January 2, 7:00 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Ukrainian air defenses reportedly intercepted all drones from two consecutive nights of Russian drone strike assaults towards Ukraine on December 31 – January 2. Ukraine’s air pressure reported on January 1 that Ukrainian air protection forces shot down all 45 Russian Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones that Russia fired at Ukraine on New 12 months’s Eve.[1] Ukrainian Air Drive Spokesman Yuriy Ignat acknowledged on January 1 that Ukrainian forces used the US-provided NASAMS air protection system to shoot down these drones.[2] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces intercepted all 39 Shahed-136 drones launched towards Ukraine between the night time of January 1 and a pair of.[3] The Ukrainian Basic Workers once more reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces shot down all 27 Shahed-136 drones that Russian forces launched towards Ukraine on January 2, although it’s unclear if this determine contains the beforehand reported intercepts from the night time between January 1 and a pair of.[4] Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Principal Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Vadym Skibitsky reiterated on January 1 that Russian forces solely have sufficient cruise missiles to conduct two to 3 extra large-scale missile assaults towards Ukraine.[5]
Russia’s air and missile marketing campaign towards Ukraine is probably going not producing the Kremlin’s desired info results amongst Russia’s nationalists. Russian forces performed a cruise missile strike towards an object in Khmelnytskyi Oblast — reportedly a base of the Ukrainian eighth Separate Special Forces Regiment — on December 31.[6] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that the strike, whereas well-executed and a great info operation, is just too little too late.[7] The blogger argued that Russia wanted to systematically conduct such strikes earlier on within the struggle, that the strike ought to have had follow-up strikes to make sure most injury, and that the timing of this strike was inopportune since Ukrainian components have been unlikely to be on the base on New 12 months’s Eve.[8] The blogger famous that this was not the primary time that Russian forces didn’t ship efficient strikes on account of an absence of secondary strikes and that Russia ought to typically be extra thorough in its destruction.[9]
A devastating Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on December 31 generated important criticism of Russian navy management within the Russian info house. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported {that a} Ukrainian precision strike on a Russian manpower and navy gear focus level in Makiivka destroyed as much as 10 items of apparatus however didn’t launch an official casualty quantity as of January 2.[10] The Division of Strategic Communications of the Ukrainian Armed Forces acknowledged on January 1 that the strike killed 400 mobilized personnel and injured 300.[11] Geolocated footage revealed on January 1 additionally positioned the aftermath of the strike on the Vocational Faculty No. 19, fewer than 13km east of the frontline.[12] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) acknowledged the strike, claiming that 4 of the six rockets killed 63 Russian servicemen.[13] Samara Oblast Governor Dmitry Azarov confirmed that among the many deceased servicemen are residents of the oblast, and a few Russian sources claimed that 600 servicemen of a mobilization regiment have been within the faculty constructing on the time of the strike.[14] Some milbloggers claimed that the dying depend was about 110, with over 100 wounded personnel.[15]
The Russian MoD is probably going making an attempt to deflect the blame for its poor operational safety (OPSEC) onto Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) officers and mobilized forces. DNR legislation enforcement officers instructed Russian state wires that the strike occurred when Russian servicemen violated operational safety through the use of private cell telephones, permitting Ukrainian forces to conduct a precision strike on the base.[16] Kremlin-leaning retailers and a few milbloggers amplified the declare, stating that Russian forces mustn’t underestimate the Ukrainian capacity to take advantage of poor OPSEC practices on the frontlines and known as on the Kremlin to introduce stricter pointers on cellphone use amongst servicemen.[17] Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) Deputy Inside Minister Vitaly Kiselyov amplified milblogger studies that navy commanders are demanding the resignation of DNR Head Denis Pushilin.[18] Some DNR public officers have additionally known as for the punishment of the official who had determined to make use of the college.[19] The Russian MoD might have intentionally relied on the DNR officers accountable OPSEC violations on mobilized servicemen for the assault in an effort to make the DNR the accountable occasion.
The Russian MoD’s obscure acknowledgment of the strike generated criticism in the direction of the Russian navy command, nevertheless. Wagner-affiliated milbloggers acknowledged that Russian navy command had made it simple for the Ukrainian forces to strike a number of hundred servicemen in a single location, calling the DNR clarification of cellphone utilization a “lie.”[20] A former Russian officer had additionally acknowledged that Russian forces saved ammunition within the faculty’s basement, enabling the devastating strike.[21] Different milbloggers acknowledged that the Russian command witnessed comparable strikes all through the previous 11 months however have been “criminally negligent” and didn’t disperse the Russian forces quartered in Makiivka into smaller teams additional within the rear.[22] A number of milbloggers referred to a Putin assertion concerning the necessity for the Ministry of Protection (MoD) to take accountability and take heed to criticism on December 21 whereas calling on the Kremlin to punish the commander liable for the OPSEC failures.[23] Wagner financier and avid critic of the Russian navy command, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, provided an uncharacteristic and obscure remark concerning the state of affairs — stating that he couldn’t reveal how Wagner prevents comparable OPSEC issues.[24] ISW beforehand reported on two different cases of mass milblogger criticism: the failed Russian river crossing in Bilohorivka in Might 2022 and the botched Russian offensive operation on Pavlivka in October 2022.[25]
Such profound navy failures will proceed to complicate Putin’s efforts to appease the Russian pro-war neighborhood and retain the dominant narrative within the home info house. Russian sources claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the navy and the Investigative Committee to analyze the incident in Makiivka by January 6.[26] Putin’s lack of ability to deal with the criticism and repair the failings in Russia’s navy marketing campaign might undermine his credibility as a hands-on struggle chief.
Russian sources responded lukewarmly to Russian President Vladmir Putin’s staged New 12 months’s handle, whereas Russian milbloggers lauded Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s appearances on the frontlines over the New 12 months’s holidays. A number of Russian milbloggers amplified social media criticisms that Putin used background actors somewhat than standing with actual troopers throughout his handle.[27] These criticisms and a sequence of Putin’s canceled public appearances and conferences with bizarre residents might present Putin as out of contact. One pro-Kremlin milblogger acknowledged the talk through an editorial in a preferred Russian newspaper through which he vehemently denied that Putin used actors at his speech.[28] Former militant commander and distinguished Russian milblogger Igor Girkin drew a direct comparability between Putin and Prigozhin.[29] Girkin posted that he wouldn’t touch upon Putin’s speech however that Prigozhin determined to combat paperwork and corruption and gave a sensational New 12 months’s speech.[30] In the meantime, a number of Russian sources praised Prigozhin for a sequence of appearances with actual Russian troopers on the frontlines in Ukraine on New 12 months’s Eve and New 12 months’s Day.[31]
Prigozhin used reporting on deceased Wagner Group mercenaries and his prominence in New 12 months’s options to proceed to push for authorized recognition of Wagner Personal Navy Firm (PMC) and to criticize bureaucrats not favorable to Wagner PMC. Prigozhin continues to hunt elevated legitimization of and state advantages for Wagner forces, though non-public navy corporations are unlawful in Russia.[32] Prigozhin instructed a reporter who questioned why Wagner troopers’ family usually are not receiving the our bodies of their deceased troopers that Wagner forces took care of the useless even on New 12 months’s whereas the Russian authorities, which is meant to supply dying certificates, has “[rested] for the reason that starting of the struggle.”[33] Prigozhin accused bureaucrats of desecrating the reminiscence of the useless by treating useless servicemembers as objects in plastic baggage.[34] Prigozhin publicly visited a Wagner-specific cemetery and memorial and the primary base of the Wagner Group in Krasnodar Krai on January 1.[35] Prighozhin has beforehand complained that Russian authorities refuse to permit for the burial of Wagner mercenaries in Russian navy cemeteries, as ISW has reported.[36]
The Kremlin is probably going co-opting some Russian milbloggers who’re prepared to promote out in change for political status. Distinguished Russian milbloggers Alexander Sladkov and Yevgeniy Poddubny attended the Kremlin primetime New 12 months’s Eve tv present Goluboy Ogonek 2023 in Moscow on December 31.[37] This program airs instantly after Putin’s annual New 12 months’s Eve speech and is attended by Putin and Kremlin political and cultural elites. Sladkov and Poddubny have each criticized the Russian navy’s failures in Ukraine. The creators of the distinguished Telegram channel Rybar had additionally acknowledged that they obtained affords to create an open-source intelligence (OSINT) program to profit Russian non-public companies and pressure constructions.[38] Rybar added that they already gave a lecture on the elite Russian state-run Moscow State Institute of Worldwide Relations (MGIMO) and are persevering with to work in Putin’s “particular navy operation” working group.
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian air defenses reportedly intercepted all drones from two consecutive nights of Russian drone strike assaults towards Ukraine on December 31 – January 2.
- Russia’s air and missile marketing campaign towards Ukraine is probably going not producing the Kremlin’s desired info results amongst Russia’s nationalists.
- A devastating Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on December 31 generated important criticism of Russian navy management within the Russian info house.
- The Russian MoD is probably going making an attempt to deflect the blame for its poor operational safety (OPSEC) onto Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) officers and mobilized personnel.
- Russian sources responded lukewarmly to Russian President Vladmir Putin’s staged New 12 months’s handle, whereas Russian milbloggers lauded Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s appearances on the frontlines over the New 12 months’s holidays.
- Russian forces continued to hold out unsuccessful makes an attempt to enhance their tactical positions northwest of Svatove after reportedly conducting a tactical pause.
- The Ukrainian Middle for Protection Methods reported that Russian forces are persevering with to deploy personnel on the Kharkiv-Siversk frontline.
- Ukrainian officers reported that Russian forces are redeploying alongside the japanese axis whereas struggling to keep up their tempo of artillery strikes.
- Russian forces tried restricted offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast and continued efforts to bolster defensive constructions.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to increase monetary guarantees made to Russian troopers as Ukrainian officers proceed to warn of an impending wave of Russian mobilization.
We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to guage and report on the results of those prison actions on the Ukrainian navy and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity although we don’t describe them in these studies.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Japanese Ukraine
- Russian Principal Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and one supporting effort)
- Russian Subordinate Principal Effort—Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Drive Era Efforts
- Actions in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Russian forces continued conducting unsuccessful makes an attempt to enhance their tactical positions northwest of Svatove on January 1 and a pair of, after reportedly conducting a tactical pause across the New 12 months’s vacation. A Russian milblogger claimed that each Ukrainian and Russian forces performed a tactical pause on New 12 months’s however have probably resumed preventing round January 2.[39] A Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces attacked Stelmakhivka (about 16km northwest of Svatove) on January 2 however didn’t describe the end result.[40] The Ukrainian Basic Workers additionally reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault on Stelmakhivka.[41] One other Russian supply claimed that heavy artillery duels continued alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove line and acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are reconnoitering Russian positions within the neighborhood of Kyslivka, Pervomaiske, and Vilshana.[42]
Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian counterattacks round Kreminna on January 1 and a pair of. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Japanese Group of Forces Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Bilohorivka (roughly 13km southeast of Kreminna), and the Luhansk Oblast Administration reported that Ukrainian forces eradicated a Russian armored group close to Ploshchanka (roughly 13km northwest of Kreminna).[43] A Russian milblogger additionally claimed that Russian forces tried an assault on Ploshchanka however didn’t specify an consequence.[44] One other Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces are getting ready a large-scale assault close to Kreminna and famous that Russian forces predict a Ukrainian counteroffensive operation as soon as the bottom freezes within the space.[45] The supply additionally added that Ukrainian forces are erecting pontoon crossings southwest of Kreminna and are reconnoitering Russian positions close to Dibrova (roughly 6km west of Kreminna), Kreminna, and Bilohorivka. ISW makes no effort to evaluate the validity of those claims.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a sequence of HIMARS assaults on Russian rear positions in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Pervomaisk, Chmyrivka (on the japanese outskirts of Starobilsk), Svatove, and Rubizhne in occupied Luhansk Oblast with HIMARS.[46]
The Ukrainian Middle for Protection Methods, a Ukrainian nationwide safety assume tank, reported that Russian forces are largely working Western and Central Navy District (WMD and CMD) components on Kharkiv-Siversk frontline. The middle famous that 23 to twenty-eight Russian battalion tactical teams (BTGs) of the Western and Central Navy districts presently cowl about 154km of frontline on this sector with a selection of about 5.5km per BTG.[47] The Middle recognized that WMD components of 1st Tank Army and its 4th and forty seventh Tank Divisions; sixth Mixed Arms Army (CAA), third Motorized Rifle Division of the twentieth CAA, and the eleventh Army Corps (AC) of the Baltic Fleet, CMD components of the 90th Tank Division, 201st Navy Base (the Russian base in Tajikistan), 2nd CAA, and forty first CAA, Northern Navy District components of the 14th AC, Russian airborne components of the 76th Air Assault Division, 106th Airborne Division, and separate particular operations forces of the Airborne Forces are working on this course.[48] The report moreover acknowledged that components of the Donetsk and Luhansk 1st and 2nd Army Corps and Wagner Group components are additionally preventing on this frontline. These BTGs are probably not at their regular finish power and are degraded from fight. ISW additionally notes that the UK MoD reported on November 29 that the Russians are not deploying in BTG formations.[49]
Japanese Ukraine: (Japanese Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian Principal Effort—Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Principal Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces are redeploying alongside the japanese axis whereas struggling to keep up the tempo of artillery strikes. Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Japanese Group of Forces Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty acknowledged on January 2 that Russian forces have decreased their charge of shelling from 20–80,000 rounds per day to a most of 20,000 per day and are looking for Soviet 122mm and 152mm caliber ammunition shops each domestically and internationally.[50] Cherevaty acknowledged that Russian forces prioritize shelling the Bakhmut and Avdiivka frontline over different areas of the entrance. The Ukrainian Middle for Protection Methods acknowledged on January 1 that two Russian battalion tactical teams (BTGs) of the 137th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 106th Guards Tula Airborne Division arrived close to Popasna, Luhansk Oblast, and are anticipated to function within the Popasna-Soledar or Popasna-Bakhmut instructions.[51] These BTGs are probably degraded and demoralized.
Russian forces continued to conduct floor assaults close to Bakhmut and Avdiivka on January 1 and a pair of at a low charge of advance. Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have closely fortified the residential space round Bakhmut so there’s a new line of protection “each 10 meters.”[52] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported on January 1 and a pair of that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian floor assaults close to Bakhmut; north of Bakhmut close to Krasna Hora; northeast of Bakhmut close to Soledar, Bilohorivka, Rozdolivka, and Bakhmutske; south of Bakhmut close to Ozaryanivka; and southwest of Bakhmut close to Klishchiivka.[53] A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces captured a number of Ukrainian positions close to Klishchiivka, and geolocated footage exhibits that Russian forces have made marginal advances close to the settlement.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior as much as 1.7km within the Soledar-Bakhmutske space and captured Ukrainian positions northeast of Bakhmut close to Pidhorodne, however ISW can’t verify these claims.[55] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian floor assaults southwest of Avdiivka close to Opytne and Krasnohorivka on January 2.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that preventing is ongoing close to Marinka and that Russian forces are trying to advance from the Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Opytne instructions in the direction of Kamianka.[57]
A distinguished Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian offensive towards Vuhledar in southern Donetsk Oblast has “closed,” supporting ISW’s latest evaluation that the Russian offensive alongside the Donetsk Oblast frontline is probably going culminating.[58] The milblogger famous that Russian forces conduct day by day offensive operations alongside the complete japanese axis, however that these actions are largely tactical in nature.
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued restricted floor assaults throughout the southern axis between January 1 and a pair of. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk acknowledged on January 2 that Ukrainian forces proceed to repel Russian makes an attempt to assault Ukrainian positions in Kherson Oblast on the left (east) financial institution of the Dnipro River and pressure Russian troops to regroup.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 2 that Russian forces performed a raid on Ukrainian positions in Novopokrovka, Zaporizhia Oblast and that Russian forces entrenched themselves in captured Dorozhnyanka, having superior by means of to Myrne (10.5km west of Dorozhnyanka).[60] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) alleged that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked within the neighborhood of Dorozhnyanka.[61] ISW can’t independently confirm these claims. Russian forces continued to shell settlements alongside the southern axis.[62]
Varied sources continued to report that Russian forces are establishing defenses and rebuilding pressure capacities in Zaporizhia Oblast and Crimea. Sentinel satellite tv for pc imagery exhibits trench constructions apparently accomplished by Russian troopers as of December 29 alongside the P37 street close to Bohdanivka in central Zaporizhia Oblast.[63] Ukraine’s Middle for Protection Methods reported on January 1 that Russian forces are deploying “territorial troops” (shaped from mobilized males in mild infantry items), endeavoring to revive fight functionality to the 205th and thirty fourth Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades of the forty ninth Army, and deploying a logistics hub and two logistics routes in Crimea and southern Zaporizhia Oblast.[64] Advisor to the Ukrainian Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko equally acknowledged on January 2 that Russian authorities deployed freshly mobilized troopers to Urzuf, Donetsk Oblast (4km from the border with Zaporizhia Oblast).[65] Satellite tv for pc imagery exhibits that Russian forces expanded the Belbek Air Base in Crimea between June 30, 2022 and January 1, 2023.[66] [67]
Russian forces additionally continued defensive operations in Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk acknowledged on January 1 that Russian forces are getting ready for defensive operations on the left (east) financial institution of the Dnipro River.[68] Humenyuk reported that Russian forces preserve a major, unspecified variety of forces within the south regardless of pressure shortages alongside the japanese axis and that Russian forces are bringing mobilized reserve forces to the frontlines in Kherson Oblast.[69] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst shared photos of Russian forces allegedly conducting river patrols within the swamps south of Kherson Metropolis.[70] The Ukrainian Basic Workers acknowledged on January 1 that Russian forces are shelling settlements on the left (east) financial institution of the Dnipro River throughout from Kherson Metropolis to coerce the native inhabitants into evacuating and destabilize the humanitarian state of affairs in Kherson Oblast.[71]
Ukrainian forces proceed to strike concentrations of Russian personnel and gear alongside the southern axis.[72] The Ukrainian Basic Workers acknowledged on January 2 that Ukrainian forces struck Tarasivka, Basan, Polohy, Berdyansk, and Tokmak, killed greater than 175 Russian troopers, and destroyed a Russian ammunition depot and 12 items of weapons and navy gear.[73] An OSINT analyst amplified unconfirmed studies from native residents that Ukrainian forces struck the Arabatska Spit in Crimea within the night time between January 1 and a pair of, inflicting a panic amongst native authorities.[74]
Mobilization and Drive Era Efforts (Russian goal: Increase fight energy with out conducting common mobilization)
Some Russians proceed to problem Russian force-generation efforts. A Russian information outlet reported that an unidentified man threw a Molotov cocktail on the gate of a navy recruitment heart in Moscow on January 1.[75]
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to increase monetary guarantees made to Russian troopers and compound monetary burdens positioned on the Russian state by Russian force-generation efforts. Putin issued a decree on December 30 extending a November 2 decree that granted a one-time cost of 195,000 rubles (about $2,747) to mobilized males and troopers who signed a contract after the declaration of partial mobilization to incorporate troopers known as up for service within the Russian Nationwide Guard (Rosgvradia) and Rosgvradia troopers who signed a contract after September 21.[76]
Official Ukrainian sources proceed to warn of a coming Russian wave of mobilization, which is able to apply to residents of Russia and occupied territories in southern Ukraine.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported on January 2 that though Russian mobilization has by no means slowed, Russia will strengthen mobilization measures and shut Russian borders to isolate the nation over an unspecified timeframe.[78] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Russian occupation authorities in Crimea are checking lists of individuals of unspecified citizenship topic to mobilization in 2023.[79]
Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of and annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, financial, navy, and governance techniques)
Russian occupation authorities proceed efforts to consolidate the authorized and administrative techniques of occupied Ukrainian territories to help an effort to manipulate them as Russian federal topics. Russian occupation authorities formally banned the usage of the Ukrainian hryvnia (Ukraine’s nationwide foreign money) on January 1 and introduced that each one transactions all through occupied territories in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts should be tendered within the Russian ruble.[80] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported on January 2 that Ukrainians in occupied territories are largely ignoring this ban towards the hryvnia.[81] The Luhansk Oblast Navy Administration acknowledged on January 1 that Russian occupation officers will select a Head of the Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) as stipulated within the new Structure of the Luhansk Folks’s Republic of the Russian Federation that Russian authorities adopted on December 30.[82]
Russian occupation authorities search to control utilities and housing in occupied Ukraine as Russian authorities do in Russia. A Russian supply claimed on January 1 that DNR occupation authorities started growing charges for housing and utility providers in DNR territory so to equalize them with the prices in different Russian federal topics.[83] The supply acknowledged that charges in DNR territory are 2–2.5 occasions decrease than these in Russia’s neighboring Rostov Oblast.[84] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko acknowledged on January 1 that Russian occupation authorities started dispersing utility payments to residents of Mariupol after Russian authorities elevated the tariffs.[85]
Russian forces and occupation authorities continued intensifying filtration measures in occupied territories on January 1–2. The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported on January 2 that Russian forces blocked civilians from coming into or leaving occupied Polovinkine, Luhansk Oblast, to topic residents (whom Russian forces accused of facilitating strikes on Russian positions) to filtration measures.[86] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported on January 1 that Russian forces intensified counterintelligence measures in occupied Lyman Druhyi, Kharkiv Oblast, to establish pro-Ukrainian civilians.[87]
Russian occupation authorities proceed to repurpose civilian infrastructure in occupied territories for navy use. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported on January 1 that Russian forces are treating wounded Wagner forces at a maternity hospital in Pervomaiske, Luhansk Oblast.[88] The Luhansk Oblast Navy Administration acknowledged that Russian forces have positioned over 350 wounded Russian servicemen at a beforehand repurposed civilian hospital in Bilovodsk, Luhansk Oblast as of January 1 — a rise since December 29 when solely 100 wounded servicemen have been reportedly current on the hospital.[89]
ISW will proceed to report day by day noticed indicators in step with the present assessed most harmful plan of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine probably geared toward Kyiv.
ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast a few potential Russian offensive towards northern Ukraine in winter 2023 stays a worst-case situation inside the forecast cone. ISW presently assesses the chance of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, however potential, and the chance of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new part within the day by day replace will not be in itself a forecast or evaluation. It lays out the day by day noticed indicators we’re utilizing to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we count on to replace repeatedly. Our evaluation that the MDCOA stays unlikely has not modified. We’ll replace this header if the evaluation adjustments.
Noticed indicators for the MDCOA prior to now 48 hours:
- Nothing important to report.
Noticed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA prior to now 48 hours:
- A Ukrainian Principal Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR) consultant acknowledged on January 2 that Russian forces intend to conduct offensive actions towards Ukraine in 2023, however that Ukrainian intelligence doesn’t but know the place Russian forces will assault.[90] The consultant acknowledged that Russian forces may assault Ukraine from the north and the east concurrently and that Ukraine is prepared for any situation.[91]
Noticed counter-indicators for the MDCOA prior to now 48 hours:
- A Ukrainian Principal Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR) consultant emphasised on January 2 that Russian forces in Belarus should not have the potential to conduct an assault towards northern Ukraine.[92]
- The Ukrainian Basic Workers reiterated that it has not noticed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 2.[93]
Word: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these studies. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
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