June 23, 6:15 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Ongoing Belarusian mobilization workouts will proceed in Gomel Oblast till July 1 however are unlikely to be in preparation for direct Belarusian involvement within the battle in Ukraine. The Belarusian Ministry of Protection introduced on June 22 that the Belarusian Armed Forces will conduct a mobilization train with the navy commissariats of Gomel Oblast to check the readiness of the navy reserve from June 22 to July 1.[1] The Ukrainian State Border Guard Service warned on June 23 that Belarusian forces might conduct provocations alongside the border with Ukraine over the backdrop of those workouts, and Belarusian-Russian navy cooperation has seemingly intensified.[2] Belarusian Protection Minister Viktor Khrenin met with Russian Protection Minister Sergey Shoigu in Moscow on June 23 to debate ongoing bilateral navy agreements.[3] Belarusian social media customers moreover reported that Russian planes transported at the very least 16 S-400 missiles and one Pantsir system to the Gomel airport on June 21 and 22.[4]
Whereas Belarus and Russia retain shut navy cooperation and the continuing Belarusian workouts are doubtless meant partially to threaten Ukraine, Belarus stays unlikely to enter the battle in Ukraine on behalf of Russia. As ISW has beforehand assessed, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko doubtless can’t afford the home penalties of involving his restricted navy belongings in a expensive overseas battle.[5] Unsupported Belarusian forces are moreover extremely unlikely to be efficient, and Russia lacks the reserves essential to conduct one other offensive towards Kyiv. These workouts are undoubtedly meant to posture and threaten Ukrainian border areas however are unlikely to preempt precise involvement in hostilities.
Russian forces have made substantial positive aspects within the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk space during the last a number of days and Ukrainian troops proceed to endure excessive casualties, however Ukrainian forces have basically completed their goal within the battle by slowing down and degrading Russian forces. Head of the Luhansk Oblast Administration Serhiy Haidai acknowledged on June 23 that Ukrainian troops might must retreat to keep away from encirclement in Lysychansk, which signifies that Ukrainian authorities are setting situations to organize for the last word lack of each Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.[6] As ISW has beforehand assessed, nevertheless, the lack of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk is not going to characterize a significant turning level within the battle.[7] Ukrainian troops have succeeded for weeks in drawing substantial portions of Russian personnel, weapons, and tools into the realm and have doubtless degraded Russian forces’ general capabilities whereas stopping Russian forces from specializing in extra advantageous axes of advance. Russian offensive operations will doubtless stall within the coming weeks, whether or not or not Russian forces seize the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk space, doubtless granting Ukrainian forces the chance to launch prudent counteroffensives. The Kremlin’s ideological fixation on the seize of Severodonetsk, very like the sooner siege of Azovstal, will doubtless be to the last word detriment of Russian capabilities in future advances in Ukraine. The lack of Severodonetsk is a loss for Ukraine within the sense that any terrain captured by Russian forces is a loss—however the battle of Severodonetsk is not going to be a decisive Russian victory.
Key Takeaways
- Belarusian forces are conducting mobilization workouts alongside the Ukrainian border however are unlikely to enter the battle in Ukraine as a result of their low capabilities and the hostile home implications of navy involvement on behalf of Russia.
- Russian forces have doubtless reached the southern outskirts of Lysychansk and are reinforcing their grouping round Severodonetsk to finish the seize of each Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. These positive aspects stay unlikely to supply Russian forces with a decisive edge in additional operations in Ukraine and have additional degraded Russian capabilities.
- Russian forces are persevering with efforts to encircle the Ukrainian grouping in Hirske and Zolote and are doubtless shifting to take management of those settlements.
- Russian forces have doubtless efficiently interdicted Ukrainian traces of communication alongside the T1302 freeway and are utilizing latest positive aspects alongside the freeway to bolster assaults on Lysychansk.
- Russian forces amassed tools and continued constructing defensive capabilities alongside the Southern Axis.
We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to judge and report on the results of those felony actions on the Ukrainian navy and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity though we don’t describe them in these reviews.
- Most important Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate Most important Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops within the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
- Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv Metropolis;
- Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
- Actions in Russian-occupied Areas
Most important Effort—Japanese Ukraine
Subordinate Most important Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian goal: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Japanese Ukraine and seize everything of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations to drive north towards Lysychansk and reached the southern outskirts of the town on June 23. Ukrainian sources confirmed on June 23 that Russian troops captured Rai-Oleksandrivka and Luskotivka on June 22, which can enable Russian forces to launch additional advances towards Lysychansk with out having to finish an opposed river crossing from inside Severodonetsk.[8] A number of Ukrainian and Russian sources reported preventing south of Lysychansk in Bila Hora, Myrna Dolyna, and Vovchoyarivka, all inside 5 km of Lysychansk.[9] The UK Ministry of Protection confirmed that Russian forces have superior to inside 5 km of southern Lysychansk.[10] Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed that Russian forces have made it so far as the southern outskirts of Lysychansk and are preventing inside the industrial zone of the town, however ISW can’t affirm this declare.[11] Russian forces have additionally doubtless restricted Ukrainian entry to traces of communication into Lysychansk and might shell giant areas of each the Siversk-Lysychansk and Bakhmut-Lysychansk highways.[12]
Russian forces are reinforcing their grouping round Severodonetsk with a view to full the seize of the town. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that parts of the 2nd Army Corps (the Armed Forces of the Luhansk Individuals’s Republic) and Rosgvardia (Russian Nationwide Guard) are preventing to ascertain full management of Severodonetsk.[13] Rosgvardia is notably not meant to be a frontline fight pressure, and their involvement in direct fights for management of contested territory signifies that Russian troops within the Severodonetsk space are severely degraded and counting on secondary forces to help operations. The BBC’s Russian service beforehand reported on June 21 that Rosgvardia and Wagner Group personnel are offering Russia’s fundamental assault pressure in Severodonetsk, doubtless as a result of a scarcity of devoted infantry in frontline Russian models.[14] Ukrainian parliamentarian and navy skilled Dmytro Snyegerev acknowledged that Russian forces are shifting fashionable S-300V4 anti-aircraft air protection missile techniques to the Severodonetsk space with a view to shield their forces from the Ukrainian air pressure and drones.[15] Russian forces reportedly moved one battalion tactical group (BTG) from the Central Navy District to Novotoshivske, south of the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk space, doubtless in help of operations to finish the seize of the remainder of Luhansk Oblast.[16]
Russian forces have doubtless moved to finish the encirclement of Ukrainian troops in Zolote and Hirske however haven’t but taken full management of each settlements.[17] Russian sources claimed that Russian troops are clearing Zolote, Hirske, and the encompassing areas, and geolocated fight footage from June 23 confirmed Russian troops coming into Hirske itself from the east.[18] Neither official Ukrainian nor Russian sources have confirmed the seize of Zolote and Hirske, nevertheless, and Russian forces are doubtless nonetheless preventing to ascertain whole management of this space.
Russian forces continued efforts to interdict Ukrainian traces of communication alongside the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk freeway to help operations in Lysychansk and made incremental positive aspects on June 23.[19] The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that parts of the 1st Army Corps (the Armed Forces of the Donetsk Individuals’s Republic) took management of Mykolaivka, a settlement alongside the T1302 freeway about 15 km southwest of Lysychansk. Russian forces moreover continued assault operations in Berestove, a settlement adjoining to Mykolaivka alongside the T1302.[20] Head of Luhansk Oblast Administration Serhiy Haidai indicated the T1302 is at present inoperable, which means that Russian forces have efficiently interdicted Ukrainian provide efforts into the Lysychansk space.[21] Russian forces performed unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations in Vershyna and unsuccessfully tried to pin Ukrainian forces in Klynove, each southeast of Bakhmut.[22]
Russian forces continued to organize for offensive operations in direction of Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum however didn’t make any confirmed advances on June 23.[23] The Ukrainian Normal Employees acknowledged that Russian forces moved two unspecified tank models to the Izyum space to strengthen their grouping northwest of Slovyansk.[24] Russian forces reportedly performed unsuccessful assaults on Dolyna and Bohorodychne, each inside 20 km northwest of Slovyansk.[25] Russian forces will doubtless proceed efforts to drive down the E40 (often known as the M03) freeway towards Slovyansk however are unlikely to achieve success in straight assaulting the town as the primary Russian effort stays centered on the seize of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv Metropolis (Russian goal: Withdraw forces to the north and defend floor traces of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces north of Kharkiv Metropolis centered on stopping Ukrainian advances and fired on and round Kharkiv Metropolis on June 23.[26] The Ukrainian Normal Employees acknowledged that Russian forces are attempting to stop Ukrainian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast from threatening the rear of Russian operations heading in direction of Izyum-Slovyansk.[27] Russian forces performed artillery strikes on Kharkiv Metropolis and settlements to the north and southeast.[28]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Goal: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts in opposition to Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces continued to deal with defensive operations and amassed tools alongside the Southern Axis on June 23. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces performed a sequence of unsuccessful assaults close to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border round Shevchenko, Vremivka, Novosilka, and Neskuchne.[29] Russian forces moreover concentrated artillery models across the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border in response to latest Ukrainian counterattacks within the space.[30] Russian forces are moreover shifting giant columns of navy tools from Mariupol to Berdyansk and Polohy, more likely to reinforce positions in Zaporizhia Oblast to defend in opposition to each Ukrainian partisan exercise and counterattacks.[31] Head of the Ukrainian Most important Intelligence Directorate Kirill Budanov acknowledged that Russian forces are deploying a detachment consisting of air protection and rocket group models, a ship group, and particular forces to Snake Island in response to latest Ukrainian strikes straight in opposition to Snake Island.[32] Russian forces continued to fireside on Kherson, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia Oblasts.[33]
Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of occupied areas; set situations for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or another future political association of Moscow’s selecting)
Russian occupation authorities continued efforts to consolidate administrative management of occupied areas of Ukraine on June 23. The Ukrainian Resistance Heart reported on June 23 that mass “passportization” efforts have been so unsuccessful that Russian authorities are forcing inmates on the Kherson Northern Correctional Colony to acquire Russian citizenship to extend their numbers.[34] The Ukrainian Resistance Heart moreover claimed that Russian officers plan to carry an annexation referendum in Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts on September 11, 2022, although ISW can’t independently affirm this declare – which Ukrainian sources have beforehand speculated on, because the date of current Russian elections.[35] This deadline will doubtless additional strain Russian occupation authorities to create a façade of widespread public help for integration into Russia, via passportization measures or in any other case. Regardless of rising indications that Russian authorities hope to expedite the annexation course of, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that it’s “out of the query” to abolish the border between Russia and Zaporizhia, suggesting continued discrepancies over the diploma of integration of occupied territories being pursued by the Kremlin.[36]
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