Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, June 21

June 21, 7:45 pm ET

Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.

The Kremlin not too long ago changed the commander of the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces and could also be within the strategy of radically reshuffling the command construction of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, indicating a potential purge of senior officers blamed for failures in Ukraine. A number of Russian shops confirmed that the present Chief of Workers of the Central Navy District, Colonel-Normal Mikhail Teplinsky, will exchange the present Commander of the Russian Airborne Forces, Colonel-Normal Andrey Serdyukov.[1] Ukrainian sources beforehand reported on June 17 that the Kremlin fired Serdyukov for poor efficiency throughout the invasion and excessive casualties amongst paratroopers, however ISW couldn’t verify this reporting on the time.[2] A number of sources are moreover reporting contradictory claims about replacements for the present Southern Navy District Commander—and total commander of the Russian invasion of Ukraine–Army Normal Alexander Dvornikov:

• Russian reserve officer Oleg Marzoev claimed on June 21 that Russian navy officers will quickly appoint Normal of the Army Sergey Surovikin, the present commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces, as commander of the Southern Navy District (SMD), successfully changing present SMD Commander Alexander Dvornikov.[3]
• Investigative journalism group Bellingcat beforehand reported on June 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin deliberate to switch Dvornikov because the commander of the invasion of Ukraine following Dvornikov’s extreme consuming and lack of belief amongst Russian forces.[4]
• Ukraine’s Battle Intelligence Group (CIT) reported on June 19 that Putin changed Dvornikov because the commander of the Ukrainian operation with Colonel-Normal Gennady Zhidko, the top of the Navy-Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces.[5]
• An unofficial however extensively adopted Russian Airborne Troops social media web page claimed that Dvornikov has been promoted and that Serdyukov will take his place inside the SMD. This declare is extremely unlikely to be true provided that pro-Kremlin sources introduced Serdyukov’s retirement.[6]

ISW can’t independently confirm these reviews and can proceed to observe the state of affairs for corroboration. Nonetheless, if these diverse reviews are all correct, former Aerospace Forces Commander Surovikin has changed Dvornikov (who could have been pressured to retire) as commander of the Southern Navy District, however Zhidko has been appointed commander of Russian operations in Ukraine, regardless of in a roundabout way commanding Russian fight troops in his everlasting position. Zhidko at present directs the physique of the Russian Ministry of Protection liable for sustaining morale and ideological management inside the Russian navy, moderately than commanding a navy district. As ISW beforehand reported, Southern Navy District Commander Dvornikov was the pure option to command Russia’s operations in Ukraine following Russia’s loss within the Battle of Kyiv, as nearly all of Russian offensive operations are occurring inside the Southern Navy District’s space of duty. The appointment of a separate commander over the Southern Navy District, and the alternative of the commander of the SMD in the course of main fight operations, is a drastic step that will communicate to extreme crises inside the Russian excessive command, and presumably a purge by the Kremlin. Such drastic rotations inside the Russian navy, if true, will not be actions taken by a drive on the verge of a significant success and point out ongoing dysfunction within the Kremlin’s conduct of the battle.

Russian forces are efficiently advancing towards Lysychansk from the south moderately than making an opposed river crossing from Severodonetsk, threatening Ukrainian defenses within the space. ISW beforehand forecasted that Russian forces would search to assault towards Lysychansk from the south to negate the defensive benefit that the Siverskyi Donets River would grant Ukrainian defenders opposing a direct assault from Severodonetsk. Russian forces look like securing such an advance and can seemingly assault the outskirts of Lysychansk inside the coming week. This Russian advance is a transparent setback for Ukrainian defenses within the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk space, however Russian forces will seemingly require additional protracted battles with Ukrainian forces much like the block-by-block preventing seen in Mariupol and Severodonetsk with a purpose to seize Lysychansk.

The Kremlin is failing to discourage the relations of sailors that survived the sinking of the Moskva from issuing an enchantment towards the deployment of surviving conscripts to the battle in Ukraine as of June 20.[7] Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta revealed an enchantment from the dad and mom of the surviving 49 conscript crewmembers of the Moskva, demanding that the Navy Prosecutor’s Workplace in Sevastopol, the Committee of Soldier’s Moms, and the Human Rights Commissioner instantly terminate the crewmembers’ deployment. The enchantment states that Russian commanders didn’t ship the surviving conscripts house from their deployment following the sinking of Moskva and that they are going to be recommitted to hostilities on June 30. The enchantment famous that the survivors refuse to take part in additional assignments because of psychological misery and are at present stationed on the previous ship Ladnyi, which the enchantment claims is unfit for fight. The Ukrainian Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR) beforehand reported that Russian forces have threatened the households of Moskva sailors with felony prosecution and nullification of any monetary advantages to stop them from talking out towards Russian operations.[8]

Russian forces proceed to face drive technology challenges and are committing unprepared contract servicemen to the invasion of Ukraine. The BBC’s Russian service reported on June 20 that new Russian recruits obtain solely 3 to 7 days of coaching earlier than being despatched to “probably the most lively sectors of the entrance.”[9] The BBC additionally reported that volunteers inside the standard Russian navy, Rosgvardia models, and Wagner Group mercenaries have turn into Russia’s primary assault drive, versus full standard navy models. ISW has beforehand assessed that Russian models in japanese Ukraine are affected by poor enhances of infantry, slowing their capacity to grab city terrain. The Russian navy is providing substantial monetary incentives to safe further recruits with rising disregard for his or her age, well being, felony information, and different established service {qualifications}. The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported on June 21 that Russian Airborne (VDV) models are pressured to recruit reserve officers for short-term three-month contracts because of important officer losses, and the BBC reported that the Russian Ministry of Protection is providing to repay the loans and money owed of volunteers to entice recruits.[10]

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin not too long ago changed the commander of the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces and should have fired the commander of the Southern Navy District and appointed a brand new total commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, indicating ongoing dysfunction within the Kremlin’s conduct of the battle.
• Russian forces performed a number of profitable advances in settlements southeast of Severodonetsk on June 21 and could possibly threaten Lysychansk within the coming days whereas avoiding a tough opposed crossing of the Siverskyi Donets River.
• Russian forces continued to launch assaults on settlements alongside the T1302 Lysychansk-Bakhmut freeway to interdict Ukrainian floor traces of communications (GLOCs).
• Russian operations alongside the Izyum-Slovyansk axis are more and more stalled as Russian forces prioritize operations round Severodonetsk.
• Russian forces seemingly recaptured the japanese financial institution of the Inhulets River from the Ukrainian bridgehead located close to the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian positions on Snake Island within the Black Sea, prone to destroy Russian fortifications and gear on the island, however ISW can’t verify competing Ukrainian and Russian claims of the outcomes of the assault.
• Russian occupation authorities are persevering with to face challenges recruiting native collaborators and are seemingly counting on Russian authorities personnel to consolidate their societal management of occupied Ukrainian territories.

We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian navy and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in these reviews.

• Important Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and three supporting efforts);
• Subordinate Important Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops within the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
• Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv Metropolis;
• Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
• Actions in Russian-occupied Areas

Important Effort—Japanese Ukraine

Subordinate Important Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian goal: Encircle Ukrainian forces in japanese Ukraine and seize the whole thing of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces performed a number of profitable advances in settlements southeast of Severodonetsk on June 21 and could possibly threaten Lysychansk within the coming days whereas avoiding a tough opposed crossing of the Siverskyi Donets River. The Ukrainian Normal Workers confirmed that Russian forces seized Pidlisne, Myrna Dolyna, and Ustynivka and said they captured parts of Bila Hora, all cities located on the western Siverskyi Donets Riverbank inside 10 km of the southern outskirts of Lysychansk.[11] Geolocated footage from June 20 signifies Russian forces captured terrain in contested Toshkivka, simply east of the T1303 Lysychansk-Hirske freeway.[12] Russian forces additionally performed {a partially} profitable assault towards Hirske, and can seemingly try to hold out a shallow encirclement round Zolote.[13] The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Severodonetsk’s southeastern outskirts of Syrotyne and Voronove, prone to interdict Russian advances to the japanese financial institution of Siverskyi Donets River.[14] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that preventing continues to be ongoing on the Azot Chemical Plant in Severodonetsk as of June 21.[15]

Russian forces continued to launch assaults on settlements alongside the T1302 Lysychansk-Bakhmut freeway to interdict Ukrainian floor traces of communications (GLOCs). Russian forces attacked Mykolaivka and seized Vrubivka, each adjoining to the T1302 freeway.[16] Russian forces additionally launched floor assaults towards Vershina and Semyhirya, roughly 12 km and 17 km south of Bakhmut. Russian forces will nonetheless have to seize the T1302 to chop off Ukrainian GLOCs operating by means of Siversk to disrupt Ukrainian GLOCs to Lysychansk. The Ukrainian Normal Workers additionally reported that Russian forces consolidated battalion tactical teams (BTGs) from the fifth Mixed Arms Army and withdrew models of the first Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the first Army Corps (the armed forces of the Donetsk Folks‘s Republic) to revive their fight capabilities, indicating that Russian forces are experiencing important losses in ongoing operations in Luhansk Oblast.[17]

Russian operations alongside the Izyum-Slovyansk axis are more and more stalled as Russian forces prioritize operations round Severodonetsk. The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported that Russian forces launched unsuccessful floor assaults towards Bohorodychne and Dolyna (north of Slovyansk) and didn’t try and conduct offensive operations within the Lyman space.[18] Ukraine’s Strategic Communications Directorate reported that Russian forces are redeploying a number of army-level headquarters models from frontlines within the Izyum and Lyman areas to Svatove and Horoshe, simply 30-40 km east of Severodonetsk and Popasna.[19] The redeployment of those headquarters models could additional complicate Russian logistics routes and troop administration in Izyum and Lyman and signifies that these models could also be additional shifting to the Severodonetsk axis. Satellite tv for pc imagery from June 19 additionally confirmed that Russian forces constructed a pontoon bridge in Kupyansk, seemingly to enhance provide routes to Svatove.[20] ISW beforehand reported on June 17 that Russian forces are deploying further gear through GLOCs in Svatove to assist offensive operations within the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk space.[21]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv Metropolis (Russian goal: Withdraw forces to the north and defend floor traces of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces continued to give attention to hindering Ukrainian counteroffensives southeast and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis. Russian forces reportedly continued to shell settlements round Kharkiv Metropolis to impede Ukrainian advances towards the Russian forces working in Izyum and the worldwide border.[22] Geolocated fight footage confirmed native preventing close to Yuchenkove, roughly 61 km southeast of Kharkiv Metropolis, although neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces performed any main assaults.[23]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Goal: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts towards Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces seemingly recaptured the japanese financial institution of the Inhulets River from the Ukrainian bridgehead located close to the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border. The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported that Russian forces fired on Ukrainian positions on the western financial institution of the Inhulets River, seemingly indicating that Ukrainian forces misplaced entry to the bridgehead on the japanese riverbank, which they’d occupied since Could 28.[24] Geolocated footage of Ukrainian forces putting Russian forces in Andriivka (located east of the Inhulets River) additionally signifies that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces west of the river.[25] Russian forces continued to construct long-term firing positions, conduct air reconnaissance, and shell settlements on the Kherson-Mykolaiv and Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast borders on June 21.[26]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian positions on Snake Island within the Black Sea, prone to destroy Russian fortifications and gear on the island. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting an ongoing concentrated assault on Snake Island and inflicted unspecified injury on the Russian garrison as of June 21.[27] The Russian Protection Ministry claimed that Russian air-defense programs repelled an assault towards the island by greater than 15 Ukrainian drones on June 20.[28] Russian officers additionally claimed that Ukrainian drones struck fuel manufacturing platforms close to Crimea after Russian forces defeated the Ukrainian try and seize Snake Island.[29] ISW is unable to independently verify both declare and can proceed to observe the state of affairs because it unfolds. The UK Protection Ministry additionally said that Ukrainian assaults on Russian ships off Odesa shores have “neutralized” Russia’s capacity to manage the ocean and derailed Russian plans to dam Odesa Oblast from the Black Sea.[30]

Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of occupied areas; set circumstances for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or another future political association of Moscow’s selecting)

Russian occupation authorities are persevering with ad-hoc annexation insurance policies in Donbas and southern Ukraine. The deputy head of the Russian Kherson Oblast Navy-Civil Administration, Kirill Stremousov, made one other announcement stating that Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast could conduct a referendum to affix Russia within the fall of 2022.[31] Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin beforehand claimed that the DNR will maintain a referendum to unite with Russia after the tip of the “particular navy operation” in Ukraine, which he hopes will finish by winter 2022—one other indicator that the Kremlin and its proxies anticipate the battle to protract.[32] It’s unclear when or if the Kremlin will pursue a full annexation of Donbas and occupied southern Ukrainian territories, however Russian occupation authorities proceed to supply disjointed timeframes and preconditions for referendums. The DNR Territorial Protection Workers additionally reported that the DNR added Lomakyne, simply east of Mariupol, to the “zone of DNR duty.” It stays unclear whether or not or not the DNR is liable for all newly occupied settlements.[33]

Russian occupation authorities are persevering with to face challenges recruiting native collaborators and are seemingly counting on Russian authorities personnel to consolidate their societal management. Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov famous that many younger persons are fleeing Enerhodar and are refusing to cooperate with Russian occupation forces.[34] Orlov reported that Russian forces have mistreated the remaining staff of the Zaporizhia Nuclear Energy Plant who stayed again within the metropolis to attenuate the dangers of a nuclear emergency.[35] Ukrainian Telegram channel MariupolNow famous the arrival of a big convoy of Russian automobiles and busses close to Mariupol, presumably carrying Russian non-military personnel.[36] Russian occupation authorities put in Russian tv networks in Kherson Oblast and are persevering with to revive railways in Mariupol regardless of being unable to consolidate societal management in newly occupied territories.[37]

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