August 18, 7pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
There have been no claimed or assessed Russian territorial beneficial properties in Ukraine on August 18, 2022 for the primary time since July 6, 2022.[1] Russian and Ukrainian sources didn’t declare any new territorial beneficial properties on August 18. Nevertheless, Russian forces nonetheless carried out restricted and unsuccessful floor assaults throughout the japanese axis on August 18.
Russian sources reported explosions throughout Crimea—probably brought on by Russian air defenses, Ukrainian reconnaissance, or a Ukrainian assault—the night time of August 18. Three native sources advised Reuters that no less than 4 explosions struck round Belbek Airbase in Russian-occupied Crimea, close to Sevastopol.[2] The Russian-appointed governor of Sevastopol, Mikhail Razvozhaev, claimed that preliminary info indicated that Russian air defenses shot down a Ukrainian drone and induced no injury.[3] Video of a big explosion that circulated on social media within the speedy aftermath of the reported explosions was from a earlier engagement on August 8 and isn’t from the neighborhood of the airbase.[4]
Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian air defenses shot down a drone close to the Kerch Bridge between Crimea and Russia on the night time of August 18 as social media footage confirmed energetic air defenses within the space.[5] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak had tweeted on August 17 that the Kerch bridge was illegally constructed and ”should be dismantled.”[6] The railway facet of the Kerch bridge is a vital goal for Ukraine to disrupt Russian logistics capabilities into occupied Ukraine. Social media movies additionally claimed to depict energetic Russian air defenses at a Russian base in Nova Kakhova in southern Kherson oblast the night time of August 18, suggesting a probably coordinated sequence of Ukrainian assaults, if there have been assaults, or drone overflights.[7]
ISW can not independently confirm whether or not Russian air defenses shot down a Ukrainian UAV, or whether or not any UAV was current in Kerch or Belbek. A Russian social media person posted video claiming to be at Belbek on the night of August 18, exhibiting no obvious proof of a strike there.[8] Ukrainian forces will probably proceed their marketing campaign to strike Russian navy targets in Russian-occupied Crimea to degrade Russian logistics capabilities and degrade Russian capabilities to maintain operations on the west financial institution of the Dnipro River, as ISW beforehand assessed.[9] Nevertheless, it’s unclear on the time of publication whether or not the reported explosions are as a result of Ukrainian assaults or reconnaissance, poor Russian dealing with of navy tools, profitable Russian air defenses, or nervous Russian defenders who’re probably steeling themselves for extra assaults in areas that the Russian navy had believed till now to be out of the vary of Ukrainian forces.
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) seems to be setting info circumstances responsible Ukrainian forces for future false flag operations on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (NPP). The chief of Russia’s Radiation, Chemical, and Organic Protection Forces, Lieutenant Normal Igor Kirillov, claimed in an August 18 briefing that Ukrainian forces are getting ready for a provocation on the Zaporizhzhia NPP and that the provocation is supposed to coincide with UN Secretary Normal Antonio Guterres’ go to to Ukraine.[10] Kirillov accused Ukrainian forces of getting ready to stage this provocation to be able to blame Russia for inflicting a nuclear catastrophe and create a 30km-wide exclusion zone across the NPP.[11] Kirillov’s briefing, which was amplified by the Russian MoD, coincides with experiences that Russian authorities advised Russian NPP workers to not are available to work tomorrow, August 19.[12] Leaked footage from throughout the plant exhibits 5 Russian vehicles very near one of many reactors on the NPP on an unspecified date, which can point out the Russian forces are setting circumstances to trigger a provocation on the plant and to shift the data narrative responsible Ukraine for any kinetic occasions that happen on the territory of the plant.[13]
Key Takeaways
- There have been no claimed or assessed Russian territorial beneficial properties in Ukraine on August 18, 2022 for the primary time since July 6, 2022.
- Russian sources reported a sequence of unidentified and unconfirmed explosions throughout Crimea on the night time of August 18.
- The Russian Ministry of Protection could also be setting info circumstances responsible Ukraine for a false flag assault on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant.
- Russian forces carried out floor assaults south of Siversk and northeast and south of Bakhmut.
- Russian forces continued conducting offensive operations north, west, and southwest of Donetsk Metropolis.
- Russian forces carried out an unsuccessful floor assault on the Zaporizhia axis.
- Ukrainian officers confirmed extra strikes on a Russian navy base and warehouse in Kherson Oblast.
- The Kremlin is probably going leveraging established Cossack organizations to help Russian pressure technology efforts.
- Russian occupation officers continued preparations for the long-term integration of occupied territories of Ukraine into Russia.
We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those prison actions on the Ukrainian navy and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity although we don’t describe them in these experiences.
- Major Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Subordinate Major Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops within the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv Metropolis
- Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
- Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts
- Actions in Russian-occupied Areas
Major Effort—Japanese Ukraine
Subordinate Major Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian goal: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Japanese Ukraine and seize everything of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces didn’t conduct any confirmed floor assaults alongside the Izyum-Slovyansk line and shelled settlements close to the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border on August 18.[14] The Russian Ministry of Protection claimed {that a} Russian artillery strike focused Ukrainian positions in Mazanivka (about 20km northwest of Slovyansk), confirming ISW’s management of terrain evaluation that Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian troops out of the settlement.[15]
Russian forces tried to advance on Siversk from the south on August 18. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian troops unsuccessfully tried to advance from Mykolaivka (about 15km southwest of Siversk) to Vyimka (about 5km southeast of Siversk).[16] Russian sources claimed that Russian troops are persevering with to battle alongside the japanese ring of Siversk within the neighborhood of Serebryanka, Verkhnokamyanske, and Ivano-Darivka.[17] Russian troops additionally continued artillery and air strikes on Siversk and surrounding settlements.[18]
Russian forces continued floor assaults northeast and south of Bakhmut on August 18. Russian troops continued efforts to advance southwest on Bakhmut alongside the T1302 freeway from Soledar and reportedly tried to advance from Volodymyrivka to Soledar.[19] The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian troops tried to advance on Bakhmut from Pokrovske, about 10km east of Bakhmut.[20] Russian forces, reportedly together with Wagner Group mercenaries, continued pushing north on Bakhmut from Klynove, Kodema, and Semihirya, all inside roughly 15km of the southern outskirts of Bakhmut.[21] The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces try to advance on Bakhmut from the northern outskirts of Horlivka within the space of Holmivsky and Zaitseve.[22] Russian operations close to Horlivka are probably supposed to achieve entry to the T0513 Horlivka-Bakhmut freeway, which signifies that Russian forces are probably making an attempt to advance on Bakhmut alongside three strains: from Horlivka to the southwest alongside the T0513, from Soledar to the northeast alongside the T1302, and from the Klynove-Vershyna space alongside the E40 freeway.
Russian forces carried out a sequence of floor assaults on the northern and western outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis on August 18. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces tried to advance in the direction of Avdiivka (10km northwest of Donetsk Metropolis) from the route of Verkhnotoretske and Novoselivka Druha—15km and 7km northeast of Avdiivka, respectively.[23] Russian forces additionally reportedly tried to push west of their positions in Pisky in the direction of Pervomaiske, about 10km west of Pisky.[24] A number of Russian sources additionally posted footage claiming to point out Russian troops consolidating positions in Marinka, which lies on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis.[25] Russian forces continued heavy artillery strikes in opposition to fortified Ukrainian positions in and round Avdiivka and west of Donetsk Metropolis to help ongoing floor assaults.[26]
Russian forces carried out a restricted floor assault southwest of Donetsk Metropolis on August 18. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian troops unsuccessfully tried to enhance their tactical positions and advance from Taramchuk (25km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis) in the direction of Vodyane (35km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis).[27] Russian sources claimed that Russian and Donetsk Individuals’s Republic (DNR) troops continued combating close to Vuhledar, about 45km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis.[28] Russian operations southwest of Donetsk Metropolis are probably targeted on having access to the T0524 street that runs into Marinka and could also be used to help Russian operations to push west of the present positions on the western outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv Metropolis (Russian goal: Defend floor strains of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and stop Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces didn’t conduct any confirmed floor assaults alongside the Kharkiv Metropolis axis on August 18. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces targeted on holding occupied positions and stopping Ukrainian counterattacks.[29] Russian forces deployed an unspecified variety of extra digital warfare programs and a battalion tactical group (BTG) within the Kharkiv Metropolis route in an try to revive the fight functionality of models already stationed round Kharkiv Metropolis.[30] Russian BTGs which were engaged in fight are probably badly understrength and can add comparatively little fight energy. Volunteer battalions have deployed with very restricted coaching and would add far much less fight energy than their numbers counsel. Russian troops continued distant mining close to Lebyazhne (about 40km southeast of Kharkiv Metropolis), indicating Russian forces search to restrain Ukrainian assaults within the route of Russia’s floor strains of communication alongside the Izyum axis.[31] Russian sources continued to repeat earlier unsubstantiated claims of Russian management of Stohnii, Baranivka, Odnorobivka, and Udy (all about 40km north of Kharkiv Metropolis and inside 10km of the Ukraine-Russia border).[32]
A number of Ukrainian sources reported main Russian missile strikes on 4 of the 9 districts of Kharkiv Metropolis and on Krasnohrad (western Kharkiv Oblast) between August 17 and 18.[33] The missiles struck a dormitory and residential areas of Kharkiv Metropolis, induced main injury to civilian infrastructure, and killed and injured a number of civilians.[34] Russian forces additionally carried out airstrikes close to Staryi Saltiv, Verkhnii Saltiv, and Baranivka (northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis) and continued to shell settlements surrounding Kharkiv Metropolis.[35]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts in opposition to Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces carried out a restricted and unsuccessful floor assault on the Zaporizhia axis on August 18. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to advance from Yehorivka to Shevchenkove, each east of the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border.[36] The Ukrainian Normal Employees additionally reported that Russian forces strengthened an unspecified space alongside the Southern Axis with no less than two battalion tactical teams (BTGs), indicating a continued Russian effort to strengthen the south in preparation for Ukrainian counterattacks. These BTGs are unlikely to extend Russian fight energy materially.
Russian forces continued specializing in sustaining occupied strains and stopping Ukrainian forces from advancing alongside the Southern Axis on August 18. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces intensified aerial reconnaissance utilizing UAVs on settlements in north and west Kherson Oblast, in addition to in settlements in northern Zaporizhia Oblast.[37] The Ukrainian Normal Employees additionally reported that Russian forces carried out airstrikes on Lozove and Bila Krynytsia, each close to the Ukrainian bridgehead throughout the Inhulets River, and Blahodatne, roughly 20km northwest of Kherson Metropolis.[38] Russian forces additionally continued shelling settlements alongside all the line of contact utilizing tank, tube, and rocket artillery.[39]
Russian forces continued to focus on settlements in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts utilizing artillery and missiles on August 18. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian forces used tube artillery to shell Nikopol, situated throughout the Dnipro River from Russian-occupied positions in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and different settlements all through Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[40] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched two anti-radar missiles from a Su-35 plane within the Bakhtanka and Mykolaiv instructions and continued shelling different settlements all through Mykolaiv Oblast.[41]
Ukrainian forces continued concentrating on Russian logistics factors and ammunition depots in Kherson Oblast. Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported on August 18 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian warehouse in Bilohirka, situated close to the Ukrainian bridgehead throughout the Inhulets River.[42] Khlan additionally reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian navy base in Nova Kakhovka on August 17.[43]
Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts (Russian goal: Develop fight energy with out conducting common mobilization)
The Kremlin is probably going leveraging established Cossack organizations to help Russian pressure technology efforts. Formal Russian Cossack organizations are paramilitary formations that carry out state companies, together with legislation enforcement and navy administrative duties, in accordance with Russian Federal Legislation.[44] Russian every day newspaper Kommersant reported that the All-Russian Cossack Society fashioned a 250 man-strong Cossack “Terek” detachment which is at present finishing its preparations to deploy to Ukraine.[45] The Terek detachment reportedly contains navy specialists with scout, sniper, and machine gunner expertise with personnel drawn from Stavropol Krai, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and the Chechen Republic. It’s unclear whether or not there are established Cossack organizations in predominantly Muslim federal topics, comparable to Chechnya and Dagestan, from which ”Cossacks” is likely to be recruited provided that Cossack tradition and historical past are historically hostile to Islam.[46] Russian Cossack organizations could also be serving to practice Russian recruits due the ineffectiveness or limitations of different extra typical Russian recruitment organs. Kommersant moreover reported that the All-Russian Cossack Society has deployed seven volunteer models (of unspecified echelon) to Ukraine, is getting ready three volunteer models for deployment, and has over 6,000 Cossacks supporting the struggle in Ukraine in unspecified capacities.
Russian occupation forces proceed efforts to mobilize Ukrainian residents into navy models. Vladimir Novikov – one of many pro-Russian militia leaders in Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia – advised RIA Novosti on August 18 that the Russian occupation administration in Zaporizhzhia Oblast is forming a “volunteer military” (of unspecified dimension) to seize the rest of occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[47] Russian occupation forces will probably intensify efforts to mobilize Ukrainian residents in Zaporizhia Oblast as they’ve in occupied japanese Ukraine.[48]
Russian volunteer models and forcibly mobilized Ukrainian residents are unlikely to generate efficient Russian fight energy as a result of their low morale, poor tools, and lack of coaching. Mari El Republic Governor Yuri Zaitsev said that of roughly 430 Mari Eli residents who deployed to Ukraine in volunteer formations, no less than 58 died.[49] This report means that the unit probably suffered a complete casualty price (killed and wounded) of 40 p.c given the conventional ration of three wounded-in-action for each fatality. A Ukrainian citizen who was mobilized in Luhansk on August 3 to battle for Russian forces (and who Ukrainian forces captured no later than August 18) testified that Russian forces offered him with a shirt, an outdated iron helmet, and no sneakers and said that his infantry unit had no armor help and needed to stroll on foot throughout fight.[50]
Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of occupied areas; set circumstances for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or another future political association of Moscow’s selecting)
The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported on August 18 that Russian occupation authorities are planning to conduct door-to-door “surveys” of households in occupied Melitopol from September 11-17 in lieu of in-person voting for the Kremlin’s sham annexation referendum.[51] The Resistance Middle claimed that Russian forces are conducting such simply falsifiable surveys as a result of the referendum can have low turnout and urged Ukrainian civilians to evacuate occupied areas earlier than the referendum takes place to keep away from participation. The Middle additionally reported that Ukrainian partisan exercise pressured the Russian navy to switch forces away from the entrance strains to safe the sham referendum.[52]
Russian occupation authorities are taking steps to revive some industrial, housing, and media capability in occupied Ukrainian territory. These reconstruction efforts seem like largely in service of Russian authorities campaigns to create administrative capabilities in occupied areas, to boost or reinforce Russian logistical provide strains, and to wage an info struggle in occupied elements of Ukraine, thereby acclimating Ukrainian civilians to the Russian occupation. “Reconstruction” efforts don’t seem like assembly even primary wants of civilians in occupied areas, who face the approaching winter with out warmth in elements of the nation.
- Administrative marketing campaign: The Mariupol Metropolis Council reported on August 17 that Russian occupation officers are conducting a listing of housing in Mariupol to determine properties whose house owners fled the Russian invasion.[53] The Council reported that occupation officers intend to offer this housing to Russian officers, their households, and collaborators. Gives of free housing are a technique the Kremlin is probably going making an attempt to incentivize Russian bureaucrats to maneuver to occupied areas and administratively help the mixing of occupied Ukrainian territory into the Russian Federation in addition to to alter the demographics of the world in Russia’s favor.
- Logistical marketing campaign: The Mariupol Metropolis Council and native Telegram channel Mariupol Now reported on August 18 that Russian occupation authorities are working to revive Mariupol’s port to facilitate the export of steel merchandise from Mariupol to Russia.[54] Restoration of the port may be used to strengthen Russian logistics strains—Mariupol mayoral advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on August 17 {that a} ferry from the Russian metropolis of Yeysk to Mariupol started service however shall be used for navy functions.[55] Andryushchenko warned that Russian forces hid ammunition throughout the ferry. Deputy Russian Protection Minister Timur Ivanov claimed on August 18 that Russian occupation officers have been prioritizing reconstruction in Donbas and restoring consuming water in cities like Donetsk—measures which are probably required to incentivize Russian directors to maneuver to the world or to accommodate Russian forces for any time frame.[56]
- Propaganda and inhabitants management marketing campaign: The Central Election Fee head for United Russia, the political get together of Russian President Vladimir Putin, attended the grand opening of the Russian-run Tavria tv channel in Kherson and framed channel workers as “info troops” who’re “extraordinarily necessary” to the Russian invasion. He emphasised that “Tavria is right here eternally, like Russia.”[57] Russian occupation officers will probably try to make use of state-run propaganda shops like Tavria to conduct info operations in opposition to Ukrainian civilians in occupied southern Ukraine as public companies worsen and partisan assaults proceed. For instance, the Ukrainian mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Federov, said on August 18 that there isn’t a fuel for warmth in Melitopol.[58] Federov stated that Russian propagandists present three completely different tales for a way civilians can keep heat this winter—building of a fuel pipeline from Crimea, building of a pipeline from Berdyansk, and importing coal provides—however that no work is being carried out on the alleged pipelines. Zaporizhia Occupation Administration Head Yevheny Balitsky said on August 18 that occupation authorities are working to offer gas to ”preferential classes” of residents—probably those that cooperate with occupation authorities.[59]
Word: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the idea for these experiences. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
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