AFGHANISTAN, January 4 –
Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Madison Williams, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 3, 6:45 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Russian President Vladimir Putin accredited a sequence of directions for Russian companies and high-level officers on January 2 prone to deal with criticisms of the Kremlin’s therapy of navy personnel and painting the Kremlin as an concerned war-time equipment.[1] These directions are ostensibly an effort to deal with grievances voiced by moms of servicemen throughout a extremely staged November 25 assembly with Putin.[2] The 11 directions direct a number of high-ranking members of the Russian authorities—together with Protection Minister Sergei Shoigu, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin—and authorities companies (together with the Russian Ministry of Protection) to collaborate with different companies and non-government organizations to generate an inventory of suggestions for addressing and enhancing provide, advantages, and healthcare processes for navy personnel.[3] Putin instructed the Ministry of Tradition to help the nongovernmental group “Committee of the Fatherland Warrior’s Households” to assist create documentaries and different materials to showcase the “braveness and heroism” of Russian forces in Ukraine and to display home documentaries to “battle towards the unfold of neo-Nazi and neo-fascist ideology.” These directions are unlikely to generate important modifications and can possible take important time to implement.
Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that Russia is utilizing a wide range of social schemes to justify the switch of Ukrainian youngsters to Russia. In his annual New 12 months’s speech, Putin thanked Russians for his or her efforts to ship youngsters from occupied Ukrainian territory on “holidays.”[4] ISW has beforehand reported cases of Russian officers utilizing the guise of “holidays” and trip schemes to justify the switch of Ukrainian youngsters to Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea.[5] Putin’s listing of directions additionally directs Russian Commissioner for the Rights of the Baby Maria Lvova-Belova and the occupation heads of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts to “take extra measures to determine minors…left with out parental care” in occupied areas to supply them with ”state social help” and ”social help.”[6] The Kremlin could search to make use of this social profit scheme to tabulate the names of kids it deems to be orphans to determine youngsters for deportation to Russia and probably open avenues for his or her adoption into Russian households. ISW continues to notice that the compelled adoption of Ukrainian youngsters into Russian households could represent a violation of the Conference on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[7]
Systemic failures in Russia’s drive era equipment proceed to plague personnel capabilities to the detriment of Russian operational capability in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 3 that the Russian navy has despatched not too long ago mobilized personnel educated as artillerymen and tankers following their mobilizations to infantry divisions in Ukraine with no formal infantry coaching.[8] Though the usage of personnel in non-infantry branches in infantry roles just isn’t uncommon, the Russian navy’s observe on this case is probably going very problematic. The Russian Armed Forces devoted too little time to coaching mobilized personnel to be used within the branches they’d beforehand served in earlier than sending them to the entrance traces. They definitely didn’t have time to coach them in extra specialties.
Russian forces have suffered important losses of artillery methods and armored autos in operations in Ukraine because the begin of partial mobilization in September of 2022, and, subsequently, possible have extra personnel educated in the usage of particular navy gear.[9] Ukrainian Jap Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhii Cherevaty reported that Russian forces in jap Ukraine are presently firing artillery shells at roughly one-third the speed of the summer time of 2022.[10] The decreased price of Russian artillery hearth is probably going a results of the depletion of ammunition shares, given experiences that Russian forces are intentionally transferring ammunition from one sector of the entrance to a different.[11] Placing poorly-trained artillerymen into infantry models with out coaching them for infantry fight operations will possible make them little greater than cannon fodder.
Degraded Russian navy personnel capabilities will possible additional exacerbate Russian milblogger criticism of Russian drive era efforts and the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD). One Russian milblogger argued that Russian Protection Minister Sergei Shoigu’s proposals to create 5 new artillery divisions and the latest creation of an artillery division within the Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps might be a waste of personnel and artillery munitions if the Russian MoD continues to coach these personnel in simply an artillery capability with out infantry coaching.[12] One other Russian milblogger argued inaccurately that placing a tanker or an artilleryman in service as a easy infantryman is a struggle crime that even Soviet commanders didn’t commit in probably the most troublesome months of the Second World Struggle in 1941.[13] (It definitely isn’t any kind of crime to allocate people with sure specialties to carry out totally different roles and missions in struggle, and tankers and gunners in all armies at struggle have generally fought as infantry when their methods have been destroyed or unavailable.) The Russian milblogger in contrast the present scenario to the same incident in 2015 when the Russian deployment of an artillery unit as infantry within the operation to seize Debaltseve, Donetsk Oblast, led to the demise of 80 p.c of the unit to argue that Russian commanders who make such selections ought to face felony prosecution.[14] Russian milbloggers have routinely criticized the Russian MoD for the poor conduct of partial mobilization and can possible proceed to take action as Russian drive era efforts produce degraded personnel capabilities that can possible additional constrain the Russian navy’s skill to realize any operational success in Ukraine. The hyperbole of milblogger criticism of the MoD’s personnel practices highlights the ever-increasing hostility towards and skepticism of the MoD amongst components of the milblogger neighborhood.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin tried to justify the Wagner Group’s lack of progress in Bakhmut, partially supporting ISW’s evaluation that Russian forces in Bakhmut are culminating.[15] Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti amplified a December 31 interview with Prigozhin on January 3 during which Prigozhin acknowledged that Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut are unable to interrupt by means of Ukrainian defenses in Bakhmut.[16] Prigozhin acknowledged that Wagner’s offensive operations in Bakhmut are extremely attritional as a result of every home in Bakhmut is a “fortress,” that Ukrainians have defensive traces each 10 meters, and that Russian forces should clear building-by-building.[17] This can be a important inflection for Prigozhin and the primary time he has framed Wagner forces in Bakhmut as making successfully no features. Prigozhin beforehand acknowledged in October 2022 that Wagner forces working within the Bakhmut space advance 100–200 meters a day.[18] The Wagner Group performed data operations to claim that Wagner Group forces solely made features in Bakhmut with out the help of different Russian components in December.[19]
Prigozhin is probably going setting data circumstances accountable Wagner Group’s failure to take Bakhmut on the Russian Ministry of Protection or the Russian industrial base. Wagner Group troopers advised Prigozhin that they have been unable to interrupt by means of Ukrainian traces in Bakhmut resulting from inadequate armored autos, ammunition, and 100mm shell provides throughout a probable scripted phase within the clip. This assertion seeks to absolve the Wagner Group and Prigozhin of private accountability by attributing their failure to seize Bakhmut to the bigger Russian useful resource allocation issues that Russian and Ukrainian sources have been more and more discussing since late December.[20]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin accredited a sequence of directions for Russian companies and high-level officers possible aimed toward appeasing widespread criticisms of the provisioning and fee of advantages to Russian navy personnel and propagandizing the struggle.
- Putin confirmed that Russia is utilizing a wide range of social schemes to justify the switch of Ukrainian youngsters to Russia.
- Systemic failures in Russia’s drive era efforts proceed to plague Russian personnel capabilities to the detriment of Russian operational capability in Ukraine.
- Degraded Russian navy personnel capabilities will possible additional exacerbate Russian milblogger criticism of Russian drive era efforts and the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD).
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin tried to justify the Wagner Group’s lack of progress in Bakhmut, partially supporting ISW’s evaluation that Russian forces in Bakhmut are culminating.
- Russian forces continued restricted counterattacks alongside the Svatove-Kreminna line as Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian navy logistics in Luhansk Oblast.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations close to Bakhmut and Avdiivka and could also be reinforcing their grouping in western Donetsk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces have reportedly established positions on the Velikiy Potemkinsky Island within the Dnipro River delta as of January 2.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree that guarantees extra advantages to Russian forces personnel and Russian Nationwide Guard (Rosgvardia) who defend the Russian-Ukrainian border.
We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian navy and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in these experiences.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Jap Ukraine
- Russian Primary Effort—Jap Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and one supporting effort);
- Russian Subordinate Primary Effort—Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Power Technology Efforts
- Actions in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Jap Ukraine: (Jap Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces continued restricted counterattacks to regain misplaced positions alongside the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 3. The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults close to Stelmakhivka (16km northwest of Svatove), Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[21] Geolocated footage posted on January 3 exhibits Russian forces working 1km north of Bilohorivka, indicating that Russian forces have made marginal advances across the settlement.[22] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces used thermobaric artillery methods, a high-value navy district-level asset, to strike Ukrainian forces within the Kreminna space.[23] The Russian navy’s use of a navy district-level asset within the Kreminna space signifies that Russian forces are possible persevering with to prioritize operations alongside the Kreminna-Svatove line amidst the Russian navy’s potential preparation for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast.[24]
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian navy logistics in Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Jap Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhii Cherevaty reported on January 3 that Ukrainian forces destroyed Russian ammunition subject warehouses and a gas and lubricants storage space within the Svatove course.[25]
Russian Primary Effort—Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations round Bakhmut on January 3. The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian assaults close to Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut close to Rozdolivka (18km northeast), Soledar (10km northeast), and Krasna Hora (5km northeast); and south of Bakhmut close to Kurdyumivka (12km southwest) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group forces launched an assault towards Krasna Hora and are persevering with makes an attempt to push north in direction of Bakhmut from positions close to Klishchiivka, Ozeryanivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut), and Opytne (3km south of Bakhmut).[27] Geolocated fight footage exhibits Ukrainian strikes on Russian autos and infantry components north of Soledar, indicating that Russian forces have established positions on this space.[28]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis space on January 3. The Ukrainian Basic Employees acknowledged that Russian troops performed assaults close to Avdiivka (simply north of Donetsk Metropolis) and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis).[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops additionally attacked Ukrainian fortifications alongside the western outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis close to Krasnohorivka and tried to push on Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[30] One other Russian supply reported that components of the Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) ninth Regiment are advancing towards Avdiivka and combating in small teams to keep away from personnel losses.[31] Russian sources continued to assert that road combating is ongoing in Marinka.[32]
Russian forces could also be reinforcing their grouping in western Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Basic Employees famous on January 3 that Russian forces are strengthening their grouping within the Novopavlivka course (the operational course used to consult with the realm southwest of Donetsk Metropolis) on the expense of models transferred from the Kherson course.[33] This assertion is in line with ISW’s earlier observations that Russian forces are persevering with to strengthen positions all through jap Ukraine with components beforehand deployed to Kherson Oblast.[34] Geolocated footage posted on January 3 exhibits Ukrainian artillery stopping a Russian infantry rotation close to Pavlivka (40km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis).[35] Russian forces continued routine artillery hearth in western Donetsk and jap Zaporizhia oblasts.[36]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces claimed they established positions on the Velykyi Potomkin Island within the Dnipro River delta southwest of Kherson Metropolis as of January 2. Geolocated footage exhibits that Ukrainian forces reached the northeastern a part of the island as of January 2, and a few social media customers claimed that Ukrainian forces captured elements or the entire island.[37] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Navy Advisor Serhiy Khlan acknowledged on January 3 that ”there may be data” that Ukrainian forces have captured the island however there may be presently no official affirmation.[38] Geolocated footage posted on January 2 exhibits that Russian forces nonetheless function in different areas of the delta.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that the island stays a contested zone and that experiences of Ukrainian forces capturing the island are a Ukrainian data operation.[40]
Ukrainian forces continued to focus on Russian drive concentrations within the rear areas of southern Ukraine. Geolocated footage posted on January 2 exhibits the destroyed “Gran Prix” stud farm complicated in Oleshky, Kherson Oblast following a Ukrainian strike.[41] A Russian soldier had beforehand posted an image of himself standing in entrance of the complicated’s brand, a violation of operational safety ideas that possible aided Ukrainian troops in focusing on the strike.[42] The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drive focus in Chukalivka, Kherson Oblast (35km southwest of Kherson Metropolis on the T2216 freeway) on December 31, killing and wounding 500 Russian navy personnel.[43] Russian milbloggers denied experiences of the strike.[44] The Ukrainian Basic Employees additionally reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drive focus in Fedorivka (possible referring to a settlement alongside both the E58 or R47 highways in jap Kherson Oblast) on January 1 and are nonetheless figuring out Russian casualties.[45] A Ukrainian supply reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian forces in Chaplynka, Kherson Oblast (69km south of the Dnipro River on the T2202 Nova Kakhovka-Armiansk freeway).[46] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on January 3 that Ukrainian forces shelled a hospital in Tokmak, and geolocated footage exhibits injury to a medical facility the place Russian forces reportedly had positions.[47] Russian sources reported that Russian air defenses shot down possible Ukrainian drones over Sevastopol and Dzhankoi, Crimea, on January 2 and three.[48]
Ukrainian officers acknowledged that Russian occupation officers are working to strengthen their administrative management of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP). The Ukrainian Resistance Middle warned on January 3 that Russian occupation officers plan to nominate Dmitry Minyaev, a Rosenergoatom (a subsidiary of Russian nuclear power company Rosatom) particular safety companies official, because the ZNPP deputy director for bodily safety and regime points someday in January 2023.[49]
Mobilization and Power Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Develop fight energy with out conducting common mobilization)
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree that guarantees extra advantages to Russian forces personnel and Russian Nationwide Guard (Rosgvardia) particular police on January 3.[50] Putin signed a decree that guarantees a 5-million-ruble (about $69,000) payout to the households of medically-discharged or killed-in-action Russian personnel who served in border areas—together with occupied Ukrainian territories—since February 24.[51] The decree additionally guarantees a 3-million-ruble fee (about $41,000) to these serving in border areas who have been injured throughout service.[52] These payouts are possible a Kremlin try and mitigate milblogger criticism of the underfunding of the Russian border guard service.
Russian navy officers proceed to seek out sneaky means to proceed mobilization. The Central Financial institution of the Russian Federation ordered its branches on December 27, 2022, to ship mobilization summonses to all “male debtors” of their system and to current the male debtors with service contracts.[53] The official Central Financial institution of the Russian Federation letter suggested staff to threaten police intervention ought to any of the male debtors resist or refuse to just accept the summonses, however reassured staff that the chance of collaborating in mobilization recruitment efforts is “minimal.”[54] A Russian supply reported on January 2, 2023, that the navy registration and enlistment workplace in Krasnodar Krai despatched a letter to a neighborhood enterprise demanding that 20 of its staff go to a “45-day navy coaching camp.”[55] The supply assesses that that is possible a mobilization scheme.[56]
The Kremlin continues to develop the authorized framework for mobilizing residents of occupied territories. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on December 30, 2022, that suspended the earlier age limits for mobilization in occupied territories till no less than 2026 and promised larger ranks to those that have beforehand served within the Russian forces or legislation enforcement.[57] ISW beforehand assessed that Putin has closely drained the pool of accessible combat-ready reservists.[58] This decree is probably going a determined try and develop the pool of these eligible for mobilization.
Russian forces could also be falsifying the demise certificates of Russian personnel killed in motion in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Primary Intelligence Directorate (GUR) shared intercepted audio on January 2 of a Russian servicemember claiming that the Russian forces have been falsifying demise certificates for Russian troopers by falsely claiming that Russian personnel who died in Ukraine died in Belgorod Oblast as a substitute.[59] ISW is unable to confirm this Russian servicemember’s declare.
Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of and annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, financial, navy, and governance methods)
Ukrainian officers in previously occupied areas proceed to unearth Russian torture chambers. The Kherson Oblast Police reported on January 3 that Ukrainian law enforcement officials found a Russian torture chamber within the basement of the primary police division constructing of Kherson Oblast in Kherson Metropolis.[60] Kherson Police acknowledged that officers discovered objects indicating that Russian forces performed torture and interrogations within the chamber and held retired legislation enforcement officers, these recognized to carry pro-Ukrainian sentiments, and atypical Kherson residents who refused to cooperate with Russian occupation officers there.[61] Ukraine’s State Safety Service (SBU) reported that SBU personnel found a torture chamber within the liberated village of Oleksandrivka in Horokhiv Hromada, Mykolaiv Oblast.[62] The SBU reported that Russian forces tortured residents whom they deemed to be uncooperative utilizing suffocation, beatings, and electrical shocks.[63] This can be a direct violation of the legal guidelines of armed battle and Article III of the Geneva Conference.[64]
Russian officers are persevering with efforts to deport youngsters to Russia beneath the guise of cultural packages. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Yevheniy Balitsky acknowledged on January 3 that the occupation Ministry for Youth Coverage, beneath the purview of the Russian federal mission “We Are Collectively,” plans to take youngsters and households of individuals within the battle to Moscow to attend “The Nutcracker.”[65] Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik acknowledged on January 2 that Russian occupation officers despatched 44 youngsters from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Moscow for the New 12 months vacation by means of the cultural program “Moscow – Open Metropolis.”[66] It’s unclear whether or not and beneath what circumstances these youngsters and their households will return to Ukraine. ISW has beforehand assessed that Russian officers are conducting a deliberate depopulation marketing campaign in occupied territories and notes that compelled deportation of kids is a possible violation of the Conference on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in addition to a constituent ingredient of a broader ethnic cleaning marketing campaign.[67]
ISW will proceed to report day by day noticed indicators in line with the present assessed most harmful plan of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine probably aimed toward Kyiv.
ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast a couple of potential Russian offensive towards northern Ukraine in winter 2023 stays a worst-case state of affairs inside the forecast cone. ISW presently assesses the chance of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, however potential, and the chance of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new part within the day by day replace just isn’t in itself a forecast or evaluation. It lays out the day by day noticed indicators we’re utilizing to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we count on to replace usually. Our evaluation that the MDCOA stays unlikely has not modified. We are going to replace this header if the evaluation modifications.
Noticed indicators for the MDCOA up to now 24 hours:
- Nothing important to report.
Noticed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA up to now 24 hours:
- Nothing important to report.
Noticed counter-indicators for the MDCOA up to now 48 hours:
- The Ukrainian Basic Employees reiterated that it has not noticed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 3.[68]
Notice: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these experiences. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/23160; http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/70322; https://t.me/mod_russia/22080
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/23160; http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/70322; https://t.me/mod_russia/22080
[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5WO7HsYLtR0
[5] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/421; https://understandingwar.org/backgroun… https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass…
[6] http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/70322
[7] https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/paperwork/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1…
[8] https://t.me/notes_veterans/7252 ; https://t.me/sashakots/37929; https://t.me/sashakots/37927
[9]https://defence.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/dailybrief/2022/09/CDS-Day by day-B… https://isw.pub/UkrWar12312022
[10] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/01/03/sposterigayetsya-stijka-tendencziya-do-vynyknennya-v-rosiyan-deficzytu-snaryadiv-ta-riznyh-naboyiv-sergij-cherevatyj/
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar12312022
[12] https://t.me/sashakots/37927 ; https://t.me/sashakots/37929
[13] https://t.me/notes_veterans/7252
[14] https://t.me/notes_veterans/7252
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[16] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/standing/1610277981032747009; https://t.me/rian_ru/190473
[17] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/standing/1610277981032747009; https://t.me/rian_ru/190473
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass… https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass… https://t.me/Viktor_Murakhovskiy/398; https://t.me/rybar/42463
[21] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MRa2LRNNPL1wxxfQd7p…
[22] https://twitter.com/blinzka/standing/1610264517467840513; https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/standing/1610194524856324096
[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/23151
[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/23151; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122822
[25] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/01/03/pvk-vagner-sergij-cherevatyj/
[26] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MRa2LRNNPL1wxxfQd7p…
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/10150
[28] https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/standing/1610225252558159876; https:/…
[29] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MRa2LRNNPL1wxxfQd7p…
[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/10150
[31] https://t.me/milchronicles/1453
[32] https://t.me/nm_dnr/9689; https://t.me/wargonzo/10150
[33] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MRa2LRNNPL1wxxfQd7p…
[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122822; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121422; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110922
[35] https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/standing/1610158395918778368; https://twitt…
[36] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NTR6eG4hhZS24wEqop…
[37] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/standing/1610042126770864131; https://twitter.com/NOELreports/standing/1609969778994585601; https://twi… https://t.me/oleksiihoncharenko/29863; https://twitter.com/small10space/standing/1609964267096113153
[38] https://www.fb.com/sergey.khlan/movies/699383645253900/
[39] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/standing/1610037457155940353; https://twitter.com/NOELreports/standing/1609995184380551169; https://twitter.com/fdov21/standing/1610001979438145536
[40] https://t.me/rusich_army/7089
[41] https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/standing/1610119057055055873; https://twitter.com/TWMCLtd/standing/1610046880221921281; https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/standing/1610219776382750721
[42] https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/standing/1610119057055055873; https://twitter.com/TWMCLtd/standing/1610046880221921281; https://twitter…
[43] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MRa2LRNNPL1wxxfQd7p…
[44] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/21057; https://t.me/rusich_army/7090
[45] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MRa2LRNNPL1wxxfQd7p…
[46] https://t.me/hueviyherson/32262; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/26213; h… https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/26204
[47] https://t.me/vrogov/6947; https://twitter.com/rollowastaken/standing/1610251561124478979; https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/standing/1610238630101909507
[48] https://t.me/readovkanews/50111; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/44155; https://t.me/razvozhaev/1789 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/1790; https://t.me/milinfolive/95094; https://t.me/milinfolive/95093
[49] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/03/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-zvozyty-svij-personal-na-zaes/
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/23157; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Doc/View/0001202301030003; https://interfax dot ru/russia/879569
[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/23157; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Doc/View/0001202301030003; https://interfax dot ru/russia/879569
[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/23157; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Doc/View/0001202301030003; https://interfax dot ru/russia/879569
[53] https://abif dot ru/data/information/vydacha-mobilizatsionnykh-povestok-v-bankakh-sushchestvenno-ne-otrazitsya-na-bankovskoy-sisteme-ross/; https://t.me/msk_gde/3561
[54] https://abif dot ru/data/information/vydacha-mobilizatsionnykh-povestok-v-bankakh-sushchestvenno-ne-otrazitsya-na-bankovskoy-sisteme-ross/
[55] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/6648
[56] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/6648
[57] https://t.me/kommunist/14651; https://kremlin dot ru/acts/information/7-311; https://lug-info dot com/information/putin-ustanovil-osobennosti-postupleniya-na-sluzhbu-v-organy-vnutrennih-del-v-novyh-regionah-rf
[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[59] https://gur.gov dot ua/content material/staviat-chto-pohyb-v-belhorode-a-ne-v-ukrayne.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVbCmJU26qw&ab_channel=%D0percent93percentD0percentBEpercentD0percentB…
[60] https://www.fb.com/100064570697084/posts/pfbid02VpknzXyvFZBX7UVHiq…
[61] https://www.fb.com/100064570697084/posts/pfbid02VpknzXyvFZBX7UVHiq…
[62] https://t.me/SBUkr/6413?single
[63] https://t.me/SBUkr/6413?single
[64] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949/article-3
[65] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/658
[66] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/660
[67] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111622; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder… https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/paperwork/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1…
[68] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MRa2LRNNPL1wxxfQd7p… ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NTR6eG4hhZS24wEqop…
