January 21, 7:45 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
The Ukrainian protection of Bakhmut is probably going a strategically sound effort regardless of its prices for Ukraine. Whereas the prices related to Ukraine’s continued protection of Bakhmut are vital and sure embrace alternative prices associated to potential Ukrainian counter-offensive operations elsewhere, Ukraine would even have paid a big worth for permitting Russian troops to take Bakhmut simply. Bakhmut itself will not be operationally or strategically vital however had Russian troops taken it comparatively quickly and cheaply they may have hoped to develop operations in ways in which might have pressured Ukraine to assemble hasty defensive positions in much less favorable terrain. One should additionally not dismiss the seemingly “political” calculus of committing to the protection of Bakhmut evenly—Russian forces occupy greater than 100,000 sq. kilometers of Ukrainian territory together with a number of Ukrainian cities and are inflicting atrocities on Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas. It’s not unreasonable for political and army leaders to weigh these components in figuring out whether or not to carry or cede explicit inhabitants concentrations. People haven’t needed to make such selections since 1865 and shouldn’t be fast to scorn concerns that may be very actual to them had been American cities dealing with such threats.
Ukrainian forces have beforehand employed an analogous gradual attrition mannequin to compel Russian operations in sure areas to culminate after months of struggling excessive personnel and tools losses in pursuit of marginal tactical good points. Russian troops spent months making an attempt to grind via efficient Ukrainian defenses in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk within the early summer season of 2022 and captured Lysychansk solely after a managed Ukrainian withdrawal from the realm.[1] The seize of Lysychansk and the Luhansk Oblast administrative border, nevertheless, shortly proved to be operationally insignificant for Russian forces, and the final word results of the Ukrainian protection of the realm was the pressured end result of the Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast, resulting in the general stagnation of Russian offensive operations in Donbas in the summertime and fall of 2022. Ukrainian protection of Bakhmut will probably contribute to an analogous outcome—Russian forces have been funneling manpower and tools into the realm since Might 2022 and have but to realize any operationally vital advances that significantly threaten the Ukrainian protection of the realm. ISW continues to re-evaluate its evaluation that the Russian offensive on Bakhmut could also be culminating however continues to evaluate that Ukrainian forces are successfully pinning Russian troops, tools, and total operational deal with Bakhmut, thus inhibiting Russia’s potential to pursue offensives elsewhere within the theater.
The West has contributed to Ukraine’s incapability to benefit from having pinned Russian forces in Bakhmut by slow-rolling or withholding weapons methods and provides important for large-scale counteroffensive operations.
Milblogger discourse surrounding the reported alternative of Colonel Common Mikhail Teplinsky with Lieutenant Common Oleg Makarevich as commander of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) has additional emphasised the fracture between two principal teams inside the Russian MoD—the pro-Gerasimov camp, comprised of those that symbolize the standard MoD institution, and milblogger favorites who’re much less aligned with the MoD establishment. A distinguished milblogger introduced Teplinsky’s alternative on January 20, triggering a wave of discontent amongst different milbloggers who voiced their confusion and concern over the state of affairs.[2] A number of milbloggers questioned why the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) would substitute a well-respected profession VDV commander with an “educational” with no fight expertise.[3] One milblogger remarked that the Russian MoD has now “eliminated” two of the “key” commanders of Russian operations in Ukraine—Teplinsky and former theater commander Army Common Sergey Surovikin (though Surovikin was merely demoted to a decrease command place moderately than faraway from workplace).[4] A number of milbloggers claimed that Teplinsky was dismissed following a disagreement with the Russian Common Workers, more than likely which means the Chief of the Common Workers Valery Gerasimov, concerning the usage of Russian paratroopers for deliberate offensive operations.[5] The staunch milblogger criticism of a transfer that was probably orchestrated by Gerasimov means that the Russian data house is more and more viewing modifications made inside the Russian MoD in a binary with the pro-Gerasimov camp on one hand and people perceived as milblogger favorites on the opposite.
The milblogger discourse on this difficulty moreover provides perception into inner Russian MoD dynamics which will have led to Teplinsky’s removing. The suggestion that Teplinsky was eliminated following an argument with the Common Workers over the usage of paratroopers in offensive operations means that Teplinsky could have resisted Gerasimov’s needs to make use of VDV forces to assist operations within the Bakhmut space, the place Russian offensive operations are largely targeted. ISW beforehand noticed that VDV forces took excessive losses within the early phases of the struggle and had been probably held in reserve following the Russian withdrawal from the proper (west) financial institution of Kherson Oblast within the fall of 2022. Teplinsky might have resisted committing VDV items to extremely attritional offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast which were largely led by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group on the grounds that conventional motorized rifle or tank items would have been extra acceptable or for extra purely parochial causes.[6] He could have resigned or been fired over the disagreement. Gerasimov probably seeks to weaken the numerous airborne mafia that has lengthy protected the airborne troops (that are a separate service from the bottom forces in Russia) from insurance policies and reforms that utilized to the bottom forces by changing Teplinsky with Makarevich, a floor forces officer with no VDV expertise.[7] Milblogger dialogue of this reported interplay means that Gerasimov is more and more in search of to commit typical Russian components, together with VDV components, to operations in Ukraine, and the ensuing pushback from the Russian data house signifies that his marketing campaign to take action is not going to be nicely acquired.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has launched a sequence of data operations aimed toward portraying himself as a sacrificial hero of Russia in a campaign in opposition to petty and corrupt Russian authorities. Prigozhin’s private press service on January 21 amplified a letter from the household of a deceased Wagner PMC soldier that contrasted “detached” native officers, who didn’t assist with the funeral of their son, with Prigozhin, who listens to their appeals.[8] The letter referred to Prigozhin as “the one Individual [sic] who will not be detached to the destiny of the Defender of Russia and his household.”[9] Prigozhin additionally responded to reviews that the Mayoral Workplace of Kamyshlovsky Raion, Sverdlovsk Oblast denied a Wagner Group fighter a funeral with honors with the declare that “we,” probably displaying solidarity with “the frequent man,” will “cope with this scum” and “pull their youngsters by the nostrils” to take part within the struggle in Ukraine.[10] These statements set Prigozhin at odds with unpopular Russian officers who function underneath a special algorithm from nearly all of Russians and enhance his enchantment as a “hero” of the unvoiced. Additionally they assist Prigozhin’s ongoing marketing campaign to realize authorized recognition – primarily within the types of recognition and funerary honors for Wagner PMC troopers – for Wagner PMC, as non-public army corporations stay unlawful in Russia.[11] Prigozhin is falsely portraying himself and Wagner Group as ethical entities that may proceed their ethical acts regardless of prosecution. Prigozhin claimed on January 20 that he wouldn’t thoughts if somebody introduced a legal case in opposition to him as a result of he would be capable to take part in Wagner PMC from jail and that worldwide fighters hunt down Wagner as a result of “name of their conscience.”[12]
Prigozhin is concurrently constructing his home energy base and status as a big worldwide actor in an effort that’s each fueled by and additional fuels his data operations in opposition to the Russian authorities. Wagner-affiliated information outlet RIAFAN printed staged footage of Wagner forces putting the our bodies of supposed Ukrainian troopers into coffins to ship again to Ukraine, and Prigozhin claimed that he advocated sending 20 truckloads of our bodies to Ukraine in a probable try to humanize Wagner Group and painting Wagner fighters as honorable whereas portraying Wagner Group as prepared and in a position to act instead of the Russian state to return struggle useless to the opposing aspect.[13] Some Russian milbloggers notably amplified this narrative of human and honorable Wagner fighters, whereas one other accused Wagner of staging the entire scene.[14] Prigozhin’s press service challenged US Coordinator for Strategic Communications on the Nationwide Safety Council John Kirby to call the struggle crimes Wagner Group has dedicated in response to the US Treasury designation of Wagner as a transnational legal group.[15] Prigozhin even claimed that the US designation of Wagner Group as a transnational legal group “lastly” signifies that the US and Wagner Group are “colleagues,” implying that the US can also be a transnational legal group.[16] Wagner Group continues to function militia coaching facilities in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts in a probable effort to offer army assist for areas that the Russian MoD supposedly neglects to defend, though neither faces any danger in opposition to which Wagner Group might defend.[17]
The Solar reported that US intelligence estimates whole Russian army casualties in Ukraine as 188,000 as of January 20, suggesting a potential 47,000 Russians killed in motion in lower than a 12 months of preventing.[18] The historic ratio of wounded to killed in struggle is 3:1, suggesting that Russian casualties in Ukraine up to now are near the whole US deaths within the Vietnam Warfare.[19] The US Nationwide Archives estimates that the whole US battle deaths in Vietnam is roughly 58,000 throughout eight years of preventing.[20] Soviet forces suffered 15,000 deaths throughout 9 years of struggle in Afghanistan, a threshold that the UK Ministry of Protection assessed Russian casualties surpassed in Might 2022 after simply three months of hostilities.[21]
Key Takeaways
- The Ukrainian protection of Bakhmut is probably going a strategically sound effort regardless of its prices for Ukraine.
- Milblogger discourse surrounding the reported alternative of Colonel Common Mikhail Teplinsky with Lieutenant Common Oleg Makarevich as commander of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) has additional emphasised the fracture between two principal teams inside the Russian MoD—the pro-Gerasimov camp, comprised of those that symbolize the standard MoD institution, and milblogger favorites who’re much less aligned with the MoD establishment. The milblogger discourse on this difficulty moreover provides perception into inner Russian MoD dynamics which will have led to Teplinsky’s removing.
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has launched a sequence of data operations aimed toward portraying himself as a sacrificial hero of Russia in a campaign in opposition to petty and corrupt Russian authorities.
- The Solar reported that US intelligence estimates whole Russian army casualties in Ukraine as 188,000 as of January 20, suggesting a potential 47,000 Russians killed in motion in lower than a 12 months of preventing.
- Russian forces performed a small floor reconnaissance into northeastern Sumy Oblast.
- Russian forces continued restricted floor assaults to regain misplaced positions alongside the Svatove-Kreminna line.
- Russian forces continued to conduct floor assaults round Bakhmut and west of Donetsk Metropolis. Russian forces are probably making incremental good points round Bakhmut.
- Obtainable open-source proof as of January 21 signifies that Zaporizhia Oblast Russian occupation official Vladimir Rogov’s January 20 claims of a significant territorial seize are probably a part of a Russian data operation.
- Complaints from Russian milbloggers point out that Russian forces proceed to depend on cell telephones and non-secure civilian applied sciences for core army features – critical breaches of operational safety (OPSEC).
We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity although we don’t describe them in these reviews.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Japanese Ukraine
- Russian Important Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and one supporting effort);
- Russian Subordinate Important Effort—Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts
- Actions in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Japanese Ukraine: (Japanese Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces performed a small floor reconnaissance into northeastern Sumy Oblast on January 20. Sumy Oblast Head Dmytro Zhivytsky reported {that a} 6-person Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group (DRG) tried to maneuver from Russia to the Yunakiv hromada of northeastern Sumy Oblast.[22] Ukrainian troops reportedly repelled the hassle.[23]
Russian forces continued restricted floor assaults to regain misplaced positions alongside the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 21. The Ukrainian Common Workers reported that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian assault close to Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove).[24] A Russian soldier deployed close to Svatove reported a Ukrainian artillery strike on a command publish within the space on January 20.[25] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai moreover reported heavy preventing close to Kreminna and that Russian forces are pulling reserves to the realm to compensate for continued losses.[26] The Ukrainian Common Workers reported Russian assaults within the Kreminna space close to Ploshchanka (15km northwest of Kreminna) and Chervonopopivka (5km north of Kreminna).[27] Geolocated footage posted by the Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) Folks’s Militia exhibits Russian forces preventing close to Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[28] The video claims that preventing is ongoing on each banks of the Siverskyi Donets River, which runs via the realm.[29]
Russian Important Effort—Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Important Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued floor assaults round Bakhmut and sure continued making incremental good points on January 21. The Ukrainian Common Workers reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian assaults on Bakhmut itself; north of Bakhmut close to Bilohorivka (20km northeast), Rozdolivka (17km northeast), Yasyukivka (15km north), Krasna Hora (5km north), and Yahidne (4km north); and west of Bakhmut close to Predtechyne (18km southwest).[30] The Ukrainian Common Workers report means that Russian forces could have superior into the western a part of Sil (northeast of Bakhmut) to assault towards Yasyukivka and that Russian forces could have additionally superior southwest of Bakhmut within the Klishchiivka-Kurdiumivka space to launch assaults on Predtechyne. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) moreover claimed that Russian troops took management of Dvorichchia (8km northeast of Bakhmut), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters captured Krasnopolivka (12km northeast of Bakhmut).[31] Geolocated footage exhibits that Russian forces have made incremental advances in southern Klishchiivka (about 8km southwest of Bakhmut) and on the southeastern outskirts of Bakhmut itself.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces try to maneuver from Dyliivka to Bila Hora (about 20km southwest of Bakhmut), probably in an effort to chop the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut freeway.[33]
Russian forces continued floor assaults on the western outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis on January 21. The Ukrainian Common Workers acknowledged that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian assaults close to Vodiane (on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis) and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis).[34] Geolocated footage posted on January 20 exhibits Ukrainian troops firing on Russian positions underneath the Pervomaiske bridge on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces proceed to battle for the western a part of Marinka.[36] A Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces performed a floor assault close to Novosilka, however this assault will not be confirmed.[37] Russian forces continued routine oblique fireplace alongside the Avdiivka-Donesk Metropolis line of contact and in western Donetsk and japanese Zaporizhia oblasts.[38]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions and safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes)
Obtainable open-source proof as of January 21 signifies that Zaporizhia Oblast Russian occupation official Vladimir Rogov’s January 20 claims of a significant territorial seize are probably a part of a Russian data operation. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) didn’t declare that Russian forces seized new territory in Zaporizhia Oblast on January 21, as a substitute claiming that unspecified components of the Russian Japanese Navy District (EMD) gained unspecified positions alongside extra “advantageous strains” in Zaporizhia Oblast, which undermines claims of serious territorial good points because the MoD would have probably echoed Rogov’s claims if the MoD thought of his claims believable.[39] A distinguished Russian milblogger claimed that the Orikhiv space is calm with some Russian reconnaissance group exercise on January 21 and indicated that Stepove, Novoandriivka, Novodanylivka, Mala Tokmachka, and Bilohirya stay contested, not Russian-controlled as Rogov claimed on January 20.[40] One other milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked Stepne and Mala Tokmachka and shelled areas together with Bilohirya on January 21.[41] Ukrainian official sources reported on January 21 that Russian forces shelled close to Maly Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, Novoandriivka, Novodanylivka, Mala Tokmachka, and Bilohirya, all six settlements that Rogov claimed Russian forces seized on January 20.[42] Rogov additionally claimed that Russian Pacific Fleet Naval Infantry items are intensifying unspecified offensive operations within the Hulyaipole space, however ISW has noticed no proof supporting Rogov’s declare.[43] Rogov is probably going operating his personal data operation to artificially inflate Russian battlefield successes in Zaporizhia Oblast, opposite to the Russian MoD’s personal informational objectives for the axis, for some cause.
Russian forces continued routine fireplace in opposition to areas in west (proper) financial institution Kherson Oblast and Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on January 21.[44] Russian sources reported that Russian tanks proceed to fireplace in opposition to areas within the Dnipro River Delta.[45] Ukrainian forces continued hanging Russian forces in east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast, together with Oleshky, Hola Prystan, Kozachi Laheri, Nova Zburivka, Tavriisk, and Kakhovka.[46]
Russian occupation authorities could also be struggling to say administrative management over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP). The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported on January 21 that Russian occupation authorities are unable to start out or function any of the ZNPP’s reactors as a result of Ukrainian workers refuse to cooperate with occupation authorities.[47] Russian nuclear power operator Rosenergoatom Advisor Renat Karchaa claimed that Ukrainian authorities are trying to recruit or coerce ZNPP personnel into appearing on behalf of Ukrainian pursuits, just like Ukrainian reviews of Russian occupation authorities’ techniques to coerce Ukrainian ZNPP personnel into cooperation.[48] Karchaa’s declare could also be an try to elucidate the dearth of Russian progress to restart the ZNPP and join it to the Russian energy grid. There’s at present no indication that Russian occupation authorities are struggling to take care of bodily management over the ZNPP and the encircling space. The Ukrainian Resistance Middle additionally reported that Russian forces proceed to militarize the ZNPP by erecting fortifications and different army buildings on ZNPP grounds.[49]
Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts (Russian goal: Increase fight energy with out conducting common mobilization)
Complaints from Russian milbloggers point out that Russian forces proceed to depend on cell telephones and non-secure civilian applied sciences for core army features—critical breaches of operational safety (OPSEC).[50] A number of milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) for making an attempt to limit the usage of cell telephones and Telegram and accused army management of being out of contact with the worth of know-how in trendy warfare.[51] Basic OPSEC practices prohibit troopers‘ use of insecure private units for army features. Nevertheless, the shortcoming of the Russian MoD to offer, combine, or generate assist for safe, efficient army alternate options signifies the inadequacy of the Russian army trade and the Russian MoD. Milblogger critiques of basic OPSEC practices point out vital self-discipline points and a disconnect between Russian commanders, Russian MoD coverage, and the frequent soldier. Separate milblogger criticism of MoD efforts to put accountability for army failures – such because the January 1 Ukrainian strike in opposition to a Russian Base in Makiivka – on poorly disciplined troops who use private units has probably additional decreased the legitimacy of the Russian MoD’s OPSEC insurance policies amongst many Russian troopers to the detriment of Russian forces OPSEC and total effectiveness.[52] Ongoing discussions inside the Russian nationalist group counsel that Russian officers are dropping credibility amongst line troopers and failing to dispel even primary OPSEC myths.[53] The Russian army’s reliance on a scrambled mix of hastily-trained mobilized forces, convicts, volunteers, and militia teams with inconsistent command buildings is probably going contributing to the decline in professionalism within the Russian army.
Russian milbloggers proceed to name consideration to Russian command and management failures as a result of appointment of newly mobilized civilians to management roles.[54] A milblogger claimed on January 21 that such “utterly incompetent” officers command platoons solely of mobilized troopers.[55] The milblogger questioned why Russian forces would even trouble creating new items of mobilized males in any respect whereas existent typical items stay understaffed and endure continued losses.[56] The milblogger claimed that Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) forces tried to create items comprised fully of mobilized troopers months earlier than Russian forces did so and that these items’ poor efficiency demonstrated the failure of such an concept.[57] Russian milbloggers accurately assessed that Russian reliance on poorly educated, newly-mobilized recruits for command positions, versus drawing commanders from Russia’s diminished officer cadre or selling skilled troopers and NCOs to NCO and command positions, severely hinders the effectiveness of mobilized forces. The inexperience of mobilized troopers serving in command positions probably contributed to the poor choices that enabled a extremely harmful Ukrainian strike on a Russian base in Makiivka on January 1, as ISW has beforehand reported.[58]
Russian authorities proceed efforts to revitalize Russia’s weak protection industrial base (DIB). A mainstream Russian information company reported on January 21 that Omsk Oblast is launching a six-month coaching program for protection enterprise specialists to expedite the normal two-year school course of.[59] Labor shortages, lack of planning, and endemic corruption will probably proceed to hobble efforts to reinvigorate Russia’s DIB, as ISW has beforehand reported.[60]
Some Russian minority communities proceed restricted resistance to official mobilization efforts. A Russian Telegram channel posted on January 21 a video of a Tuvan girl requesting that Russian authorities spare the lads of Tuva Republic from mobilization as a result of already small dimension of the Tuvan ethnic group.[61]
Russian forces could also be mobilizing emergency service workers in occupied territories to replenish manpower losses. The Ukrainian Resistance Middle and Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai reported on January 21 that Russian forces mobilized workers of the Luhansk Folks’s Republic Ministry of Emergency Conditions in occupied Alchevsk, Luhansk Oblast.[62]
Russian authorities proceed makes an attempt to streamline mobilization procedures for a probable second wave of mobilization and to handle bureaucratic challenges to mobilization efforts.[63] A Russian opposition information supply reported on January 20 that the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka Ministry of Emergency Conditions held workouts on January 12 to streamline procedures for processing mobilized troopers.[64] A Krasnoyarsk Krai information supply claimed on January 20 that Russian authorities responded to public outcry and formally dismissed mobilized troopers that authorities had deemed unfit for service however continued to pay and maintain in readiness for 3 months.[65] Russian officers proceed to unfold confusion with contradictory responses to debates over mobilization exemptions for fathers of three or extra youngsters, fathers of youngsters with disabilities, and solely youngsters of retired mother and father.[66]
Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of and annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance methods)
Russian forces proceed to commandeer healthcare assets and enhance pressure on army and civilian medical methods in occupied areas of Ukraine.[67] The Ukrainian Common Workers reported on January 21 that Russian forces positioned over 300 wounded troopers within the Starobilsk Metropolis Hospital in Luhansk Oblast.[68] Ukrainian officers famous that Russian forces proceed to deprioritize the therapy of civilians whereas exacerbating medical shortages by changing Ukrainian medical doctors.[69] Russian-led forces are trying to recruit to make good deficiencies in medical personnel. A Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel posted a particular recruitment hyperlink for these desirous about medical specialties on January 21.[70]
Russian occupation authorities proceed authorized and monetary efforts to legitimize their regimes and Russian governance. Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai acknowledged on January 21 that Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) officers held two pseudo-votes to undertake a regulation on referendums and kind an “election fee.” A Russian information supply reported that Russian majority state-owned financial institution Sberbank positioned ATMs in Sevastopol, Simferopol, Yalta, and Opolzneve, Crimea on January 21.[71]
Russian occupation authorities proceed to make use of coercive measures to strengthen management over civilians in occupied areas. The Ukrainian Common Workers reported on January 21 that Russian occupation authorities are making a database of civilian residences and weaponizing electrical energy cuts.[72] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Oleksandr Starukh acknowledged on January 21 that Russian forces have faked the “deportation” (probably referring to propaganda “evacuations”) of civilians and are as a substitute detaining them in basements.[73]
ISW will proceed to report day by day noticed Russian and Belarusian army exercise in Belarus.
ISW’s most harmful plan of action warning forecast a few potential main Russian offensive in opposition to northern Ukraine from Belarus seems more and more unlikely. ISW at present assesses the chance of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as very low. ISW will proceed reporting noticed indicators we’re utilizing to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we count on to replace usually.
Noticed vital army actions in Belarus up to now 24 hours that point out an assault from Belarus is extra probably:
- Nothing vital to report.
Noticed vital army exercise in Belarus up to now 24 hours that’s ambiguous:
- The Ukrainian Common Workers reported on January 21 that the Belarusian Ministry of Protection prolonged the Belarusian army’s ongoing complete readiness checks to January 30.[74] The Ukrainian Common Workers additionally reported that Russian forces are deploying unspecified territorial protection forces to Belarus, probably for coaching.[75]
- The Belarusian Ministry of Protection reported that Russian and Belarusian pilots continued conducting joint tactical flight workouts, probably as a part of the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) on January 21.[76] The Belarusian Ministry of Protection introduced that these workouts are occurring in any respect Belarusian airfields.[77]
- Belarusian components proceed conducting workouts in Belarus. Components of a mechanized battalion of the Belarusian a hundred and twentieth Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade performed workouts at a coaching floor close to Barysaw on January 21.[78]
Noticed vital army exercise in Belarus up to now 24 hours that signifies that an assault from Belarus stays unlikely:
- The Ukrainian Common Workers reiterated that it has not noticed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 21.[79] The Ukrainian Common Workers additionally reported that Russian items proceed coaching in Belarus.[80]
Be aware: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
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