear submarine or plane squadron on the O-5 (commander) degree. There are exceptions, corresponding to small boat squadrons and smaller craft corresponding to minesweepers the place extra junior officers are given command, however the problem is basically akin to going from a school baseball staff to the foremost leagues and not using a stint within the minors. Some can handle it, however others can’t.
A lieutenant colonel (O-5) within the Army or Marine Corps has seemingly had a number of platoons and no less than one firm below his or her belt earlier than taking on a battalion of as much as a thousand troops. If there are main issues in management or self-confidence in particular person officers, they’re typically recognized or corrected earlier than the chance for main command happens.
Sociopaths, power incompetents and “me firsters” will often floor as soon as they’re made solely chargeable for the efficiency and morale of even just a few dozen subordinates. A advantageous tactician who drives most of his troopers over the hill via petty tyranny will seemingly not survive to command a battalion or regiment.
The Navy lacks such winnowing functionality. A ship’s government officer (XO) understudies the captain and screens disciplinary actions, however he’s nonetheless a employees officer.
To achieve success, a platoon commander within the Army or Marine Corps learns to identify personnel conflicts in his squads. He can transfer personnel round to resolve them earlier than they degrade the unit’s efficiency. If a recruit who has simply joined the unit from boot camp is having issues adjusting, he might be endorsed and mentored by the lieutenant and his platoon sergeant.
Command kinds might be tried and adjusted with expertise. If the issue turns into power, the soldier or Marine might be referred for skilled remedy earlier than turning to self-harm. Platoons with power management issues shortly come to the eye of the corporate commander; the chief of the unit might be endorsed, and enchancment — or lack thereof — monitored as wanted. Those that merely can’t hack the pains of command are eliminated and changed by those that can. This typically occurs within the Navy, however the course of is disjointed and never formalized.
The Navy ought to think about making division management a command billet. It will make such officers not solely chargeable for the technical working of their assigned space of accountability however for the well-being, morale and self-discipline of the sailors of their divisions. They might have Article 15 disciplinary tasks like these of firm commanders within the Army and Marine Corps. It will not detract from the captain’s general accountability for the ship and its crew, however it might give the skipper a stronger management infrastructure to help her or him in figuring out personnel issues earlier and considerably lessening the burden of command. It additionally would give junior officers intermediate command expertise.
Not everybody can command, and plenty of gifted officers don’t need command. There are all kinds of jobs within the Navy and the opposite providers the place officers can attain flag rank with out having commanded and, frankly, these ought to be expanded. Intelligence, logistics, cyber operations and public affairs are only a few of the specialties that profit from permitting such specialists to excel and advance with out the distraction of being pressured right into a command slot for which they is probably not suited.
Such a reform would price actually nothing and permit the service to establish its future Halseys and Nimitzes early, whereas removing those that fail as leaders.
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