Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, October 8

AFGHANISTAN, October 9 –

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 8, 10:30 pm ET

Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.

A big-scale explosion broken the Kerch Strait Bridge that hyperlinks occupied Crimea with Russia on October 8. Maxar satellite tv for pc imagery reveals that the explosion collapsed one lane of the street bridge and broken the close by railway observe.[1] The Russian Investigative Committee said {that a} truck exploded on the bridge and ignited seven gasoline tanks on the railroad.[2] A small fraction of Russian milbloggers speculated that Ukrainian saboteurs used a ship to detonate the bridge from the ocean, although there is no such thing as a seen proof for such a conclusion.[3] The Kremlin kept away from accusing Ukraine of sabotage or assault, echoing comparable restraint following the sinking of the cruiser Moskva and the Ukrainian strike on Saky airfield in Crimea.[4] Ukraine didn’t declare duty for the incident, however The New York Instances reported that an unnamed senior Ukrainian official said that Ukrainian intelligence participated within the explosion.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov famous that the Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a authorities fee composed of presidency officers, safety providers, and the Ministry of Emergency Conditions to research the ”emergency.”[6]

The explosion is not going to completely disrupt essential Russian floor strains of communication (GLOCs) to Crimea, however its aftermath is prone to improve friction in Russian logistics for a while. The street bridge seems at the least partially operational, and the railroad bridge didn’t undergo important structural harm based on Russian experiences that usually appear believable primarily based on the out there video proof. Russian footage reveals individuals strolling on the broken street bridge and a prepare shifting on the railroad bridge.[7] The Head of occupied Crimea Sergey Aksyonov claimed that the remaining lane of the street bridge opened to automobiles and buses after a rigorous safety examine, however that vehicles should transfer by ferry.[8] The collapsed lane of the street bridge will limit Russian army actions till it’s repaired, forcing some Russian forces to depend on the ferry connection for a while. Russian forces will doubtless nonetheless be capable to transport heavy army gear through the railroad. Russian officers will doubtless intensify safety checks on all autos crossing the bridge, nevertheless, including delays to the motion of Russian army gear, personnel, and provides to Crimea. Putin has already signed a decree strengthening the safety protocol on the bridge beneath the supervision of the Russian Federal Safety Service (FSB).[9]

The Kremlin is probably going persevering with to border the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) because the scapegoat for the Kerch Bridge explosion and different Russian army failures to deflect the blame from Putin. The Russian MoD has not issued an official assertion concerning the incident as of this publication.[10] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that the Russian Presidential Administration despatched out a information to Russian mass media on the suitable method to downplay the severity of the harm to the bridge, and it’s potential that the Kremlin has ordered the Russian MoD to stay quiet concerning the state of affairs.[11] Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov said that Russia should provoke a strike marketing campaign on essential Ukrainian infrastructure as an alternative of listening to Russian MoD guarantees.[12]

Some nationalist voices famous that Putin and his shut circle are failing to right away deal with the assault on a symbolic bridge, voicing direct criticism of Putin for the primary time. A milblogger warned that if Putin fails to undertake retaliatory actions it “might be mistaken for the weak spot of the president himself.”[13] One other milblogger famous that it’s hypocritical for the Kremlin to name on Russians to rally behind Putin if he’s unable to touch upon important occasions such because the Moskva sinking, prisoner exchanges together with Azovstal fighters, or the collapse of the Kharkiv frontline.[14] Others criticized the silence of Russian Deputy Chairman of the Safety Council Dmitry Medvedev concerning the explosion, on condition that Medvedev had made a number of statements defining any assaults on the Kerch Bridge as a violation of Russian ”crimson strains.”[15] Russian milbloggers and propagandists alike referred to as on the Kremlin to renew strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure and notably didn’t make any requires Russia to make use of tactical nuclear weapons towards Ukraine.

Ukrainian and Russian sources claimed that the Kremlin focused some greater army command figures following the Kerch Bridge explosion, however these experiences stay unverified as of this publication. The Ukrainian Primary Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin detained, arrested, and blocked unspecified army officers and ordered the models of the elite Dzerzhinsky Separate Operation Goal Division to enter Moscow on October 8.[16] Milbloggers who favor the Wagner Group claimed that the Kremlin has changed Russian Protection Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of Basic Employees Army Basic Valery Gerasimov supposedly with Tula Governor Alexey Dyumin and the deputy commander-in-chief of the bottom forces, Lieutenant Basic Alexander Matovnikov, respectfully.[17] ISW can’t independently confirm both of those experiences right now.

The Kremlin named the Russian Commander of the Aerospace Forces, Army Basic Sergey Surovikin, the brand new commander of the Russian operation in Ukraine, and this appointment has generated constructive suggestions inside the nationalist neighborhood. Sorovikin beforehand commanded the “southern” group of forces in Ukraine and was reportedly answerable for the seize of Lysychansk in July.[18] Milbloggers shared their pleasure concerning Surovikin’s appointment, noting that Surovikin has the “powerful” character essential to regain the initiative in Ukraine.[19] Wagner financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin extravagantly praised Surovikin as a result of he “acquired right into a tank and rushed to avoid wasting” the Soviet Union throughout the 1991 coup try in Moscow.[20] Prigozhin’s interview additional confirmed experiences of a fissure between pro-war and “liberal” factions inside the Kremlin, which ISW will think about in additional element in subsequent experiences.

Key Takeaways

A big-scale explosion severely broken the Kerch Strait Bridge that hyperlinks occupied Crimea with Russia.
The Kremlin named the Russian Commander of the Aerospace Forces, Army Basic Sergey Surovikin, the brand new commander of the Russian operation in Ukraine, and this appointment has generated constructive suggestions inside the nationalist neighborhood.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts.
Russian forces continued establishing defensive positions in northern Kherson Oblast.
Russian forces continued to assault settlements round Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and west of Donetsk Metropolis.
Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to shoot down Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones.
Russian federal topics are dealing with monetary challenges in funding mobilization.
Russian and occupation administration officers continued measures to take away Ukrainian kids from their properties in Russian-occupied territories.

We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those prison actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these experiences.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Japanese Ukraine
Russian Primary Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and two supporting efforts);
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort—Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Drive Technology Efforts
Actions in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Japanese Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations from Kharkiv Oblast within the route of Svatove on October 8. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults southeast of Kupyansk.[21] The Head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Oleg Synehubov, reported that Russian forces continued to shell Kupyansk and surrounding settlements.[22] Russian forces continued routine artillery, air, and missile strikes in japanese Ukraine within the neighborhood of Kharkiv Metropolis, Bohodukhiv, and close to Izyum.[23]

Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations within the Kreminna route on October 8. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces trying to cross the Zherebets River at an unspecified location.[24] The Donetsk Individuals’s Republic (DNR) Individuals’s Militia claimed that Russian forces preserve full management over the Kreminna-Svatove freeway, regardless of earlier experiences of Ukrainian forces working within the space.[25] The Russian MoD additionally claimed that Russian airstrikes hit two Ukrainian concentrations of manpower south of Kreminna close to Siversk and west of Kreminna close to Yampilivka.[26] The Russian MoD is more and more together with tactical particulars about Ukrainian forces in its claims, doubtless in response to Russian milblogger criticism that they don’t report sufficient on Ukrainian advances. ISW makes no try to judge the veracity of the small print the Russian MoD presents in regards to the sizes, echelons, designations, or forms of Ukrainian models and won’t current these particulars in our experiences.

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces are persevering with to undergo personnel losses in Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported on October 8 that Russian forces transported 300 wounded personnel to a hospital in Luhansk Oblast.[27]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Russian forces continued establishing defensive positions in Kherson Oblast on October 8. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces continued to shell areas alongside the road of contact to forestall Ukrainian advances and started establishing new defensive strains within the Beryslav and Nova Kakhovka Raions.[28] A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces are persevering with to consolidate alongside the entrance line close to Davydiv Brid and Mala Oleksandrivka and are equipping strongholds in Bezimenne, all close to the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River.[29] ISW doesn’t try and validate Russian forecasts of potential Ukrainian operations and gives no touch upon their plausibility.

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported ongoing battles north and northwest of Kherson Metropolis, close to the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and northeast of Beryslav on October 8. The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian floor assault close to Ternovy Pody, roughly 20km northwest of Kherson Metropolis.[30] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to advance within the space of Davydiv Brid and Mala Oleksandrivka close to the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River.[31] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian makes an attempt to advance close to Sukhanove, Pyatikhatki, Sadok, Ishchenka, Burskynske, Shchaslyve, and Mala Seidemynykha on the northern Kherson Oblast frontline.[32] A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces retook Pravdyne, 33km northwest of Kherson Metropolis.[33] A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian floor assault close to Dudchany on the western financial institution of the Dnipro River.[34] The Donetsk Individuals’s Republic (DNR) claimed that Russian forces preserve positions in Snihurivka, Mykolaiv Oblast, roughly 60km east of Mykolaiv Metropolis, and reported ongoing preventing on the outskirts of the settlement.[35]

Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction marketing campaign in Kherson Oblast to help their southern counteroffensive on October 8. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces struck three Russian concentrations of manpower and gear and a logistics level in Beryslav Raion.[36] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command additionally reported that Ukrainian aviation struck Russian anti-aircraft techniques in Beryslav and Kakhovka Raions.[37] Geolocated pictures present that Ukrainian forces doubtless hit 5 gasoline storage amenities close to Kyselivka, Bilozerskyi Raion.[38] Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down a Russian Orlan-10 drone in Chervone, Beryslav Raion.[39] The Russian MoD claimed that land and maritime logistics routes are constantly provisioning Russian forces working within the Mykolaiv-Kryvyi Rih and Zaporizhia instructions, nevertheless.[40]

Russian Primary Effort—Japanese Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Primary Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued conducting floor assaults all through Donetsk Oblast on October 8. The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian floor assaults on and round Bakhmut close to Vyimka, Bilohorivka, Bakhmutske, and Krasna Hora to the north and Mayorsk, Ozeryanivka, Zaitseve, Odradivka, and Andriivka to the south.[41] A Russian milblogger referred to current Russian-claimed features south of Bakhmut of Zaitseve and Vesela Dolyna as a “tactical success.”[42] ISW first reported on Russian floor assaults towards Zaitseve and Vesela Dolyna on August 5 and July 13 respectively, noting that Russian forces have taken over two months to have the ability to declare to have secured two small villages.[43] The Ukrainian Basic Employees additionally reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian floor assaults round Avdiivka close to Pervomaiske, Vesele, Kamianka, and Nevelske, and in western Donetsk Oblast close to Pobieda, Krasnohorivka, and Novomykhailivka.[44] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack at an unspecified location within the “South Donetsk” route, presumably referring to the Vuhledar, western Donetsk Oblast space, however there’s presently no impartial affirmation of the Russian MoD’s definition of this operational route.[45]

Ukrainian forces doubtless carried out strikes towards railway stations within the Russian rear in Donetsk Oblast on October 8. The DNR claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a railway station in Ilovaisk, Donetsk Oblast, damaging three diesel gasoline tanks for trains and a technical space of the station.[46] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the Karan railway station in Andriivka, Donetsk Oblast, roughly 51km north of Mariupol.[47] Geolocated footage reveals smoke rising from the station space with audible secondary detonations, doubtless from ammunition.[48]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to conduct routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on October 8.[49] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces attacked Zaporizhzhia Metropolis, Mykolaiv Metropolis, Ochakiv, and areas of Odesa Oblast with Shahed-136 kamikaze drones however said that Ukrainian forces efficiently shot them down.[50] Russian forces continued artillery fireplace and drone strikes towards infrastructure in Nikopol and Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on the north financial institution of the Dnipro River.[51] The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported that Ukrainian forces shelled Russian manpower and gear concentrations within the areas of Polohy and Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast, and that Russian forces suffered at the least 85 casualties.[52]

Russian and Ukrainian sources traded accusations of shelling the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP) in a single day on October 7-8.[53] Russian and Ukrainian officers and the Worldwide Atomic Power Company said that the shelling lower off the exterior vitality provide to the ZNPP after engineers had simply restored the exterior energy line on October 7.[54] Ukrainian Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov later said that engineers restored energy to Enerhodar and the encompassing settlements on October 8.[55] Russian Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov said that Russian atomic vitality company Rosatom has already began the method of integrating the ZNPP into the Russian energy grid.[56]

Mobilization and Drive Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Increase fight energy with out conducting basic mobilization)

The monetary, logistical, and political challenges of supporting the Russian mobilization course of proceed to gasoline societal division inside Russia and criticism of the federal government. The Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Protection (MOD) threat alienating core supporters together with these supportive of mobilization by failing to handle inconsistencies and inadequacies within the implementation of mobilization.

The massive-scale removing of Russian males of working age (both by means of mobilization or by means of their flight) has left holes within the positions they previously stuffed. A Russian supply reported on October 6 that the Russian Ministry of Pure Sources proposed to exempt rubbish collectors and rubbish truck drivers from mobilization.[57] Forbes reported on October 6 that Russian sports activities facilities once more petitioned authorities for an exemption to mobilization for coaches and instructors, as mobilization applies to 70% of males employed within the trade.[58] Moms caring for kids after the mobilization of their husbands may even face higher non-work calls for on their time. A Russian supply reported on October 6 that the Liberal Democratic Occasion drafted a invoice authorizing the discount of labor hours for moms with mobilized husbands to 35 hours every week at prior salaries.[59] Russian authorities seem to have acknowledged and tried to handle labor shortages brought on by mobilization. The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported on October 8 that native authorities in some Russian districts try to implement mobilization plans drawing on unemployed males of conscription age.[60] Nevertheless, the financial gaps left by the sudden removing of a part of the Russian workforce are prone to proceed to create problems.

Funding mobilization poses an financial problem to Russian areas, as ISW has beforehand reported.[61] Russian areas stability strain to ship on guarantees to the mobilized whereas remaining inside their means. A neighborhood Russian supply reported on October 6 that Tartarstan Deputy Finance Minister Gela Gerasimova said that the finances of Tartarstan can’t finance mobilization. Gerasimova claimed mobilization will draw on the federal finances.[62] Omsk Governor Aleksandr Burkov said on October 7 that he discovered an unspecified method to pay every mobilized particular person 100,000 rubles ($1,603) after beforehand stating the area’s finances couldn’t afford such funds.[63] The prices of mobilization are prone to proceed nicely into 2023, and the long-term viability of such options is questionable.

Poor conduct demonstrated by conscripts delivered to coaching grounds has disturbed close by communities. A Russian supply reported on October 7 that residents of Mulino raised complaints that the mobilized despatched to Mulino coaching grounds drank closely and walked across the village. ISW has beforehand reported comparable complaints on this space.[64] Nizhny Novgorod Governor Gleb Nikitin has due to this fact banned the sale of alcohol throughout mobilization in Mulino.[65]

Reviews from October 6 and seven present a sequence of girls throughout Russia recording video messages asking for assist in response to their husbands’ unlawful mobilization.[66] ISW has beforehand reported an ongoing sample of mobilization of Russians with disqualifying well being and private circumstances.[67] Fontanka Saint Petersburg reported on October 6 {that a} housewife in Krasnogvardeysky District, Saint Petersburg, acquired a mobilization discover.[68] This report is the primary that ISW has recognized detailing the mobilization of a girl with out point out of a related work background.

Mobilized troopers additionally proceed to face excessive situations. A Russian information supply counted 15 deaths among the many mobilized from varied areas previous to deployment to Ukraine as of October 7.[69]

Discrepancies within the degree of public concern for newly mobilized models as in comparison with contract troopers have doubtless created a rift in Russian society. Ukraine’s Primary Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) printed on October 8 a recording of a name between a contract Russian soldier and his mom. The mom complained that mobilized models face preferential remedy over volunteer and contract troopers who’ve been preventing for months. The mom argued that Russian contract troopers bought their very own gear and confronted the identical difficulties as newly mobilized troopers whereas the Russian public didn’t care in the identical method that they do in regards to the mobilized males. She additionally famous that contract troopers confronted such difficulties with out the 200,000-300,000-ruble ($3,207-4,811) bonus acquired by the mobilized. The mom instantly expressed discontent with the obvious unreachability of Putin on points associated to troopers’ well-being and questioned whether or not he “even [knows] the place our guys are?”[70] ISW can’t verify the extent of such dissatisfaction, however the rising concessions given to mobilized males in response to broad criticism of the mobilization effort might improve such emotions amongst contract troopers, volunteer troopers, and their households.

Deputy Russian Minister of Protection Viktor Goremykin deflected criticism that the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) is severely undersupplying troopers by claiming on October 7 that the Russian Armed Forces “have every little thing essential to offer for each servicemember in full.”[71] Widespread experiences of Russian mobilized models being compelled to buy their very own gear and clothes, going for days with no meals or water, and requesting donations from Russian society contradict Goremykin’s assertion.[72] Russian army bloggers publicly mocked Goremykin’s false declare and marveled on the potential of the Russian MoD to proceed denying apparent logistical issues. One Russian army blogger claimed that the Russian MoD prioritizes “makes an attempt to create an exterior gloss” above the lives of troopers and above the necessity to win.[73] One other army blogger said that it’s now not potential to interchange actuality with lovely experiences.[74] Blatantly false claims lower basic perception within the credibility of the Russian MoD and contribute to the rising narrative of MoD incompetence.

Russian authorities seem like avoiding prosecution of males avoiding army summonses. Russian lawyer Pavel Chikov posted to Telegram on October 7 that the Penza Prosecutor’s Workplace canceled the primary prison case for evasion of mobilization beneath Article 328 of the Russian prison code after launching the case two days earlier than.[75] Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Laws and State Constructing Head Andrey Klishas said on October 7 that it’s illegal to threaten residents with prison legal responsibility beneath Article 328 for refusal to mobilize.[76] Such responses might signify a response to public strain or challenges in prosecuting all mobilization dodgers. They may additionally signify the will to attempt mobilization dodgers beneath various articles or proceed makes an attempt to power dodgers to mobilize fairly than sit in jail.

Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance techniques)

Russian and occupation administration officers continued to extend filtration and regulation enforcement measures in Russian-occupied territories on October 8. The Ukrainian Resistance Heart reported on October 8 that Russian forces proceed filtration actions close to positions struck by Ukrainian forces to seek out suspected Ukrainian partisans that they imagine to be offering Ukrainian forces with the positions of Russian manpower and gear concentrations.[77] Russian media reported that Russian forces in Russian-occupied Melitopol have elevated avenue inspections of residents’ paperwork.[78] The Ukrainian Resistance Heart reported that Russian and occupation administration officers launched a Telegram chatbot for experiences on the situation of Ukrainian partisans within the Russian-occupied territories.[79] The middle additionally reported that Russian Federal Safety Service (FSB) personnel more and more query residents in filtration facilities about their participation within the annexation referenda that had been held in Russian-occupied territories in late September.[80] Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov claimed that occupation administration officers are deporting residents with pro-Ukrainian sentiments and transporting them to the Vasylivka border checkpoint, however that Russian forces are nonetheless not permitting residents to cross by means of into Ukrainian-held Zaporizhia Oblast.[81] Russian and occupation administration officers are prone to improve filtration and regulation enforcement actions as Ukrainian counteroffensives progress.

Russian and occupation administration officers continued measures to take away Ukrainian kids from their properties in Russian-occupied territories on October 8. The Head of the Kherson Occupation Administration Vladimir Saldo reported that Russian-occupied Crimea agreed to take over 5,000 kids from Kherson Oblast “on trip” and that 1,500 of these kids have already arrived in Crimea.[82] Vladimir Saldo additionally introduced that the governors of Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai said that their administrations are prepared to just accept as much as 10,000 kids from Kherson Oblast. Saldo didn’t specify a length for such gives or “holidays.”[83] Vladimir Saldo said that the kids’s mother and father would be capable to be a part of their kids within the territories to which they’re despatched.[84]

Notice: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the idea for these experiences. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://twitter.com/Maxar/standing/1578853400195629056; https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/standing/1578784718228975617

[2] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/standing/1578669310066950144; https://t.me…

[3] https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/standing/1578632284173131776?s=20&t=0kI…

[4] https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/866921; https://www.fb.com/watch/?v=821458139007933; https://twitter.com/…

[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/08/world/europe/ukraine-crimea-bridge-ex…

[6] https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/866921

[7] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/standing/1578707636656435200?s=20&t=kxWCPLN… https://t.me/rian_ru/180969

[8] https://t.me/Aksenov82/1559; https://t.me/Aksenov82/1558 ; https://t.me/rybar/39937

[9] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/66452; https://ria dot ru/20221008/putin-1822522699.html; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/66455

[10] https://t.me/mod_russia/20683

[11] https://meduza dot io/information/2022/10/08/ne-razrushen-a-vsego-lish-povrezhden-meduza-uznala-kak-administratsiya-prezidenta-rekomenduet-gosudarstvennymi-smi-pisat-o-vzryve-na-krymskom-mostu

[12] https://t.me/epoddubny/12837; https://t.me/SolovievLive/132592

[13] https://t.me/notes_veterans/5519

[14] https://t.me/bulbe_de_trones/2373

[15] https://t.me/grey_zone/15259; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/12534; https:…

[16] https://gur dot gov.ua/content material/v-moskvi-rozpochalys-areshty-viiskovykh.html

[17] https://t.me/grey_zone/15262

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign… https://t.me/mod_russia/17359

[19] https://t.me/rybar/39916; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/41380; https://t…

[20] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/1793; https://t.me/SolovievLive/132667; htt… https://t.me/boris_rozhin/66436

[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/20672

[22] https://t.me/synegubov/4453

[23] https://t.me/synegubov/4453