December 11, 9 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated marketing campaign replace at present, December 11. This report discusses how the Belarusian regime’s assist for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in addition to Russian stress on Belarus to change into extra concerned additional constrains Belarusian readiness and willingness to enter the struggle in Ukraine.
Russian officers persistently conduct info operations suggesting that Belarusian typical floor forces would possibly be part of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Belarusian leaders together with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko typically play together with these info operations. The aim of those efforts is to pin Ukrainian forces on the Belarusian border to stop them from reinforcing Ukrainian operations elsewhere within the theater. Belarus is awfully unlikely to invade Ukraine within the foreseeable future regardless of the course of those info operations. A Belarusian intervention in Ukraine, furthermore, wouldn’t be capable to do greater than draw Ukrainian floor forces away from different elements of the theater briefly given the extraordinarily restricted efficient fight energy at Minsk’s disposal.
The Kremlin’s efforts to stress Belarus to assist the Russian offensive marketing campaign in Ukraine are part of a long-term effort to cement additional management over Belarus. ISW beforehand assessed that the Kremlin intensified stress on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to formalize Belarus’ integration into the Union State following the Belarusian 2020 and 2021 protests.[1] Russia significantly sought to ascertain everlasting army basing in Belarus and direct management of the Belarusian army.[2] Russia has routinely tried to leverage its affect over Belarusian safety and army affairs to position stress on Belarus to assist its invasion of Ukraine.[3] ISW assessed that Russian Minister of Protection Army Basic Sergei Shoigu meet with Lukashenko on December 3 to additional strengthen bilateral safety ties – probably within the context of the Russian-Belarusian Union State – and enhance Russian stress on Belarus to additional assist the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[4]
The Belarusian regime’s assist for the Russian invasion has made Belarus a cobelligerent within the struggle in Ukraine. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko provided Belarusian territory to Russian forces for the preliminary staging of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[5] Belarusian territory provided vital floor traces of communication (GLOCs) to the Russian Armed Forces of their failed drive on Kyiv and their subsequent withdrawal from northern Ukraine.[6] ISW has beforehand assessed that Belarus materially helps Russian offensives in Ukraine and supplies Russian forces with safe territory and airspace from which to assault Ukraine with high-precision weapons.[7]
Belarusian assist for Russia’s struggle in Ukraine is probably going degrading the Belarusian army’s materials capability to conduct typical army operations of its personal. The Belarusian open-source Hajun Mission reported on November 14 that the Belarusian army transferred 122 T-72A tanks to Russian forces, probably below the guise of sending them for modernization work within the Russian Federation.[8]The Hajun Mission reported on November 17 that Belarus transferred 211 items of army gear to Russian Armed Forces, together with 98 T-72A tanks and 60 BMP-2s.[9] The confirmed switch of 98 T-72 tanks represents roughly 18 % of the Belarusian stock of energetic principal battle tanks, in line with the Worldwide Institute for Strategic Research’ 2021 Navy Steadiness report.[10] It’s unclear if the 98 transferred tanks are a part of the 122 tanks designated for modernization or if they’re a separate assortment of apparatus. Neither is it clear that the tanks despatched to Russia had been a part of the energetic Belarusian tank park or autos held in storage or reserve. Belarus lacks capabilities to provide its personal armored combating autos making the switch of this gear to Russian forces each a present and a probable long-term constraint on Belarusian materials capacities commit mechanized forces to the combating in Ukraine.[11]
Belarus can also be probably drawing down its stock of artillery munitions by munitions transfers to the Russian army. The Ukrainian Primary Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 3 that Belarus has been transferring 122mm and 152mm artillery ammunition to Russian Armed Forces all through October and November.[12] The GUR reported on November 17 that Belarusian authorities are fascinated with establishing a closed cycle of manufacturing for these artillery shells and that Belarusian officers deliberate to satisfy with Iranian officers to debate such closed manufacturing cycles of artillery munitions.[13] The GUR additionally reported on October 11 {that a} prepare with 492 tons of ammunition from the Belarusian forty third Missile and Ammunition Storage Arsenal in Gomel arrived on the Kirovske Railway Station in Crimea on an unspecified date.[14]
Belarusian officers are probably making an attempt to hide the quantity of army gear they’re sending to Russia to assist its invasion of Ukraine. The Hajun Mission reported on November 5 that the Belarusian State Safety Committee, Ministry of Inner Affairs, and the Belarusian Special Forces have instituted enhanced safety and surveillance of rail infrastructure and have banned trains carrying army gear from passing by Belarusian cities.[15] Belarusian authorities probably try to stop Western and Ukrainian intelligence businesses from totally assessing that extent of the Belarusian army gear transfers to Russia. Belarus could also be sending extra in depth quantities of army gear to Russian forces. Belarusian authorities may additionally be making an attempt to cover the extent of the transfers in an effort to mitigate the doable backlash in opposition to Lukashenko‘s degradation of the nation’s army capability and subservience to Moscow.
The Belarusian army is probably going dealing with constraints on its capability to coach present and new personnel on account of its supporting function in Russian power era efforts. The Belarusian army is continuous to coach Russian mobilized army personnel on the 230th Mixed Arms Obuz-Lesnovsky Coaching Floor in Brest, Belarus and at different coaching services close to Mozyr, Gomel, and Mogilev in Belarus as a part of the Union States’s Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV).[16] The Belarusian Ministry of Protection reportedly drafted 10,000 conscripts into the Belarusian Armed forces as part of its autumn conscription marketing campaign, the same quantity to these drafted within the autumn cycle in 2021.[17] The Belarusian coaching of those mobilized Russian servicemembers coincides with the beginning of the Belarusian army’s educational 12 months.[18] The GUR reported on September 29 that Belarus was making ready to accommodate as much as 20,000 mobilized Russian servicemembers.[19] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported on November 25 that 12,000 Russian personnel had been stationed in Belarus.[20] ISW beforehand assessed that Russian forces deployed the mobilized males for coaching in Belarus as a part of the RGV on account of Russia‘s degraded coaching capability.[21]
The Belarusian army probably has a comparatively restricted capability to coach present and new personnel. The Belarusian army has solely six maneuver brigades and is comprised of roughly 45,000 energetic personnel break up into two command headquarters.[22] The small Belarusian army probably has restricted coaching capability and infrastructure to assist its personal power era efforts. Belarusian army officers are actually chargeable for coaching a minimum of two instances as many servicemembers because the Belarusian army usually trains. Belarusian assist for Russian power era efforts would probably additionally constrain it from having the ability to prepare extra Belarusian army personnel if Lukashenko wished to extend the variety of drafted conscripts within the subsequent conscription cycle to organize for doable losses in fight following a putative Belarusian invasion of Ukraine.
The degradation of the Russian army by devastating losses in Ukraine would additionally hinder the deployment of Belarusian mechanized forces to battle alongside Russian troops. Belarusian forces ought to theoretically be capable to function in mixed items with Russian mechanized forces. ISW beforehand assessed that Russia pursued efforts to combine the Belarusian army into Russian-led buildings in joint army workouts and everlasting joint mixed fight coaching facilities earlier than the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[23] The Belarusian army coordinated with the Russian army within the Zapad-2021 joint workouts in September of 2021 during which Russian and Belarusian items fashioned joint ”cellular tactical teams” that operated as single army items on the battalion stage.[24] These mixed items require a excessive diploma of coordination and army coaching, and due to this fact Russian and Belarusian forces used elite items in such efforts. Russian items that took half within the joint workouts with Belarusian forces included components of the 1st Guards Tank Army, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, the 20th Mixed Arms Army, the thirty first Guards Air Assault Brigade, and the 106th Guards Airborne Division, all elite items that ISW has assessed have been severely degraded in Ukraine.[25] These Russian items now probably lack the aptitude to function in mixed formations with Belarusian forces and sure are unable to function successfully in mixed operations. Belarusian forces would probably must function along with poorly educated mobilized Russian personnel in the event that they entered the struggle in Ukraine.[26] The end result of efforts to kind and use such mixed items in fight is prone to be poor.
Lukashenko’s assist for Russia’s struggle in Ukraine and Russian stress on Belarus to hitch the combating are probably inflicting friction inside the Belarusian army. The Ukrainian Basic Employees reported on December 7 that troopers of the Belarusian border service and the Belarusian Armed Forces are more and more dissatisfied with the actions of the Belarusian military-political management because of the menace of Belarus coming into the struggle in Ukraine.[27] Ukrainian sources reported on November 13 that social tensions between Belarusians and Russian forces in Brest Oblast intensified as Russian forces strained native hospitals on account of unsanitary situations on the 230th Mixed Arms Obuz-Lesnovsky Coaching Floor.[28] The GUR reported on November 6 that inside memos from senior Belarusian army officers present quite a few complaints from rank-and-file Belarusian servicemen about tensions with Russian mobilized personnel, significantly in relation to derogatory ethnic statements.[29]
Belarusian personnel are definitely conscious of the numerous losses that Russian forces suffered in Ukraine and sure don’t want to expertise the identical consequence. An October 25 CNN report detailed how the Belarusian army and hospitals handled many Russian casualties because the Russian army offensive to seize Kyiv failed.[30] Belarusian items that educated with elite Russian items which have since suffered heavy losses combating in Ukraine are additionally probably conscious of the extent of the casualties that the Russian military has confronted in Ukraine. These Belarusian items probably know that their items and the Belarusian army as a complete wouldn’t fare higher than Russian items that had been way more succesful and well-trained.
Parts inside the Belarusian army have proven resistance to the thought of coming into the struggle in Ukraine. A Belarusian lieutenant colonel posted a viral video on February 27 during which he referred to as upon Belarusian army personnel to refuse orders if instructed to enter the struggle in Ukraine.[31] It’s probably that some components of the Belarusian Armed Forces would specific reluctance or outright refusal if Lukashenko determined to invade Ukraine.
Lukashenko’s setting of knowledge situations probably additional constrains Belarusian willingness to enter the struggle. Lukashenko continues to set informational situations to withstand Russian stress to enter the struggle in Ukraine by claiming that NATO is making ready to assault Belarus.[32] Lukashenko would probably wrestle to set info situations justifying the Belarusian army’s involvement to the south in Ukraine that didn’t clearly contradict the supposed menace of NATO forces to the west that he has framed to the Belarusian public. Belarusian officers’ repeated invocations of the specter of NATO could have additionally instilled a misguided perception amongst some Belarusian authorities and army officers {that a} defensive posture in western Belarus is important.
Belarus is already unlikely to invade Ukraine on account of inside dynamics inside the nation. ISW has beforehand assessed that Lukashenko doesn’t intend to enter the struggle in Ukraine on account of the opportunity of renewed home unrest if his safety equipment weakened by participation in a expensive struggle in Ukraine.[33] Lukashenko relied upon components of the Belarusian Armed Forces along with Belarusian safety companies to quell fashionable protests in opposition to his rule in 2020 and 2021.[34] Committing a considerable quantity of that safety equipment to the struggle in Ukraine would probably go away Lukashenko open to renewed unrest and resistance. Lukashenko can also be probably conscious that invading Ukraine would undermine his credibility because the chief of a sovereign nation as it will be evident that Russia’s effort to safe full management of Belarus had succeeded.
Belarusian entry within the struggle would at worst power Ukraine to briefly divert manpower and gear from present entrance traces. Ukrainian Basic Employees Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov acknowledged on November 24 that 15,000 Belarusian army personnel, along with the 9,000 Russian personnel stationed in Belarus, may theoretically take part within the struggle with Ukraine.[35] Even when Lukashenko dedicated a considerably bigger variety of his forces to an offensive into Ukraine, the Belarusian army would nonetheless be a small power that will be unable to attain any substantial operational success. ISW has beforehand assessed {that a} Russian or Belarusian offensive from Belarus wouldn’t be capable to minimize Ukrainian logistical traces to the West with out projecting deeper into Ukraine than Russian forces did through the Battle of Kyiv, when Russian forces had been at their strongest.[36] A Belarusian invasion couldn’t make such a drive, nor it may it critically threaten Kyiv. Belarus’ entry into the struggle would at worst divert Ukranian forces away from present entrance traces in japanese Ukraine.
Belarus will proceed to assist Russia battle its struggle in Ukraine though Lukashenko is very unlikely to ship his military to hitch the combating. Belarus can provide materials to Russia that Russia can’t in any other case supply on account of worldwide sanctions regimes in opposition to the Russian Federation that don’t affect Belarus.[37] Belarusian provision of territory and airspace permits Russian forces to assist their offensive operations in Ukraine and conduct their strikes on Ukrainian civilian targets from a protected haven.
Russian officers will proceed to conduct info operations aimed toward suggesting that Belarusian forces would possibly invade Ukraine in an effort to pin Ukrainian forces on the Belarusian border. These info operations are terribly unlikely to herald precise Belarusian intervention within the foreseeable future.
Key inflections in ongoing army operations on December 11:
- The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) denied rumors on December 11 that Basic Valery Gerasimov resigned or was faraway from his place as Chief of the Basic Employees.[38]
- Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that combating continues alongside the Svatove-Kreminna line and close to Lyman amidst poor climate situations.[39]
- A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces transferred over 200 items of apparatus from the Kherson path to the Kupyansk path, and geolocated footage reveals Russian T-90 tanks in Luhansk Oblast headed west.[40] A Ukrainian official acknowledged {that a} bigger Russian power grouping doesn’t at present pose a menace.[41]
- Russian forces made marginal territorial positive factors round Bakhmut as Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued combating within the space.[42] A Ukrainian Armed Forces Japanese Group spokesperson acknowledged that Russian forces modified ways from utilizing battalion tactical teams (BTGs) to smaller assault teams for offensive actions.[43]
- Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Skadovsk, Hola Prystan, Oleshky, and Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, all alongside main Russian logistics traces.[44]
- Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian army base in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[45] One supply claimed that the strike killed as much as 200 Russian army personnel.[46]
- Ukrainian officers reported that Russian occupation authorities intensified pressured mobilization measures in occupied Ukraine.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces face shortages of blood for wounded army personnel and are operating donor drives in occupied Crimea.[48]
- A Ukrainian partisan group claimed accountability for setting fireplace to a Russian army barracks in Sovietske, Crimea.[49] Ukrainian and Russian officers reported that Russian authorities continued filtration and regulation enforcement crackdowns in occupied Ukraine.[50]
[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-forced-integration-russiapercentE2percent80percent94not-protest-movementpercentE2percent80percent94-lukashenkopercentE2percent80percent99
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-forced-integration-russiapercentE2percent80percent94not-protest-movementpercentE2percent80percent94-lukashenkopercentE2percent80percent99 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-russia-opens-permanent-training-center-belarus-and-sets-conditions
[3]https://isw.pub/RusCampaignMar11 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignMar21 ; https://isw.pub/UkraineInvasionUpdate20 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust21 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept29 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct18
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120322
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/map/russian-forces-belarus-january-25-2022 ; https://isw.pub/InitialRusCampaignAssessment ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-3
[6] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignApr3
[7] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct11
[8] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5792
[9] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5830
[10] Worldwide Institute for Strategic Research 2021 The Navy Steadiness, 183-184 ( https://hostnezt.com/cssfiles/currentaffairs/Thepercent20Militarypercent20Balancepercent202021.pdf )
[11] Worldwide Institute for Strategic Research 2021 The Navy Steadiness, 183-184 ( https://hostnezt.com/cssfiles/currentaffairs/Thepercent20Militarypercent20Balancepercent202021.pdf )
[12] https://gur.gov dot ua/content material/za-deiakymy-vydamy-ozbroiennia-rosiia-vzhe-vykorystovuie-stratehichnyi-zapas.html
[13] https://gur.gov dot ua/content material/v-bilorusi-planuiut-nalahodyty-vyrobnytstvo-snariadiv-dlia-stvolnoi-artylerii-ta-rszv.html
[14] https://gur.gov dot ua/content material/okupanty-prodovzhuiut-perekydaty-na-terytoriiu-bilorusi-dronykamikadze-shahed136.html
[15] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5733
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28 ; ; https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5717 ; ; https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5900 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RdkUN4VDMb4WU8WgfzGVhnoVLzZ1XNNruZPgXHHkYBYivXUzPKKmD6cWZgEVqnH3l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/22459 ; . https://t.me/mod_russia/22459
[17] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5597 ; https://motolko.assist/ru-news/komplektovanie-srochnikami-vs-rb-kakim-rodam-vojsk-otdaetsya-naibolshee-predpochtenie/ ; https://primepress dot by/information/ekonomika/otpravka_v_voyska_prizyvnikov_osennego_prizyva_nachalas_v_belarusi-39008/
[18] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5888
[19] https://gur dot gov.ua/content material/v-bilorusi-hotuiutsia-pryiniaty-20-tysiach-mobilizovanykh-z-rf.html
[20] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/25/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-rozgortaty-vijska-v-bilorusi/
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112822
[22] Worldwide Institute for Strategic Research 2021 The Navy Steadiness, 183-184 ( https://hostnezt.com/cssfiles/currentaffairs/Thepercent20Militarypercent20Balancepercent202021.pdf )
[23] Russia’s Zapad-2021 Train | Institute for the Research of Warfare (understandingwar.org) ; Russia in Evaluate: Russia Opens Everlasting Coaching Middle in Belarus and Units Situations for Everlasting Navy Basing | Institute for the Research of Warfare (understandingwar.org)
[24] Russia’s Zapad-2021 Train | Institute for the Research of Warfare (understandingwar.org)
[25]https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct3;https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct10 ;https://isw.pub/RusCampaignApr3; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJune8
[26] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct10
[27]https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08ERrBJJor2mUkZyp3z7qAYGSXEcycpnnpqAq7QSBq6U1HZiixVz9wGkcBxMNDtLrl
[28]https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YCSX87CsqK2udvjM2z98ry1BcCQHfDkcNhtd5fHqe2wTWo53uMBfwjmyZCBVFUyMl
[29] https://gur.gov dot ua/content material/sered-rosiiskykh-chastkovo-mobilizovanykh-u-bilorusi-spalakh-zakhvoriuvan-cherez-nedotrymannia-sanitarnykh-umov.html
[30] https://version.cnn.com/interactive/2022/10/europe/belarus-hospitals-russian-soldiers-ukraine/index.html
[31] https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/standing/1497911200692289544
[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1
[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10
[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-kremlin-enables-lukashenko-resume-crackdown-belarus-protest ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-violent-confrontation-between-protesters-and-military-likely ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-opposition-continues-unify-lukashenko-continues-crackdown ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-belarusian-security-forces-escalate-violence-against-protesters
[35] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLG2IZaEQf0; https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/11/24/10-15-tysyach-biloruskyh-sylovykiv-gotovi-voyuvaty-proty-ukrayiny-za-rosijski-zarplaty/
[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20
[37] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust21
[38] https://t.me/readovkanews/48710; https://t.me/swodki/201791; https://t.me/notes_veterans/6986; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/43559; https://t.me/arnamax/6304; https://t.me/mig41/22438; https://t.me/mod_russia/22588
[39] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10249; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10250; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/9827; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/20536; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10253; https://t.me/stranaua/79881; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02BaPRkC1tPp53SEWzh7xRVaYDtdYTy5eT1qnaVEGGnXnrpXoCLjmzyQ8Htm9t3dU8l; https://t.me/mod_russia/22572; https://t.me/wargonzo/9704
[40] https://twitter.com/Danspiun/standing/1601718010162839552; https://t.me/notes_veterans/6984
[41] https://t.me/stranaua/79876
[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/22572; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02BaPRkC1tPp53SEWzh7xRVaYDtdYTy5eT1qnaVEGGnXnrpXoCLjmzyQ8Htm9t3dU8l; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026zZzZfMLuTFAs1uGTQfXELBRmgeqbWPqj5XYQL5NHcp9qBvzNFaDr4vSmLT3vCCtl; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/standing/1601883386943246337
https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/standing/1601856772049965056; https://t.me/robert_magyar/239
https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/standing/1601688657316175873
https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/standing/1601696466200059904; https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/standing/1601675015619248128
https://twitter.com/blinzka/standing/1601684321814728704; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/24517; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/54951; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72569; https://t.me/brussinf/5367; https://t.me/wargonzo/9704;
[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/11/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-okupanty-zminyly-taktyku-vedennya-bojovyh-dij-sergij-cherevatyj/
[44] https://t.me/readovkanews/48700; https://t.me/readovkanews/48663; https://suspilne dot media/336006-pivtora-miljona-ludej-na-odesini-bez-svitla-es-pogodivsa-nadati-18-milardiv-ukraini-291-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://t.me/hueviyherson/30748
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/22572; https://t.me/nm_dnr/9569; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/587; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/586; https://t.me/vrogov/6438; https://t.me/vrogov/6441; https://t.me/vrogov/6432; https://t.me/readovkanews/48671; https://t.me/wargonzo/9701; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/standing/1601860410755682304
https://t.me/izvestia/114955; https://t.me/rybar/41913; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/standing/1601697039452364800
https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/standing/1601682486861660161; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/standing/1601825348404273153; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/standing/1601703038640877568; https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/standing/1601702987654889472
https://t.me/rian_ru/188336; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35233; https://ria.ru/20221211/melitopol-1837856255.html;
[46] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/standing/1601856383472881666
[47]https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02BaPRkC1tPp53SEWzh7xRVaYDtdYTy5eT1qnaVEGGnXnrpXoCLjmzyQ8Htm9t3dU8l; https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/12/11/rosiyany-aktyvizuyut-mobilizacziyu-na-tot/; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7366; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7367
[48] https://t.me/rybar/41912; https://t.me/dva_majors/6687
[49] https://t.me/atesh_ua/267
[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/9570; https://www.fb.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid029vwMB4NrzykBNWV1NSsLoLkt43hGLqpEFTpvrDFy92KPdYqDiyb4DTBN1ZGWybiyl?__cft__[0]=AZWT5akh1meKaLw08dbViXATtycy0dVuw9cN6O_8iiIdiOEzTyMRRsuyO4TyTshmMFKF3lc_Qwm5BES4SoX_8savwlb37zw9HT8DS54DQ5cq25ozwlWw-CqYu5KtFslt8agtB10kN9CJDFWX8BQGx5xE&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1022
