August 19, 7:30 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Current Ukrainian strikes on Russian army and transportation infrastructure in Crimea and Kherson Oblast are doubtless lowering Russian confidence within the safety of Russian rear areas. Stories from August 18 about Ukrainian strikes are affecting the Russian info house although these stories have been doubtless overblown. Obtainable open-source proof signifies that Ukrainian forces didn’t conduct a profitable kinetic assault in opposition to both the Stary Oskol Air Base in Belgorod or Belbek Air Base in Crimea on August 18. Geolocated footage reveals {that a} hearth began at a discipline simply south of the Stary Oskol Airfield (moderately than on the airfield itself), and satellite tv for pc imagery reveals Russian forces transporting ammunition and army tools to a forest near the sector.[1] An unspecified Russian Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official reiterated that Russian air defenses close to the Kerch Strait Bridge activated in opposition to a Ukrainian unmanned aerial car (UAV) moderately than an incoming strike.[2] There is no such thing as a visible proof of harm to both air base of as August 19. Geolocated footage reveals no explosions or proof of kinetic exercise close to the Belbek Air Base in a single day on August 18-19, lending credence to claims that footage reportedly exhibiting the explosion is recycled footage misattributed to the Belbek Air Base.[3] As ISW reported on August 18, Russian sources largely reported on and disseminated these false or exaggerated stories, indicating broader Russian panic.[4]
Russian authorities are visibly rising safety measures in Crimea, indicating rising fear amongst Russian authorities and civilians about the specter of Ukrainian strikes on rear areas beforehand believed to be safe. Russian authorities put in checkpoints to go looking Ukrainian automobiles and determine saboteurs in Sevastopol.[5] Sure Russian milbloggers made dramatic, pessimistic assessments that Ukrainian forces used strikes on the Kerch Strait Bridge and Belbek Air Base to conduct reconnaissance on Russian air and missile protection readiness and make assessments for brand new assaults, significantly the feasibility of a big strike.[6] Ukraine’s Middle for Strategic Communications (UA StratCom) reported on August 19 that Russian forces aren’t accountable for the scenario in Crimea as evidenced by the blocking of the Kerch Strait Bridge and activation of air alarms in Sevastopol for the primary time because the begin of the invasion.[7] UA StratCom warned that Ukrainian forces haven’t but struck the Kerch Strait Bridge with full capabilities and that prior Ukrainian strikes on the bridge reveal that the bridge will not be as protected because the Russians beforehand believed.[8]
The scenario on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP) remained largely unchanged on August 19, regardless of the Russian Ministry of Protection’s August 18 claims that Ukrainian forces would stage a provocation on the ZNPP on August 19. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled the ZNPP at night time on August 18-19 however didn’t declare that Ukrainian forces launched a large-scale assault on the power, opposite to Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) statements on August 18.[9] Zaporizhia Oblast Head Oleksandr Starukh emphasised on August 19 that the scenario on the ZNPP stays tense however below management.[10]
Ukraine’s Most important Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian authorities are doubtless making ready to carry present trials for Ukrainian troopers in Mariupol round August 24, notably coinciding with Ukraine’s Independence Day.[11] The GUR warned that Russian authorities intend to carry a present trial of captured fighters from the Azovstal Metal Plant within the Mariupol Philharmonic Theatre and should use the theatre to stage a false-flag assault on August 24.[12] Mariupol Mayor Advisor Petro Andryushchenko confirmed that the Mariupol occupation administration canceled rehearsal schedules on the theatre with the intention to accommodate the present trials, which ISW beforehand reported on August 11.[13] As ISW beforehand reported, these present trials will doubtless be orchestrated with the intention to create the impression for Russian home audiences that Russian occupation authorities are taking mandatory steps to safe occupied areas in addition to try and demoralize Ukrainian troops.[14] Russian authorities are doubtless orienting the trials round Ukraine’s Independence Day with the intention to set additional info circumstances to exert legislation enforcement management of occupied areas.
Key Takeaways
- Current Ukrainian strikes on Russian army and transport infrastructure in Crimea and Kherson Oblast are doubtless lowering Russian confidence within the safety of Russian rear areas.
- The scenario on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP) remained comparatively unchanged on August 19 regardless of Russian claims that Ukrainian forces would stage a provocation on the plant.
- Russian authorities are doubtless making ready present trials of Ukrainian defenders of Azovstal on Ukraine’s Independence Day with the intention to additional consolidate occupational management of occupied areas of Ukraine and set circumstances to demoralize Ukrainian troops.
- Russian forces carried out restricted floor assaults north of Kharkiv Metropolis, southwest and southeast of Izyum, east of Siversk, and south and east of Bakhmut.
- Russian forces carried out a number of unsuccessful floor assaults on settlements on the Southern Axis.
- Russia continues to generate regional volunteer models and can doubtless deploy lots of them to Kherson and Ukraine’s south as a part of the third Army Corps.
- Russian occupation authorities are strengthening their management of instructional infrastructure in occupied areas in preparation for the approaching college yr and could also be sending Ukrainian youngsters to Russia as a part of a broader repopulation marketing campaign.
We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these stories.
- Most important Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Subordinate Most important Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops within the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk Oblast
- Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv Metropolis
- Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
- Mobilization and Drive Technology Efforts
- Actions in Russian-occupied Areas
Most important Effort—Japanese Ukraine
Subordinate Most important Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian goal: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Japanese Ukraine and seize the whole thing of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces carried out restricted floor assaults southwest and southeast of Izyum close to the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border on August 19. Russian troops tried to interrupt by way of Ukrainian defensive strains within the space of Karnaukhivka, Dibrovne, Virnopillya, and Nova Dmytrivka—all inside 25 km southwest of Izyum.[15] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces additionally carried out a floor assault close to Dolyna, 25 km southeast of Izyum and alongside the E40 Izyum-Slovyansk freeway.[16] Russian troops additionally shelled the Kramatorsk Know-how and Design Faculty.[17]
Russian forces carried out restricted floor assaults east of Siversk on August 19. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian troops tried to advance on Siversk from Ivano-Darivka (10 km southeast of Siversk) and Vyimka (7 km southeast of Siversk).[18] Russian troops shelled Siversk and the encircling settlements.[19]
Russian forces continued floor assaults to the east and south of Bakhmut on August 19. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian troops tried to advance on Soledar (10 km northeast of Bakhmut) from round Stryapivka and Volodymyrivka.[20] Russian troops, together with Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) components, continued to struggle within the japanese outskirts of Soledar, doubtless with the intention to consolidate management of the close by part of the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk freeway.[21] Russian troops additionally continued floor assaults south of Bakhmut round Kodema, Zaitseve, and Klynove, all inside 15 km southeast of Bakhmut. The Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) Territorial Protection claimed that DNR troops within the Horlivka space took management of the northern a part of Zaitseve (totally different from the aforementioned Zaitseve and about 20 km southwest of Bakhmut) and Dacha (15 km south of Bakhmut).[22] ISW can not independently affirm the standing of management of those two settlements, however Russian forces within the Horlivka space are doubtless persevering with efforts to achieve management of settlements alongside the T0513 Horlivka-Bakhmut freeway with the intention to enhance stress on Bakhmut from the southwest.
Russian forces carried out restricted floor assaults to push west of the outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis on August 19. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian troops carried out assault operations within the route of Pervomaiske (15 km northwest of Donetsk Metropolis) and fought round Opytne and Pisky, each on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis.[23] Russian sources additionally continued to report that Russian troops management greater than two-thirds of Marinka on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis and that makes an attempt to advance by way of the remainder of the settlement are sophisticated by Ukrainian fortifications.[24] Russian forces continued to focus on Ukrainian positions alongside the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis frontline with artillery strikes.[25]
Russian forces carried out a restricted floor assault southwest of Donetsk Metropolis within the route of the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border on August 19. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian troops tried to enhance their tactical positions close to Novomykhailivka, 25 km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis.[26] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian troops have reportedly moved to help an encirclement of Vuhledar (45 km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis) and brought management of the encircling settlements of Pavlivka and Vodyane.[27] Whereas ISW can not independently confirm these claims, Russian forces will doubtless proceed operations round Vuhledar to achieve entry to the highway that runs northeast into Marinka with the intention to help efforts to push west of the Donetsk Metropolis space.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv Metropolis (Russian goal: Defend floor strains of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and forestall Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces tried a restricted floor assault north of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Pytomnyk and shelled Kharkiv Metropolis and surrounding settlements on August 19.[28] The UK Protection Ministry (UK MoD) reported that, regardless of a restricted Russian drive presence on the Kharkiv Metropolis Axis, Russian forces have shelled Kharkiv Metropolis constantly because the begin of the battle and carried out small-scale floor assaults to forestall Ukrainian forces from reallocating personnel from this axis to different axes.[29] The UK MoD’s report confirms ISW’s earlier assessments of the restricted Russian deal with Kharkiv Metropolis and spoiling assaults north of town.[30] Russian forces carried out airstrikes on Staryi Saltiv and remotely mined each Verkhnii Saltiv and Staryi Saltiv northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis on the left financial institution of the Siverskyi Donets River.[31]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts in opposition to Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces carried out a number of unsuccessful floor assaults in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts on August 19. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces withdrew to their unique positions after launching an unsuccessful floor assault within the Oleksandrivka-Stanislav route.[32] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to interrupt by way of Ukrainian defenses close to an unspecified village named Kirove (doubtless referring to Zarichne in Mykolaiv Oblast west of Arkhanhelske as a result of Zarichne was once referred to as Kirove), roughly 5 km south of the Mykolaiv – Dnipropetrovsk oblast border.[33] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued conducting offensive actions to seize new settlements alongside the Southern Axis. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces encountered two unspecified Russian airborne models throughout offensive Ukrainian operations in an unspecified space in Kherson Oblast on August 18.[34]
Russian forces continued specializing in sustaining occupied strains and stopping Ukrainian advances alongside the Southern Axis on August 19.[35] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces carried out lively reconnaissance of Ukrainian anti-aircraft positions within the Zaporizhia route and continued UAV reconnaissance alongside the Southern Axis.[36] The Ukrainian Common Employees additionally reported that Russian forces carried out airstrikes close to Lozove and Bila Krynytsia, each close to the Ukrainian bridgehead throughout the Inhulets River.[37] Russian forces additionally carried out airstrikes close to Novosilka, close to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border, Shcherbaky (roughly 40 km south of Zaporizhia), and Dorozhnyanka (roughly 112 km southeast of Zaporizhia Metropolis).[38] Russian forces continued shelling alongside the whole line of contact utilizing tank, tube, and rocket artillery.[39]
Russian forces continued to focus on settlements in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on August 19. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian forces used tube artillery to strike civilian infrastructure in Nikopol and Marhanets, each situated throughout the Dnipro River from Russian-occupied positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[40] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched eight S-300s missiles on instructional and civilian infrastructure in Mykolaiv Metropolis at night time on August 18-19.[41]
Ukrainian forces once more struck the bridge close to the Nova Kakhovka Hydroelectric Energy Plant at night time on August 18-19.[42] Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan confirmed that Ukrainian forces “destroyed” Russian plans to revive and reopen the bridge to move army tools in Kherson Oblast.[43]
Mobilization and Drive Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Develop fight energy with out conducting basic mobilization)
Newly shaped Russian volunteer battalions are deploying or making ready to deploy to Ukraine. Native media outlet Amur Press reported that the Khabarovsk Krai “Baron Korf” indicators battalion will help the deployment of Russian discipline posts in Kherson Oblast and supply command and management to the brand new Russian third Army Corps—a unit nonetheless in formation to which lots of the newly noticed Russian volunteer models are subordinated—indicating the Kremlin will doubtless deploy lots of its new volunteer models to Kherson and Ukraine’s south.[44] Native Kirov media reported that a component of Kirov Oblast’s “Vyatka” battalion deployed to Ukraine, and native media filmed roughly 60-70 males of the “Vyatka” battalion at a pre-deployment ceremony.[45] ISW beforehand reported that the “Vyatka” battalion had virtually completed assembling as of July 9.[46] As ISW has beforehand assessed, these volunteer models are unlikely to generate important fight energy.[47]
Russian federal topics (areas) are persevering with to kind volunteer models. The Kabardino-Balkarian Republic Army Commissariat introduced on August 18 that the republic is recruiting for the “Kabardino-Balkaria” volunteer regiment that will likely be a component of the forty second Motorized Rifle Division (of the 58th Mixed Arms Army of the Southern Army District).[48] The Commissariat introduced that it’s accepting volunteers aged 18-50 years with salaries of 168,000-200,000 rubles ($2,695-3,368) per thirty days for basic army service, and 18-50 years previous for salaries of 200,000-300,000 rubles ($3,368-5,053) per thirty days for deploying to Ukraine.[49] The regiment provides contracts for lengths of three months, one yr, and three years.[50]
Rostov Oblast State Duma Deputy Viktor Vodolatsky introduced on August 18 that Rostov Oblast is forming the Cossack “Don” volunteer brigade, recruiting males aged 18-60 years previous and requiring no prior army service.[51] The “Don” volunteer brigade provides 200,000 ruble-per-month salaries, 40,000 rubles ($674) to buy provides and tools, and contracts for 3 and 6 months.[52]
Native Russian information outlet New Companion reported on August 16 that Perm Oblast is forming the 2nd “Parma” volunteer battalion, which is at the moment coaching earlier than deploying to Ukraine.[53] ISW beforehand reported on the formation of the first “Parma” and “Molot” battalions, and New Companion reported that the “Molot” volunteer tank battalion accomplished recruitment and is at the moment coaching at unspecified coaching grounds earlier than deploying to Ukraine.[54]
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov seems involved about his means to regulate Chechen models in Ukraine, presumably impacting his means to recruit for Chechen army and volunteer models. Kadyrov claimed that the “blood feud” between Chechens is efficient at deterring aggression between pro-Russia Chechens and Ichkerian Chechens, who Kadyrov claimed ally themselves in opposition to Russia and with Ukraine.[55] Kadyrov claimed that Ichkerian Chechens will reply for his or her disloyalty and crimes in opposition to the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, whatever the final result of the battle.[56] Kadyrov’s rant signifies a rising concern in regards to the Chechens he can not management and can’t persuade or simply compel to hitch the Russian army.
Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of occupied areas; set circumstances for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or another future political association of Moscow’s selecting)
Russian occupation authorities are strengthening management of instructional infrastructure in occupied areas of Ukraine in preparation for the approaching college yr. DNR Head Denis Pushilin met with a member of the United Russia Occasion on August 19 to debate the event of schooling in Donbas, which reportedly consists of the “retraining” of academics in accordance with Russian curricula.[57] Pushilin said that United Russia will present faculties in Donbas with all mandatory instructional supplies as a part of the continuing “Books for Donbas” marketing campaign, which is probably going an effort to saturate faculties in occupied areas with Russian instructional materiel and successfully erase Ukrainian curricula. LNR Head Leonid Pasechnik equally secured the patronage of Russia’s Astrakhan Oblast, which can oversee the reconstruction of instructional infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[58] Russian-backed head of the Zaporizhia occupation administration, Yevheny Balitsky, signed an schooling cooperation settlement with the Russian political group “Russian Society: Information,” which Balitsky claimed intends to facilitate data improvement and participation in varied schooling platforms.[59] Such measures point out that Russian occupation officers are taking actions to safe management of the educating and dissemination of Russian-approved curricula in occupied areas, in addition to contributing to the bodily reconstruction of faculties and different instructional establishments with the intention to combine occupied areas into the Russian system.
Russian officers, nevertheless, are doubtless encountering widespread resistance from Ukrainian residents who don’t wish to take part within the Russian-controlled schooling system. The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported that Russian authorities are pressuring Ukrainian mother and father into sending their youngsters to Russian-run faculties in occupied areas by fining households who don’t enroll in Russian faculties as much as 148,000 rubles.[60]
Russian officers could also be conducting mass deportation campaigns of Ukrainian youngsters below the guise of taking youngsters to Russia to attend youth camps and extracurricular packages. Throughout a working assembly with the United Russia celebration, Pushilin said that youngsters from Donbas will likely be supplied the chance to “relaxation” in Russia and take part in all-Russia youth packages as a part of the broader instructional cooperation settlement between the DNR and United Russia.[61] Russian-backed head of the Kherson occupation administration Kirill Stremousov said that his administration has despatched 1,500 youngsters from Kherson Oblast to Russian “resorts” as of August 19.[62] Russian occupation authorities could also be utilizing the façade of partaking youngsters with Russian youth packages in Russia to conduct pressured deportation, probably as a part of an prolonged inhabitants substitute marketing campaign.
Be aware: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these stories. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
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