August 17, 8:45 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Russian army management is probably going more and more shedding confidence within the safety of Crimea following latest Ukrainian strikes on Russian army objects in Crimea. Russian sources reported on August 17 that Vice Admiral Viktor Sokolov had changed Admiral Igor Osipov because the commander of the Crimean-based Black Sea Fleet (BSF).[1] The Russian data area, nonetheless, was evidently keen to take care of a excessive stage of secrecy concerning Sokolov’s appointment because of the claimed risk of “terrorist hazard” in Sevastopol.[2] Current Ukrainian strikes (related to Ukrainian partisans and Ukrainian Armed Forces) on Russian army belongings in Crimea, together with the headquarters of the BSF in Sevastopol, have doubtless positioned Russian forces on excessive alert and led to restructuring of power composition, logistics, and management of the Russian grouping in Crimea to be able to mitigate the impression of additional strikes. Ukraine’s Essential Army Intelligence Directorate, for instance, reported that Russian forces are relocating dozens of fastened and rotary wing plane stationed in ahead airfields in Crimea to areas deeper within the Crimean Peninsula and in mainland Russia.[3]
Russian management and the Russian nationalist data area have grow to be more and more invested in framing latest Ukrainian strikes on Russian army belongings in Crimea as acts of terrorism to be able to shift the data narrative away from Russian violations of worldwide legislation and calls on the West to designate Russia a state sponsor of terrorism. Russian sources inaccurately described the strikes on the BSF headquarters, an ammunition depot, and the Saki Airbase as acts of terrorism. The Russian-appointed head of occupied Crimea, Sergey Askenov, claimed on August 17 that the Russian Federal Safety Service (FSB) in Crimea had neutralized cells of the Hizb ut-Tahrir group (an Islamist fundamentalist political group that has traditionally been energetic in Central Asia and in Crimea amongst the Crimean Tatar group and is banned in Russia) in Dzhankoi and Yalta.[4] Aksenov accused the Ukrainian authorities of coordinating Hizb ut-Tahrir’s operations in Crimea with out offering any proof. Russian officers will doubtless more and more hyperlink Ukrainian partisan assaults in opposition to occupied territories with operations performed by organizations affiliated with Islamist extremism in an try to alienate the Ukrainian partisan motion from the worldwide group and undermine Ukraine’s calls to formally designate Russia as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Assaults in opposition to reputable Russian army targets fall properly inside the purview of authorized use of power and usually are not acts of terrorism, neither is there any proof to recommend that Islamist extremists performed these assaults.[5]
Key Takeaways
- Russian army management is falsely claiming that latest assaults on Russian army objects in Crimea are terrorist assaults to deflect calls to designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism.
- Russian forces tried a number of unsuccessful assaults close to the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border in tactically difficult forest areas.
- Russian forces continued to unsuccessfully assault settlements southeast of Siversk.
- Russian forces launched a number of assaults northeast and south of Bakhmut, and are doubtless trying to enhance tactical positions close to Horlivka.
- Russian forces made restricted positive factors northwest of Donetsk Metropolis and close to the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast administrative border.
- Russian forces are doubtless getting ready to defend their floor traces of communication (GLOCs) within the Melitopol-Tokmak-Berdyansk triangle by mining settlements on the jap Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.
- Russian federal topics are persevering with to kind new volunteer models and promote contract service, whereas dealing with recruitment challenges.
- Russian occupation authorities are struggling to extend management measures in occupied territories amidst elevated partisan exercise.
We don’t report intimately on Russian conflict crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to guage and report on the results of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in these reviews.
- Essential Effort—Jap Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Subordinate Essential Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops within the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv Metropolis
- Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
- Mobilization and Power Era Efforts
- Actions in Russian-occupied Areas
Essential Effort—Jap Ukraine
Subordinate Essential Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian goal: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Jap Ukraine and seize everything of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces performed floor assaults northwest of Slovyansk close to the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border on August 17. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces tried to advance close to Bohorodychne, about 20km northwest of Slovyansk.[6] The Ukrainian Normal Employees additionally famous that Russian forces tried advances within the neighborhood of Mazanikva (22km northwest of Slovyansk) and Novo Dymytrivka (35km northwest of Slovyansk).[7] Russian milbloggers beforehand indicated that combating on the Mazanivka-Bohorodychne line, which roughly runs alongside the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border, has been sophisticated by the densely forested terrain.[8] Russian forces on this space are doubtless persevering with positional battles inside tactically difficult forest areas to be able to maintain floor in opposition to Ukrainian counterattacks. Russian forces moreover continued artillery strikes alongside the Izyum-Slovyansk line and struck Ukrainian positions and civilian infrastructure in and round Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[9]
Russian forces performed restricted floor assaults south of Siversk on August 17. The Ukrainian Normal Employees said that Russian troops tried to advance in the direction of Vesele, about 23km southeast of Siversk.[10] Russian troops additionally reportedly performed a floor assault close to Spirne, about 20km southeast of Siversk.[11] Russian forces continued air and artillery strikes within the neighborhood of Siversk.[12]
Russian forces performed a sequence of floor assaults northeast and south of Bakhmut on August 17. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces are combating within the Soledar-Bakhmutske space (10km northeast of Bakhmut).[13] Units of the Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) sixth Cossack Regiment continued makes an attempt to consolidate management of the Knauf Gips Donbas gypsum manufacturing unit on the outskirts of Soledar alongside the T1302 freeway to be able to advance southwestward on Bakhmut.[14] The Ukrainian Normal Employees additionally reported that Russian troops performed floor assaults in Bilohorivka, about 18km northeast of Bakhmut alongside the T1302 freeway.[15] Russian operations to the northeast of Bakhmut are doubtless targeted on securing management of this phase of the T1302 to be able to drive immediately on Bakhmut.
Russian forces performed floor assaults south of Bakhmut to be able to enhance their tactical positions on this space.[16] The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Ukrainian troops stopped Russian floor assaults close to Mayorsk, Zalizne, and Shumy, which all lie about 25km southwest of Bakhmut on the outskirts of Horlivka.[17] Russian forces are doubtless conducting restricted floor assaults southwest of Bakhmut to be able to acquire entry to the T0513 freeway through the T0516 roadway, which runs westward by Horlivka. Russian forces moreover continued combating close to Kodema and Zaitseve, inside 15km and 7km south of Bakhmut, respectively.[18]
Russian forces made marginal positive factors throughout floor assaults northwest of Donetsk Metropolis on August 17. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian troops had “partial success” within the path of Optyne, about 6km northwest of the outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis.[19] Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) troops reportedly tried to advance on Nevelske (15km west of Donetsk Metropolis) below cowl of artillery fireplace.[20] Russian forces continued to conduct artillery strikes alongside the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis frontline to assist efforts to push west of this space.[21]
Russian forces secured incremental positive factors close to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border southwest of Donetsk Metropolis on August 17. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces had “partial success” within the path of Novomykhailivka, about 25km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis.[22] Russian forces reportedly performed a floor assault round Vuhledar (45km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis), doubtless to be able to bypass the settlement and acquire direct entry to the native highway that runs between Vuhledar and Marinka, which is on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis.[23]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv Metropolis (Russian goal: Defend floor traces of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and stop Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces performed restricted floor assaults on the Kharkiv Metropolis axis on August 17. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces retreated following an try to interrupt Ukrainian defensive traces within the path of Lebyazhe and Bazaliivka, each about 40km southeast of Kharkiv Metropolis and additional south than prior Russian offensives round Kharkiv Metropolis.[24] Ukrainian Normal Employees reviews haven’t talked about combating in these instructions in a number of weeks. Russian forces additionally performed distant mining within the Lebyazhne district.[25] The choice to remotely mine Lebyazhne doubtless goals to disrupt Ukrainian use of the settlement as a base from which to struggle Russian forces additional east. A Russian outlet Readovka additionally claimed that Russian forces took management of Stohnii and Baranivka, each lower than 10km from the Ukraine-Russia border.[26] Russian forces performed airstrikes east and south of Kharkiv Metropolis, close to Staryi Saltiv and Mospanove.[27] Russian forces launched 5 missiles at Kharkiv Metropolis and continued heavy shelling of settlements surrounding Kharkiv Metropolis.[28]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts in opposition to Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces are doubtless setting situations to defend their floor traces of communication (GLOCs) between the Tokmak-Melitopol-Berdyansk space, prioritizing their positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast over these on the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces mined Inzhenerne and Ukrainske, each roughly 40km northeast of Tomak and on the T0815 freeway to Polohy.[29] The T0815 helps Russian GLOCs from Polohy to Berdyansk and connects to the T0401 freeway between Polohy-Tokmak-Melitopol. Russian mining within the northernmost occupied phase of the T0815 signifies that Russian forces are establishing defenses to guard important GLOCs to Melitopol – a key logistics hub connecting Russian holdings in southern Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson Oblasts – and logistics routes alongside the Sea of Azov shoreline. Russian forces want entry to those routes to take care of operations in jap Kherson Oblast and retain a direct highway connection between Rostov-on-Don and occupied southern Ukrainian territories. Russian forces are unlikely to assault from the path of Ukrainske and Inzhenerne within the close to future given their reported mining of these villages.
Russian forces continued to conduct small-scale assaults in northwestern Kherson Oblast on August 17. Ukrainian army officers reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully performed a platoon-size assault and a reconnaissance-in-force operation close to the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River.[30] Russian forces continued to make use of aviation to strike Ukrainian positions northwest of Kherson Metropolis and close to the bridgehead, and fired artillery at 27 unspecified settlements alongside the Kherson Oblast border with Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts.[31] Satellite tv for pc imagery exhibits barge motion on the Dnipro River close to Kherson Metropolis and locals reportedly said that Russian forces are engaged on the barges at a Kherson Metropolis shipyard.[32] Russian forces could also be trying to restore and use barges to move gear throughout Dnipro River, though it’s unclear whether or not the barges the Russians are utilizing will have the ability to assist transit of heavy gear throughout the Dnipro River or whether or not Ukrainian forces can harm or destroy them as soon as they’re in precise use.
Russian forces struck Mykolaiv Metropolis and a coastal settlement in Odesa Oblast on August 16 and August 17. The Ukrainian Southern Army Command reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv Metropolis with S-300 anti-aircraft missile methods.[33] Social media footage confirmed that Russian missiles hit the Petro Mohyla Black Sea Nationwide College, and Russian Telegram channels reposted photos of minor harm to the pedestrian facet of the Varvarivskyy Bridge in western Mykolaiv Metropolis.[34] Russian Tu-22M3 plane struck leisure and residential infrastructure within the coastal city of Zatoka, alongside the railway and highway connection to Romania, with Kh-22 missiles.[35]
Ukrainian native officers reported that Russian forces fired tube artillery at Nikopol and 40 rockets from Grad MLRS at Chervonohryhorivka (northeast of Nikopol). Russian Telegram channels claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled close to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant, however the out there social media footage solely recorded the sound of an explosion in an unspecified space reportedly close to Enerhodar.[36]
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian strongholds and ammunition warehouses in northwestern and northern Kherson Oblast on August 17.[37] Ukrainian officers additionally reported that partisans performed an improvised explosive machine (IED) assault close to one of many Russian army occupation administration commandant workplaces in Melitopol.[38]
Mobilization and Power Era Efforts (Russian goal: Broaden fight energy with out conducting basic mobilization)
Russian regional authorities and safety providers are persevering with to face challenges in recruiting volunteers for Russian operations in Ukraine. The Kurgan Oblast Federal Safety Service (FSB) lowered necessities for service within the native border guard division by permitting residents aged 18 to 34 and with out greater training or army expertise to hunt employment.[39] The native FSB in Kurgan Oblast is recruiting personnel through the Russian social media platform VK and providing army pension funds in addition to three-million-ruble mortgage program if recruits signal a army contract.[40] Pskov Oblast’s Rosgvardia department is recruiting personnel of any training stage or army expertise for army service in Grozny, Chechnya.[41] Russian safety providers are doubtless posting deceptive commercials for employment alternatives to recruit extra forces for the Russian conflict in Ukraine, a tactic ISW has beforehand reported on.[42]
The Ukrainian Essential Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian army recruiters are abducting Chechen younger males to employees 4 Chechen volunteer battalions, inflicting social tensions inside the republic.[43] The GUR famous that Chechen residents are expressing discontent with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov for impressing males into service and forcing Muslim Chechen males to struggle a conflict between predominantly Christian states (Russia and Ukraine).
Native authorities organizations in Russia are growing commercial campaigns to handle quota shortages in army service contracts. Residents of Yaroslavl Oblast’s Dzerzhinskiy District acquired utility payments with army contract service adverts on the high of their fee statements.[44] The native utility firm famous that native officers ordered the corporate to incorporate the message on the high on the invoice to share the ”prospects” of contract service. Residents of a small village in Tyumen Oblast additionally shared recruitment posters at a neighborhood grocery store, which closely bolded the supplied enlistment fee and advantages.[45] Russian native authorities are doubtless trying to distribute recruitment adverts in locations with excessive civilian site visitors and are focusing on financially susceptible populations in rural villages.
One other Russian federal topic (area) claimed to have shaped new volunteer models to deploy to Donbas, however such volunteer models are drawing criticism from some Russian milbloggers. The Republic of Mordovia claimed that it has shaped three new volunteer models – Sivazhar, Aralai, and Kaval – and held a farewell ceremony for the deployment of its seventh detachment of 20 volunteers to Donbas.[46] It’s unclear on the time of this publication if these volunteer teams are working in Ukraine, if the models have a big variety of recruits, or if they’re present process a one-month coaching interval.[47] VK-based mostly milblogger Vasily Petrovich described regionally shaped volunteer models as the easiest way to ”get right into a hospital mattress or into the grave,” as these models do not need monetary assist exterior of what’s supplied by their unnamed sponsors.[48]
Russian forces are persevering with covert mobilization practices in occupied Luhansk Oblast and are promoting contract service in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Social media video confirmed Russian servicemen bodily restraining a civilian man in Luhansk Metropolis, doubtless in an try to power him right into a automotive.[49] Ukrainian officers beforehand reported that Russian servicemen kidnap males off of streets to commit them to the Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) models.[50] The Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) held promoting occasions for contract service at area people facilities in Pokrovsk.[51]
Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of occupied areas; set situations for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or another future political association of Moscow’s selecting)
Russian forces are struggling to extend management of occupied territories amid fears of elevated partisan exercise. A number of partisan assaults and reviews of a Ukrainian counteroffensive have pushed occupation authorities to take extra extreme and extremely seen measures to consolidate administrative management of occupied localities. Ukrainian officers in Kherson Oblast reported that Russian forces kidnapped Verkhnorohachytskyi District Head Svitlana Korotun on August 16 for refusing to collaborate with Russian occupation authorities.[52] This incident is a part of a broader development of Russian forces looking for to achieve legitimacy by compelling collaboration from native authorities whereas “disappearing” those that refuse to conform. Occupation forces additionally search to extra carefully monitor particular person residents. Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian occupation authorities opened a second filtration level on the jap facet of Mariupol and gathered over 1,300 residents for inspection on August 17.[53] Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov warned that plain-clothed FSB officers stationed at public, Russian Wi-fi entry factors monitor non-public conversations and steal private information, typically resulting in the detention of Ukrainian residents.[54]
Notice: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
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