November 1, 8:30 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Iran plans to ship extra fight drones and new ballistic missile techniques to Russia to be used in Ukraine, doubtless additional strengthening Russia’s reliance on Iranian-made weapon techniques. The Ukrainian Most important Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 1 that Iranian officers intend to ship a cargo of greater than 200 Shahed-136, Mohajer-6, and Arash-2 fight drones to Russia.[1] The GUR reported that Iran will ship Russia the drones in a disassembled state and that Russian personnel will assemble them with Russian markings.[2] CNN reported on November 1 that unnamed officers from a western nation that carefully screens Iranian weapons packages acknowledged that Iran plans to ship a thousand weapons to Russia by the tip of the yr, together with surface-to-surface short-range ballistic missiles and fight drones.[3] This might be the primary confirmed occasion of Iran sending Russia superior precision-guided missiles. Russia doubtless negotiated the extra Iranian cargo of weapons techniques because of the depletion of its stockpile of cruise missile and drone techniques over the course of the struggle in Ukraine, notably throughout the Russian marketing campaign towards Ukrainian essential infrastructure. The GUR reported that Ukrainian air defenses have shot down greater than 300 Shahed-136 drones since Russia beginning utilizing them in Ukraine on September 13.[4] Russia will doubtless proceed to make use of drone assaults and missile strikes towards essential infrastructure to attempt to offset the failures and limitations of its typical forces on the frontline. Russian dependence on Iranian-made techniques, and due to this fact on Iran, will doubtless enhance.
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) began its semi-annual fall conscription drive on November 1, amidst reviews of constant covert mobilization all through the nation. Russian Protection Minister Sergey Shoigu introduced that 2,700 draft committees throughout 85 federal topics started the autumn conscription call-up of 120,000 males.[5] Shoigu additionally acknowledged that partial mobilization in Russia concluded. Head of the Most important Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the Russian Basic Workers, Yevgeniy Burdinsky, reiterated that Russia is conscripting 7,500 fewer males than in earlier years and famous that partial mobilization postponed the conscription cycle by one month.[6] Burdinsky claimed that conscripts won’t serve in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, or Zaporizhia oblasts this yr and won’t take part in fight. Head of the 4th Directorate of the Most important Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the Russian Basic Workers Vladimir Tsimlyansky added that almost all recruits will deploy to coaching formations and army items the place they are going to practice for 5 months, whereas others will obtain specializations primarily based on their abilities and schooling degree.[7] The Russian MoD has performed semi-annual conscription call-ups for many years and will be capable of execute this course of successfully and effectively. Any issues with the execution of the autumn call-up would doubtless point out that partial mobilization and the struggle in Ukraine have difficult a normal process.
Quite a few Russian sources reported that Russian enlistment officers are persevering with to mobilize males regardless of Shoigu’s earlier bulletins of the conclusion of partial mobilization and transition into the conscription interval on October 28. Native Russian retailers reported situations of males receiving mobilization notices in Tyumen and St. Petersburg as of October 31.[8] The Russian Central Navy District (CMD) reportedly instructed journalists of a Russian outlet that mobilization processes will proceed throughout Russia till Russian President Vladimir Putin indicators a decree ending the mobilization interval.[9] Ukrainian Melitopol and Mariupol authorities additionally reported that Russian occupation authorities are persevering with to coerce Ukrainians into volunteer battalions and territorial protection items.[10]
Commander of the eighth Mixed Arms Army of the Southern Navy District (SMD) Lieutenant-Basic Andrey Mordvichev reportedly changed Colonel-Basic Alexander Lapin as commander of the Central Navy District (CMD). A number of Russian milbloggers—together with some who seem on Russian state tv—famous that Mordichev has changed Lapin on this place, however the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) has not formally introduced Mordichev’s appointment nor Lapin’s dismissal as of November 1.[11] A Russian native outlet citing an unnamed official throughout the Russian MoD claimed that Mordichev will solely change Lapin because the commander of the “heart“ forces in Ukraine at some stage in Lapin’s supposed three-week medical go away.[12] A milblogger who ceaselessly seems on Russian state media claimed that the Commander of the Russian Forces in Ukraine, Army Basic Sergey Surovikin, personally appointed Mordichev to interchange Lapin resulting from his dedication to goal frontline reporting.[13] If reviews of Mordichev’s appointment are true, then the Kremlin could also be making an attempt to appease the pro-war milblogger group that has been demanding transparency and extra trustworthy reporting. The milblogger added that Mordichev reportedly has “heat working relations” with Chechen chief Ramzan Kadyrov, and that Kadyrov known as Mordichev “the very best commander” throughout their assembly in mid-March.[14] Mordichev’s appointment might due to this fact point out that the Kremlin is making an attempt to appease the siloviki faction—composed of Kadyrov and Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin—that has publicly criticized Lapin as properly.[15] Lapin’s dismissal might have additionally been Surovikin’s advice as properly, nevertheless, provided that each commanders operated within the Luhansk Oblast space to grab Lysychansk and its environment in June.[16] ISW can’t independently confirm milblogger or Russian native outlet reviews right now.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin is probably going making an attempt to handle critiques towards his parallel army buildings following Lapin’s reported dismissal. Prigozhin defended his mercenaries towards unspecified “tens of 1000’s of critics,” stating that his Wagner mercenaries are dying whereas critics are refusing to go to the frontlines.[17] Prigozhin has been responding to quite a few inquiries in current days relating to Wagner items struggling losses or dealing with outbreaks of infectious ailments amongst prisoner recruits, however his assaults towards Lapin have prompted some throughout the pro-war group to publicly query his authority.[18] Many Russian milbloggers who had defended Lapin closely criticized Prigozhin’s feedback in regards to the Russian greater army command, with one milblogger stating that “shepherds and cooks,” sarcastically referring to Chechen chief Ramzan Kadyrov and Prigozhin, couldn’t assess Lapin’s efficiency.[19] ISW has additionally beforehand famous that Prigozhin’s items haven’t made important features round Bakhmut since June.[20]
Prigozhin is probably going making an attempt to cut back the looks that he would possibly develop into too highly effective, stating that he has no plans to carry political workplace and would refuse such a place if supplied.[21] Prigozhin additionally added that he doesn’t contemplate himself to be a frontrunner of public opinion and doesn’t have interaction in “showdowns” with Russian officers, regardless of persevering with to publicly assault St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov and repeatedly calling for his resignation.[22] Prigozhin added that he’s not competing with Beglov within the St-Petersburg enterprise sphere.
Key Takeaways
- Deliberate Iranian shipments of drones and ballistic missiles to Russia will doubtless additional strengthen Russian reliance on Iran and Iranian-made weapons techniques.
- The Russian MoD began its semi-annual fall conscription cycle regardless of reviews of Russian authorities covertly persevering with mobilization measures.
- Commander of the 8th Mixed Arms Army of the Southern Navy District (SMD), Lieutenant-Basic Andrey Mordvichev, reportedly changed Colonel-Basic Alexander Lapin as commander of the Central Navy District (CMD).
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin is probably going making an attempt to handle critiques towards his parallel army buildings following Lapin’s reported dismissal.
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations within the instructions of Svatove and Kreminna.
- Russian forces continued defensive preparations whereas Ukrainian forces performed counteroffensive operations in Kherson Oblast.
- Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations round Bakhmut and round Donetsk Metropolis.
- Russian forces continued to strengthen Russian management over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant.
- Russian army buildings are reportedly increasing coaching capabilities.
- Russian occupation officers continued to set circumstances for the long-term and everlasting relocation of residents from the east financial institution of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to guage and report on the results of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these reviews.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Japanese Ukraine
- Russian Most important Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Russian Subordinate Most important Effort—Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts
- Actions in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Japanese Ukraine: (Japanese Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations within the path of Svatove on November 1. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults northwest of Svatove within the instructions of Mykolaivka and Kuzemivka (14km northwest of Svatove) in Luhansk Oblast and close to Orlyanske, Kharkiv Oblast (30km northwest of Svatove).[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces additionally launched a preemptive strike towards Ukrainian forces making ready to renew a counteroffensive within the path of Orlyanske and claimed that unsuccessful Ukrainian assaults from the path of Kupyansk prior to now weeks have value Ukrainian forces important gear and manpower, which is forcing Ukrainian commanders to organize for Russian counterattacks within the path of Kupyansk.[24] One other Russian milblogger claimed that it could be extremely unlikely that Russian forces would be capable of launch an offensive within the Kupyansk path till late November or December.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces crossed the Zherebets River close to Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and are making ready to renew an assault on Russian positions within the space.[26] Russian sources claimed that Russian BARS (Fight Reserve) 13 and 16 detachments are at present defending areas within the Svatove path.[27] The BARS-13 commander reported that Ukrainian forces have elevated their grouping within the Svatove path and intend to take Svatove this week.[28]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations within the path of Kreminna on November 1. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces proceed to conduct offensive operations within the path of the Kreminna-Svatove freeway.[29] One other Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are making ready to conduct offensive operations towards Chervonopopivka to entry Kreminna from the north.[30] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces close to Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna) intend to launch offensives that may reduce off the freeway between Kreminna and Svatove.[31] One other Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces periodically launch counterattacks west of Kreminna close to Terny (17km northwest of Kreminna) and Torske (15km west of Kreminna) to constrain the actions of Ukrainian forces within the path of the freeway.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully tried to assault Kreminna from the path of Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna).[33] ISW can’t confirm these Russian claims. The Luhansk Oblast Administration confirmed on November 1 that Ukrainian forces recaptured Nevske.[34]
Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
Russian forces continued defensive preparations in Kherson Oblast on November 1. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian troops are persevering with lively defensive actions, conducting aerial reconnaissance, and forming defensive strains on the east financial institution (left) of the Dnipro River.[35] Residents reported that Russian forces are digging trenches and settling in for the protection of the east financial institution, together with alongside the Nova Kakhovka-Dnipryany-Korsunka line (on the east financial institution about 45km east of Kherson Metropolis), Hola Prystan (8km southwest of Kherson Metropolis) and as far south as Mykhailivka, which lies properly into Russian-occupied territory about 45km south of Kherson Metropolis.[36] Such reviews point out that Russian troops are making ready for protracted defensive operations on the east financial institution.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops continued counteroffensive operations in Kherson Oblast on November 1. Kherson occupation deputy Kirill Stremousov and different Russian sources claimed that Russian troops repelled an tried Ukrainian assault within the path of Beryslav.[37] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) equally claimed that Ukrainian troops unsuccessfully tried to advance in direction of Mylove (30km northeast of Beryslav), Sukhanove (32km north of Beryslav), the Bruskynske-Kostromka space (40km northwest of Beryslav), and Zeleny Hai (24km northwest of Kherson Metropolis).[38] ISW can’t independently confirm these Russian claims.
Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction marketing campaign towards Russian focus areas, logistics nodes, and army property in Kherson Oblast on November 1. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on October 31 that Ukrainian rocket and artillery items performed 180 fireplace missions towards Russian manpower and gear concentrations in Kherson Oblast and that Ukrainian aviation struck a Russian stronghold in Snihurivka, Mykolaiv Oblast.[39] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Head Yaroslav Yanushevich acknowledged that Ukrainian forces additionally hit Russian ammunition warehouses in Beryslav Raion.[40] Social media customers moreover reported explosions in Kozatske, close to Nova Kakhovka, on November 1.[41]
Russian Most important Effort—Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Most important Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations round Bakhmut on November 1. The Ukrainian Basic Workers notably didn’t point out particular Russian floor assaults round Bakhmut however famous that Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Bakhmut path on November 1.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that intense preventing is ongoing close to Opytne (about 3km southwest of Bakhmut) within the Kurdyumivka path.[43] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger additionally reported that fierce battles proceed within the outskirts of Soledar (13km northeast of Bakhmut) and Bakhmut as Wagner troops attempt to break via Ukrainian defenses.[44] Russian sources shared geolocated footage of close-quarters fight between Ukrainian forces and Wagner troops close to Zaitseve (8km southeast of Bakhmut).[45] Ukrainian troopers posted footage from settlements round Bakhmut and reported that Ukrainian forces continued to repel countless Russian assaults on Bakhmut and that Ukrainian troops are evacuating civilians in close by Klyshchiivka (about 9km southwest of Bakhmut).[46] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continued to conduct routine oblique fireplace alongside the contact line in Donetsk Oblast.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations on the northern, northwestern, and southwestern outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis on November 1. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Russian forces performed offensive operations within the Avdiivka path (15km northwest of Donetsk Metropolis) however didn’t additional specify the placement or nature of those operations.[48] The Donetsk Individuals’s Republic (DNR) militia claimed that it stormed Ukrainian positions in Nevelske (about 25km northwest of Donetsk Metropolis) and took Ukrainian prisoners. A Russian milblogger reported that preventing continued in Pervomaiske and Vodyane and close to Opytne (all about 15km northwest of Donetsk Metropolis) on the finish of the day on October 31.[49] One other Russian milblogger moreover claimed that Russian troops managed to advance inside Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis) however that it’s too early to guage Russian features in Marinka.[50] Russian forces performed routine artillery strikes within the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis space.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk Metropolis on November 1. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Russian troops performed offensive operations within the Novopavlivka path (the operational path used to confer with exercise in western Donetsk Oblast) however didn’t provide additional info on the place offensive operations occurred.[52] Donetsk Individuals’s Republic (DNR) First Deputy Minister of Data Daniil Bezsonov claimed that preventing intensified within the Vuhledar path on November 1 and acknowledged that Russian forces try to take Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis) and Novomykhailivka (25km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis) as Ukrainian forces attempt to maintain the left financial institution of the Kashlyhach River and regroup within the neighborhood of Vuhledar.[53] Bezsonov indicated that this offensive is probably going meant to encircle the Ukrainian grouping in Vuhledar however famous that seizing Vuhledar will doubtless be expensive for Russian forces.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops already management half of Pavlivka as of October 31 and that there was no important progress by Russian forces working round Novomykhailivka.[55] One other Russian miblogger refuted claims that DNR items are preventing on this space and claimed that components of the a hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade of the Japanese Navy District are working within the space as a substitute.[56] Russian forces continued routine artillery fireplace in western Donetsk and southern Zaporizhia Oblasts.[57]
Ukrainian sources reported on November 1 {that a} Ukrainian strike destroyed the Akhtamar Resort alongside the Mariupol-Donetsk Metropolis Highway close to Volnovakha.[58] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko claimed that the lodge housed Chechen troops underneath the command of Ramzan Kadyrov.[59]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued routine fireplace west of Hulyaipole and in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on November 1. Russian forces performed Shahed-136 drone and S-300 missile strikes towards Dnipro Metropolis and Mykolaiv Metropolis in a single day.[60] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces shelled Nikopol and Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Mykolaiv Metropolis, Bashtanka, Berenezhuvate, Pervomaisk, and Shyroke areas in Mykolaiv Oblast.[61] Luhansk Individuals’s Republic (LNR) Deputy Inside Minister Vitaly Kiselyov claimed that current Russian strikes towards Ukrainian army infrastructure in Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast sank two harbor tugs.[62] A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces continued preparations for a Russian offensive west of Hulyaipole, Zaporizhia Oblast.[63]
Russian forces have doubtless elevated their sabotage efforts in unoccupied southern Ukraine to additional impede Ukrainian participation within the grain deal following the Russian pullout from the deal. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on November 1 that Russian saboteurs are lively in southern Ukraine.[64] Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian authorities arrested an Odesa Metropolis legislation enforcement officer related to Russian intelligence providers who collected knowledge on Ukrainian army gear transport and deliberate to explode a railway.[65] Profitable Russian interdiction of Ukrainian logistics strains in southern Ukraine may impede Ukraine’s potential to move grain to impartial ports for worldwide cargo.
Russian forces proceed efforts to consolidate management of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP) amid deteriorating working circumstances on the plant. The Worldwide Atomic Power Company (IAEA) introduced on October 31 {that a} landmine close to the ZNPP perimeter detonated on October 30, reducing energy to reactor unit 4 and forcing it to depend on exterior energy strains to energy important security and safety features.[66] IAEA Director-Basic Rafael Grossi expressed concern on October 31 for the working circumstances of ZNPP personnel and acknowledged that Russian occupation authorities proceed to stress ZNPP personnel into signing contracts with Russian nuclear vitality company Rosatom.[67] Ukraine’s Most important Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 1 that Russian occupation authorities established deadlines of November 1 and December 2 for ZNPP personnel to signal contracts with Rosatom and have restricted Ukrainian personnel entry to the ZNPP.[68] The GUR additionally reported that Chechen forces arrived at Enerhodar, prone to carry out legislation enforcement duties, and that Russian forces put in gear on the roof of reactor unit 5 to conduct aerial reconnaissance of the realm.[69]
Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts (Russian goal: Broaden fight energy with out conducting common mobilization)
Russian army buildings are reportedly increasing sure coaching capabilities. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) reported on November 1 that Russia is creating “tactical simulator” complexes utilizing varied unspecified coaching aids to cut back the price of utilizing costly weapons techniques.[70] The Belarusian MoD equally reported that Belarus and Russia are planning to create joint coaching facilities for the mixed coaching of Russian and Belarusian army personnel.[71] Such measures are ostensibly meant to broaden the coaching and growth capabilities of the Russian army, probably in response to widespread and systemic points with coaching mobilized reservists underneath the partial mobilization order.
The Russian army management is probably going persevering with to wrestle with the morale and self-discipline of mobilized troopers. Russian sources reported on November 1 that the commander of a army base in Chita, Zabaykalsky Krai, expelled mobilized servicemen from the grounds of the bottom forward of Zabaykalsky Krai Governor Alexander Osipov’s go to to the bottom.[72] Russian sources cited fears that the servicemen would ask Osipov “uncomfortable questions on provides.”[73] Systemic points with mobilization buildings stay seemingly widespread regardless of the formal finish of partial mobilization.
Chechen chief Ramzan Kadyrov implied that Chechnya will proceed to ship summonses to serve inside Chechen items to males with earlier fight expertise.[74] Kadyrov highlighted that these males won’t serve within the military, however will as a substitute serve “amongst Chechens,” presumably in inside safety forces within the Chechen Republic. Kadyrov might have once more not directly criticized the Russian Armed Forces by stating that the households of Chechen servicemen will know the places and items of their family members’ deployments, which isn’t the case for troopers within the Russian army. Russian retailers have reported that households complained that the Russian MoD didn’t correctly inform them in regards to the deployment of their family members.[75]
Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance techniques)
Russian occupation officers in Kherson Oblast continued setting circumstances for the long-term, if not everlasting, compelled relocation of Ukrainians from the east financial institution of the Dnipro River. Kherson occupation deputy Kirill Stremousov introduced that “evacuations” (compelled relocations) started from the 15km zone of the east financial institution of the Dnipro River.[76] Occupation Head of Kherson Oblast Vladimir Saldo introduced that Russian officers will “evacuate” as much as 70,000 residents from the east financial institution of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast and briefly resettle them deep in occupied Kherson Oblast or in different occupied or Russian territories.[77] Saldo acknowledged that Russian authorities in occupied Crimea, Krasnodar Krai, Rostov Oblast, and Voronezh Oblast issued housing vouchers and 100,000-ruble (roughly 1,620 USD) bonuses to “evacuees” from Kherson Oblast, indicating that Russian authorities don’t intend to permit the unique Ukrainian inhabitants to return to the evacuated zones of Kherson Oblast for a very long time if in any respect.[78] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Russian forces are intimidating Kherson Oblast residents into leaving and have disadvantaged Kherson Oblast residents of the means to speak.[79]
Russian forces are reportedly fortifying in civilian areas in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Russian forces are setting up fortifications and explosive obstacles round civilian housing in Kherson Oblast.[80] Saldo introduced that the Kherson Oblast occupation administration is making a territorial protection battalion with over 1,000 personnel and that Russian forces are fortifying on the east financial institution of the Dnipro River.[81] Kherson Oblast locals reported that Russian forces, together with mobilized personnel, occupy civilian buildings and are constructing fortifications within the rear areas of Kherson Oblast.[82] If true, these fortifications recommend that Russian forces anticipate that Ukrainian forces might ultimately advance deep into occupied Kherson Oblast east of the Dnipro River.
Ukraine’s Resistance Middle reported on November 1 that an explosion significantly wounded a Russian occupation deputy mayor of Berdyansk on October 31.[83] A Professional-Ukrainian channel claimed that an improvised explosive machine (IED) detonation, doubtless from Ukrainian partisans, crammed with steel balls or nails injured the official.[84]
Notice: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
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