October 26, 7:30 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date each day alongside the static maps current on this report.
A Reuters investigation of a doc trove present in an deserted Russian command put up in Balakliya, Kharkiv Oblast, helps ISW’s longstanding assessments concerning the poor situation of Russian forces. ISW has lengthy assessed that the traditional Russian army in Ukraine is severely degraded and has largely misplaced offensive capabilities because the summer time of 2022, that Russian strategic commanders have been micromanaging operational commanders’ selections on tactical issues, and that Russian morale could be very low. Reuters’ investigation discovered that Russian items close to Balakliya had been severely understrength, with a fight battalion at 19.6-percent power and a reserve unit at 23-percent power.[i] The investigation discovered that poor morale, unhealthy logistics, and overbearing commanders contributed to Russian forces’ poor efficiency.[ii] The report discovered that the Russian Western Army District explicitly forbade a subordinate from withdrawing from an untenable place within the small village of Hrakove (which has an space of lower than three sq. kilometers).[iii] Ukrainian forces defeated Russian forces in Balakiya and routed Russian forces in jap Kharkiv Oblast round September 8-10.[iv]
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric signifies that he’s not all in favour of negotiating significantly with Ukraine and retains maximalist aims for the battle. Putin said that Ukraine has “misplaced sovereignty” in a gathering with Commonwealth of Unbiased States (CIS) safety officers on October 26.[v] Putin said that america is utilizing Ukraine as a “battering ram” in opposition to Russia, the Russian-Belarusian Union State, the Collective Safety Treaty Group, and the CIS. Russian State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin amplified this narrative, stating that “Ukraine has misplaced the flexibility to exist as a state,” “Ukraine is occupied by NATO,” and “[Ukraine] has change into a colony of the US” on October 26.[vi] This language is incompatible with negotiations on an equal foundation for a ceasefire, not to mention a decision to the battle that Russia started. It as a substitute strongly means that the Kremlin nonetheless seeks a army victory in Ukraine and regime change in Kyiv that might have an effect on the everlasting reorientation of Ukraine away from the West and into Russia’s management. It additionally signifies that Putin’s goals transcend the territory he has claimed to have annexed, not to mention the areas his forces really management.
Russian occupation officers in Kherson Oblast try to mitigate the informational penalties of the chaos of the preliminary Russian withdrawals from the west financial institution of the Dnipro River. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo said on October 26 that it might be “virtually not possible” to fully destroy the dam on the Kakhovka hydroelectric energy plant (HPP) and that even the destruction of the dam locks on the HPP would solely trigger the water stage of the Dnipro River to rise lower than 2 meters.[vii] Saldo’s assertion immediately contradicts his personal prior statements and the warnings made by Commander of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine Army Normal Sergey Surovikin on October 18 that Ukraine is planning to strike the Kakhovka HPP and trigger flood injury alongside the Dnipro River.[viii] Saldo’s obvious retraction of his personal warnings might recommend that he seeks to quell anxiousness accompanying the mass motion of civilians and Russian army and occupation components throughout the Dnipro in an effort to protect his personal potential to rule. Saldo additionally issued assurances concerning the provision of primary utilities and monetary providers that he claimed will proceed whilst evacuations to the east financial institution are ongoing.[ix] Saldo’s statements point out that his administration is trying to mitigate panic within the info area, doubtless in an effort to preserve management of the inhabitants of Kherson Oblast in opposition to the backdrop of ongoing evacuations.
Russian forces performed an assault on Ternova, Kharkiv Oblast, more likely to repair Ukrainian forces there and stop them from reinforcing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations elsewhere. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported on October 26 that Ukrainian forces repelled an assault on Ternova (40km northeast of Kharkiv metropolis) which is effectively faraway from areas encompassed by the jap Ukrainian counteroffensive.[x] Russian forces doubtless don’t intend to regain restricted territory in border areas of Kharkiv Oblast however as a substitute doubtless hope to maintain Ukrainian forces within the space that in any other case may be part of counteroffensive operations. Russian forces are doubtless hoping for the same consequence in northwestern Ukraine with their deployment of forces to the joint grouping of forces in Belarus and the messaging round it.
Russian officers continued to confess that Russia is deporting kids to Russia underneath the guise of adoption and trip schemes. Russian media reported on October 26 that the Russian Commissioner for Youngsters’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, adopted a Ukrainian baby who was deported from Mariupol to Russia.[xi] Lvova-Belova claimed that Russian officers have introduced 31 kids from Mariupol to Russia and that her workplace is working to “rehabilitate” Ukrainian kids from lively fight zones. As ISW has beforehand reported, the pressured adoption of Ukrainian kids into Russian households might represent a violation of the Conference on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[xii]
Russia can be persevering with to make use of the excuse of leisure journeys to deport Ukrainian kids to Russia and Russian-occupied territory. Member of the Zaporizhia occupation administration Vladimir Rogov reported on October 26 that over 500 kids from Enerhodar went on “trip” in Yevpatoria, Crimea and Anapa, Krasnodar Krai this 12 months alone.[xiii] Rogov claimed that the youngsters acquired “new data” as a part of the “academic program.”[xiv] Russian-appointed governor of Sevastopol Mikhail Razvozhaev equally claimed that kids from occupied Kherson Metropolis and Enerhodar took half in “excursions” in Sevastopol.[xv] These reviews are in step with ISW‘s earlier observations that Russian officers have used the veneer of such recreation and rehabilitation packages to justify the deportation of Ukrainian kids to Russian-controlled territory and areas of the Russian Federation.[xvi]
On October 26, Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin denied ISW’s report that Prigozhin confronted Putin and different siloviki factions within the Kremlin relating to the progress of the Russian battle in Ukraine.[xvii] Prigozhin explicitly denied ISW’s October 25 evaluation and falsely insinuated that ISW receives labeled intelligence. ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the idea for these reviews. ISW particularly doesn’t obtain info from Prigozhin’s deceased mother-in-law, as he (sarcastically) recommended.
Key Takeaways
- A Reuters investigation of Russian paperwork from Balakliya helps earlier ISW assessments concerning the poor circumstances of Russian forces.
- Putin said that Ukraine has “misplaced its sovereignty” in an October 26 speech indicating that Russia doubtless retains its maximalist aims in Ukraine and stays immune to negotiations.
- Russian occupation officers in Kherson Oblast try to mitigate the informational penalties of the Russian withdrawal from the west financial institution of the Dnipro River.
- Russian forces try to repair Ukrainian forces on Ukraine’s northern border.
- Russian officers continued to acknowledge that Russian authorities are deporting Ukrainian kids to Russia underneath the guise of adoption and trip schemes.
- Yevgeny Prigozhin denied a earlier ISW evaluation that said he confronted Putin and different siloviki factions relating to the progress of the battle in Ukraine.
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces performed counteroffensive operations west of Svatove.
- Russian forces continued to arrange defensive positions on the west and east banks of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in northwest Kherson Oblast.
- Russian forces performed floor assaults in Donetsk Oblast.
- The Russian army is reportedly trying to recruit foreigners to assist its battle effort in Ukraine.
- Russian occupation officers in Kherson Oblast continued to relocate residents from the west financial institution of the Dnipro River.
We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity though we don’t describe them in these reviews.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Japanese Ukraine
- Russian Principal Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Russian Subordinate Principal Effort—Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Power Technology Efforts
- Actions in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Japanese Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops performed counteroffensive operations west of Svatove on October 26. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 5 consecutive and unsuccessful assaults towards Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove) from Pishchane (23km northwest of Svatove).[xviii] A number of milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a number of tried Ukrainian assaults towards Svatove.[xix] One other distinguished milblogger posted a map that signifies that Ukrainian forces have superior as much as Dzherelne, about 16km due west of Svatove.[xx]
Russian sources claimed that Russian troops regained misplaced positions west of the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 26. A Russian milblogger reported that items of the third Motor Rifle Division of the twentieth Mixed Arms Army captured positions in Makiivka (20km northwest of Kreminna) and Novosadove (15km northwest of Kreminna) and pushed Ukrainian troops out of positions south of Makiivka alongside the jap financial institution of the Zherebets River.[xxi] One other Russian milblogger claimed that combating northwest of Kreminna has paused attributable to poor climate and muddy circumstances however famous that Russian forces are holding Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna) and that Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna) is a “gray zone.”[xxii] Nevertheless, footage posted to social media on October 26 reveals a Ukrainian soldier elevating a flag in Nevske, indicating that Ukrainian troops doubtless have taken management of the settlement, and Russian sources are attempting to obfuscate the achieve.[xxiii] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian troops repelled tried Ukrainian assaults in the direction of Bilohorivka, 10km south of Kreminna.[xxiv]
Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
Russian forces continued to arrange for the defensive on each the west and east banks of the Dnipro River on October 26. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces are persevering with to arrange defensive positions on the east financial institution of the Dnipro River.[xxv] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported that Russian forces in Nova Kakhovka are making ready defenses within the metropolis for avenue combating.[xxvi] Russian sources reported that Russian forces are constructing fortifications in Kherson Metropolis and creating strongholds in case of future Ukrainian breakthroughs, with one supply calling the fortifications the “Surovikin Line.”[xxvii] Nova Kakhovka notably lies on the east financial institution of the Dnipro River, making Russian preparations for combating within the metropolis distinction with Russian claims that Russian forces intend to carry Kherson Metropolis and the west financial institution of the Dnipro. This may occasionally additionally point out that Russian forces anticipate battles to happen on the east financial institution of the Dnipro River in Russian-occupied territory deeper in Kherson Oblast. Geolocated footage from October 26 reveals a resident complaining about Russian forces withdrawing to the east financial institution of the Koshevaya River (5km southwest of Kherson Metropolis).[xxviii] These continued reviews of Russian withdrawals from the world recommend that the Russian army doesn’t anticipate to carry Kherson Metropolis even when it intends to struggle for it.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in northwestern Kherson Oblast on October 26. Russian sources claimed that items of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) and the forty second Motorized Rifle Division of the 58th Mixed Arms Army repelled a Ukrainian assault towards Ischenka within the neighborhood of Davydiv Brid.[xxix] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces additionally repelled Ukrainian assaults north of the Beryslav-Nova Kakhovka space close to Bruskynske (39km northwest of Beryslav), Piatykhatky (38km north of Beryslav), and Koshara (32km north of Beryslav) in northwestern Kherson Oblast.[xxx] Components of the Russian eleventh Guards Air Assault Brigade are reportedly working in northeastern Kherson Oblast, doubtless close to or within the Beryslav Raion.[xxxi]
Ukrainian army officers largely maintained operation silence relating to Ukrainian floor maneuvers in Kherson Oblast on October 26. Ukraine’s Southern Operational command famous that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian try to interrupt by Ukrainian traces in an unspecified route on October 25.[xxxii] Ukrainian army sources additionally reiterated that Ukrainian troops are persevering with their interdiction marketing campaign to focus on Russian focus areas in Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces performed greater than 150 hearth missions within the Southern Bug route on October 26 however didn’t specify any Russian targets that had been struck.[xxxiii]
Russian Principal Effort—Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Principal Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued floor assaults in Donetsk Oblast on October 26. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian assaults on Bakhmut itself, northeast of Bakhmut round Bakhmutske (10km northeast of Bakhmut) and Soledar (12km northeast of Bakhmut), and south of Bakhmut round Ivanhrad (4km south of Bakhmut), Kurdiumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut), and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[xxxiv] Russian sources additionally reported that Russian troops performed assaults round Soledar and different settlements northeast of Bakhmut.[xxxv] The Ukrainian Normal Employees additionally reported that Ukrainian forces repelled restricted Russian assaults north and west of Donetsk Metropolis and in western Donetsk Oblast.[xxxvi] Russian sources claimed that Russian troops have made restricted positive aspects northwest of Donetsk Metropolis and have taken management of half of Vodiane (10km northwest of Donetsk Metropolis).[xxxvii] Russian forces in any other case performed routine artillery strikes round Bakhmut, the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis space, and in western Donetsk Oblast.[xxxviii]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions and safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued to conduct routine air, missile, and artillery strikes west of Hulyaipole, and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts on October 26.[xxxix] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Dnipro and Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Bereznehuvate in Mykolaiv Oblast.[xl] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast head Valentyn Reznichenko reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down a Shahed-136 drone over Nikopol on October 26.[xli] A Russian milbogger posted a picture of Russian Principal Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Spetsnaz supposedly working in Zaporizhia Oblast on October 26.[xlii]
Mobilization and Power Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Develop fight energy with out conducting normal mobilization)
The Russian army is reportedly attempting to leverage foreigners to assist its battle in Ukraine. International Coverage reported on October 25 that Russian actors—reportedly of Russia’s Wagner Group—are contacting members of the US-trained Afghan Nationwide Army Commando Corps to recruit them to hitch a Russian “international legion” to struggle in Ukraine.[xliii] International Coverage reported that many of those well-trained former troopers have been in hiding because the Taliban took management of Afghanistan in 2021 and are with out secure jobs or private safety, which signifies that as much as 10,000 of those commandos could also be weak to Russian presents. The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported that Belarusian army commissariats in Gomel Oblast mobilized Belarusian drivers and mechanics to restore Russian army gear in Belarus.[xliv] The Kremlin doubtless seeks to reinforce its battle effort with international components as Russian fight forces proceed to face acute personnel shortages.
Native Russian army commissariats proceed to contradict Russian regional governors. Army Commissar of Crimea Yevgeny Kutuzov promised that Crimea would full its partial mobilization by November 1, in time for the beginning of the autumn conscription cycle, as ISW beforehand forecasted.[xlv] Russian occupation Governor of Crimea Sergey Aksenov said that mobilization actions in Crimea ended on September 25.[xlvi] Fissures between regional Russian officers, the Russian Ministry of Protection and army commissariats, and the Russian civilian inhabitants from which mobilized forces are drawn will doubtless intensify within the coming months.[xlvii]
Russian sources are complaining that the Russian Ministry of Protection will not be sustaining contact with Russian forces and prisoners of battle (POWs) in Ukraine. Russian journalist Anastasia Kashevarova wrote a public criticism on October 26 that a whole Russian firm of mobilized males of the fifty fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade working close to Svatove are with out command.[xlviii] 13 Russian mobilized males in a platoon of the fifteenth Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 2nd Guards Taman Motorized Rifle Division filmed a video through which they said they hid in an empty home close to Svatove after their unit’s defeat. The lads report that they had no reference to their firm commander or the remainder of command.[xlix] A Russian milblogger complained that Russian officers are abandoning Russian POWs in Ukraine and implored Russian authorities to do one thing to assist Russian POWs.[l]
The UK Ministry of Protection (UKMOD) seemingly attributed an October 24 assault focusing on a Russian rail line in Bryansk Oblast to a Russian anti-war group.[li] Unknown actors destroyed a section of rail in Novozybykovo, Bryansk Oblast, about 15 km from the Russian-Belarusian border, with an explosive machine on October 24.[lii] The UKMOD reported {that a} Russian anti-war group referred to as “Cease the Wagons” claimed accountability for the assault and didn’t present any additional remark.[liii] Belarusian opposition components reportedly have performed sabotage in opposition to Belarusian railways since February.[liv] Russian army mobilization could also be selling related actions from disaffected Russians.
Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance methods)
Russian and occupation administration officers in Kherson Oblast continued to relocate residents from the west financial institution of the Dnipro River to the east financial institution on October 26. Kherson occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed on October 26 that Russian and occupation authorities have relocated 70,000 residents from the west financial institution of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast prior to now week.[lv] Saldo claimed that 40,000 Kherson residents have resettled on the east financial institution of the Dnipro River and an unspecified quantity have resettled in different Russian-occupied territories and the Russian Federation itself.[lvi] Kherson occupation administration deputy head Kirill Stremousov claimed on October 25 that occupation authorities had relocated 22,000 residents from the west financial institution.[lvii] Stremousov additionally said that the Kherson occupation administration’s resettlement program was designed to accommodate 60,000 residents.[lviii] The discrepancies between Saldo and Stremousov’s claimed figures underscore the chaotic nature through which occupation and Russian officers are relocating residents. Saldo might have launched a determine that’s reflective of the ultimate variety of residents that Russian and occupation officers intend to relocate from the west financial institution of the Dnipro River. Russian and occupation officers will doubtless enhance efforts to relocate residents from the west financial institution because the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast progresses.
Word: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the idea for these reviews. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
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