April 11, 8:30pm ET
Particular Version: Army Basic Aleksandr Vladimirovich Dvornikov
US intelligence reported over the weekend of April 9-10 that Russian Army Basic Aleksandr Vladimirovich Dvornikov, commander of the Southern Navy District, is now in general command of Russian operations in Ukraine. This information is unsurprising; Dvornikov is essentially the most senior of the three Russian army district commanders concerned within the invasion, and the Russian army is concentrating its efforts virtually solely within the space of Ukraine that Dvornikov had already been commanding. Had Putin chosen one other officer to command all the battle effort, he would doubtless have needed to relieve Dvornikov for these causes. There is no such thing as a cause to suppose, subsequently, that Dvornikov was particularly chosen to take management of the battle effort for any explicit abilities or expertise he may need. Neither is there cause to assume that the conduct of the Russian battle effort will change materially greater than it was already altering from the abandonment of the drive on Kyiv and the deal with the east. This replace, which we’re publishing along with our common army operations assessments, explains Dvornikov’s profession historical past and expertise in Syria, the challenges he faces, and what his appointment means for the Russian marketing campaign in Ukraine.
Dvornikov has commanded the Southern Navy District since September 2016, capping a army profession that started in 1978. He graduated from the Ussuriysk Suvorov Navy College—a Soviet army boarding faculty—at age 18 in 1978.[1] Dvornikov then served as a platoon commander, firm commander, and battalion chief of workers within the Far Japanese Navy District (the predecessor of Russia’s present Japanese Navy District) all through the Eighties.[2] From 1991 to 1994, Dvornikov served as deputy commander after which commander of a motorized rifle battalion assigned to the Western Group of [Soviet] Forces in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, Dvornikov served as chief of workers after which commander of an unspecified motorized rifle regiment of the Moscow Navy District (which merged into the present Western Navy District in 2010). He then served as chief of workers and commander of one other motorized rifle regiment within the North Caucasian Navy District (now a part of the Southern Navy District) till 2003, throughout which era he doubtless participated within the Second Chechen Warfare. From 2005 to 2008 Dvornikov served as a deputy commander after which chief of workers of the thirty sixth Army (half of the present Japanese Navy District). Dvornikov commanded the fifth Pink Banner Mixed Arms Army of the Far Japanese Navy District from 2008 to 2010. Dvornikov served as a deputy commander of the Japanese Navy District from 2010 to 2012, then as chief of workers of the Central Navy District from April 2012 to 2015.
Dvornikov commanded Russia’s forces in Syria from the official starting of the Russian intervention in September 2015 to July 2016.[3] He has commanded the Southern Navy District since September 20, 2016.[4] Putin promoted Dvornikov on June 23, 2020, to the rank of military normal, the second-highest rank within the Russian army and one not held by some other army district commander.[5] Dvornikov is Russia’s senior-most army district commander, outranking the opposite two army district commanders concerned within the invasion of Ukraine, and a probable candidate (together with the commander of the Aerospace Forces, Army Basic Sergey Vladimirovich Surovikin), to succeed Valery Gerasimov as Russia’s subsequent chief of the general staff. [6]
Dvornikov’s profession path will not be uncommon amongst senior Russian normal officers.[7] Dvornikov’s foundational army expertise—like lots of his fellow normal officers—was his task as a regimental chief of workers after which regimental commander within the North Caucasian Navy District from 2000 to 2003, throughout which interval he virtually definitely participated within the Second Chechen Warfare. Dvornikov’s promotion path from regimental command to Navy District Commander was typical. Russian officers normally change army districts with every promotion, as Dvornikov did—transferring by the modern equivalents of the Southern, Japanese, and Central army districts till taking command of the Southern Navy District.[8] Dvornikov’s profession path by 2015 was thus unremarkable for a really profitable normal officer.
Dvornikov’s expertise commanding the Russian deployment to Syria—and concentrating on of civilians throughout that deployment—was additionally not in itself distinctive or an indicator of a specific ability set. Many Western media shops have centered on Dvornikov’s expertise in Syria and highlighted Russian concentrating on of civilians underneath his command. All of Russia’s present army district commanders, in addition to the commanders of Russia’s Aerospace Forces, Airborne forces, and Navy-Political Directorate, have served at the least one tour of obligation in Syria as chief of workers or commander of Russia’s forces in Syria.[9] It seems to have been Russian army coverage to rotate senior officers by service in Syria after which choose for additional promotion solely those that had served in Syria.[10] Dvornikov, in actual fact, has much less expertise in Syria than lots of his contemporaries, serving one 10-month tour as commander. By comparability, Western Navy District Commander Colonel Basic Alexander Zhuravlev and Japanese Navy District Commander Colonel Basic Alexander Chayko served in Syria for 2 excursions every, totaling 24 and 20 months respectively.[11] Dvornikov’s command of Russian operations in Syria that killed massive numbers of civilians is equally, and tragically, common. Dvornikov has gained consideration in Western media because the “Butcher of Aleppo,” however Russian forces focused Syrian civilians and important infrastructure all through the Russian intervention in Syria, making all Russia’s present army district commanders and lots of of its senior army leaders complicit in such crimes.[12]
Dvornikov’s one uncommon ability might outcome from his explicit expertise establishing new command buildings in sophisticated coalition settings as a result of he was the first Russian commander in Syria. Dvornikov established Russia’s preliminary command construction in Syria from the start of the Russian intervention in September 2015. Dvornikov has written extensively on the expertise of standing up Russian operations in Syria, together with a March 2016 retrospective revealed whereas he was nonetheless serving in Syria and a number of other articles following his return to Russia.[13] He harassed the significance of creating a unified command and management construction for Russian advisers, the Russian Air Power, and varied standard and unconventional pro-Assad forces. Dvornikov notably claimed (doubtless exaggerating) in “Staffs for New Wars” (July 2018) that he rebuilt the shattered and demoralized pro-Syrian forces right into a cohesive preventing power. Dvornikov’s writing moreover stresses the significance of making a unified command construction for all Russian forces reducing throughout unit and repair boundaries. Dvornikov’s Syrian expertise might assist him combine the battered parts of the Western, Japanese, and Central army districts coming his method as reinforcements, in addition to the Chechen forces of Ramazan Kadyrov and the proxy militias of the Donetsk and Luhansk Folks’s Republics.
His expertise overseeing the pro-Assad offensive that recaptured Aleppo additionally doubtless gave him extra perception into the conduct of recent city warfare than his successors in Syria, though city warfare in Syria was not confined to Aleppo. Dvornikov commanded the ultimate pro-Assad offensive that recaptured Aleppo—Syria’s largest metropolis, with a pre-war inhabitants of over 2 million—in 2016. Aleppo was one of many bloodiest campaigns of the Syrian Civil Warfare and certain the principle supply of current Russian classes discovered on fashionable city fight.[14] However Dvornikov was not specifically chosen for command due to any expertise in city warfare. To start with, he took command of the Southern Navy District in 2016, doubtless years earlier than Putin deliberate to invade and occupy Ukraine. If Putin or Gerasimov had been particularly selecting an officer with expertise in city warfare expertise to command one thing, furthermore, it will have made far more sense to assign Dvornikov to the battle for Kyiv. Dvornikov has commanded Russian operations in Mariupol within the present Russian invasion of Ukraine all alongside. He might have been making use of—or making an attempt to use—most of the classes discovered in Syria, however his conduct of city warfare in Mariupol has been unremarkable by way of its success, velocity, and price in casualties. There is no such thing as a cause to assume that Dvornikov had been chosen to command in Syria due to any ability or theoretical work on city warfare, for that matter. He commanded the Aleppo marketing campaign as a result of it was Russia’s main marketing campaign throughout his tenure in Syria, not as a selected appointment. The ways and approaches utilized by Russian forces in each Syria and Ukraine usually are not distinctive to Dvornikov or some other particular person Russian commander. Neither are they notably efficient.
Dvornikov is the pure alternative of army district commander to command present Russian operations in Ukraine as a consequence of his command of the first Russian space of operations and his seniority. Dvornikov’s command of the SMD from 2016 to 2022 grants him the best familiarity with operations in japanese Ukraine, as he oversaw the largely frozen battle in Donbas in that interval and is the direct commander of the first Russian forces within the area—the eighth Mixed Arms Army and forces of Russia’s proxy Donetsk and Luhansk Folks’s Republics. Dvornikov has commanded the Donbas and southern axes for the reason that starting of the present Russian invasion on February 24, and his forces have achieved the best successes of the preliminary interval of the battle. Had Putin chosen one other officer to command the general battle effort now that he has condensed it to a deal with Dvornikov’s space of accountability he would virtually definitely have needed to relieve Dvornikov of his command. Contemplating that Dvornikov’s efficiency in command was no worse, and in some methods higher, than the performances of his lower-ranked colleagues, such a choice would have been odd certainly.
The Kremlin’s belated appointment of a single general commander in Ukraine won’t routinely clear up Russian command, logistics, and morale points, and Dvornikov faces a number of ongoing operations which will exceed his span of management.
Russian forces are presently finishing up the next missions in Ukraine:
- Defenses of their positions in Kherson Oblast from Ukrainian counterattacks from the west and north
- Potential advances north from Crimea towards Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro
- The seize of Mariupol
- Frontal assaults in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Offensive operations on the Izyum-Slovyansk axis to encircle Ukrainian forces in japanese Ukraine (beforehand led by WMD forces)
- Operations to repair Ukrainian forces in place in Kharkiv (beforehand led by WMD and CMD forces)
- Efforts to reconstitute broken and demoralized forces from all 4 Russian army districts to bolster two axes, Izyum and Donbas
The Russian army’s earlier method to command within the battle in Ukraine was apparently for 3 army district commanders (South, West, and East) to independently command their very own axes of advance, resulting in disjointed offensive operations. Collapsing the battle effort into the east and south itself eliminates a few of that downside, whoever took command. Dvornikov’s appointment as sole commander might properly problem his skill to conduct simultaneous operations centered on even this lowered record of Russian offensive operations, particularly given the extreme losses of senior commanders the Russian army has skilled. Now we have already seen indicators that Russian forces are unable to conduct simultaneous main offensive operations between Kherson, Donbas, and Izyum, and this problem will doubtless proceed.
Dvornikov will doubtless wrestle to combine items redeployed from western to japanese Ukraine into his ongoing operations, which need to date been carried out by Southern Navy District troops underneath his direct command. ISW has assessed all through the battle that the SMD had been the simplest Russian district as a consequence of its unity of command, excessive readiness, and fee of large-echelon army workout routines previous to the battle—in distinction to items from Russia’s different districts, which had been cobbled collectively previous to the invasion with little time to cohere unified buildings and follow the high-end standard warfare needed for the present Russian marketing campaign.[15] Broken Russian items withdrawn from Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine proceed to deploy to the Izyum axis and should finally redeploy to Donbas. These items are unlikely to carry out higher simply because Dvornikov is main them as general commander. Dvornikov will in actual fact doubtless face vital challenges integrating these items into ongoing operations.
Key Takeaways
- Russian Commander of the Southern Navy District Army Basic Alexander Dvornikov is the pure option to take general command of Russian operations in Ukraine. There is no such thing as a cause to suppose Dvornikov was chosen for any explicit abilities or expertise, neither is there cause to assume the conduct of the Russian battle effort will materially change greater than it was already altering because of the Russian abandonment of northeastern Ukraine and deal with the east.
- Russian forces might have used chemical weapons in opposition to Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol, although ISW can’t independently confirm Ukrainian claims right now.
- Russian forces didn’t make vital advances in continued assaults on Severodonetsk, Popasna, and Rubizhne in japanese Ukraine.
- Russian forces continued to amass troops in Kharkiv Oblast to bolster offensive operations on the Izyum axis and carried out a number of minor assaults.
We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity though we don’t describe them in these stories.
ISW has up to date its evaluation of the 4 main efforts Russian forces are engaged in right now:
- Principal effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Principal effort—Japanese Ukraine
Subordinate important effort—Mariupol (Russian goal: Seize Mariupol and cut back the Ukrainian defenders)
Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol claimed late on April 11 that Russian forces used drone-delivered chemical weapons in opposition to Ukrainian troops in Mariupol on April 11.[16] Victims reported shortness of breath and ataxia. ISW can’t independently affirm these stories. Nonetheless, DNR Protection Spokesperson Eduard Basurin stated Russian forces would doubtless use unspecified chemical weapons in opposition to Ukrainian forces in Mariupol earlier on April 11.[17] Basurin stated Russian forces ought to use “chemical troops” in opposition to Ukrainian defenders of the Azovstal Metal Plant to “smoke moles out of their burrows” because of the issue of storming the ability. Kremlin media shops amplified Brasurin’s declare previous to the Ukrainian declare of a chemical assault. ISW will proceed to observe the scenario.
Russian forces continued assaults up to now 24 hours and claimed additional advances, however ISW can’t independently confirm any territorial modifications.[18] Russian media outlet RT shared unmanned aerial automobile (UAV) footage on April 11 confirming that Russian forces have bisected Ukrainian defenders between the Azovstal Plant in japanese Mariupol and a second group of Ukrainian forces within the Port of Mariupol within the southwest, which ISW beforehand reported on April 10.[19] DNR head Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces have cleared 80% of Mariupol (which ISW can’t independently affirm) and falsely claimed they totally management the Port of Mariupol as of April 11, immediately contradicting the RT declare and ISW‘s evaluation that Ukrainian forces retain management of the port.[20] The Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces said the Ukrainian protection is constant to “maintain the town, durably and sustainably.”[21] Russian forces will doubtless full the seize of Mariupol within the coming week however have doubtless suffered excessive losses.
Subordinate important effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces didn’t make vital advances in continued assaults on Severodonetsk, Popasna, and Rubizhne on April 11.[22] The Ukrainian Basic Workers said Ukrainian forces repulsed 4 Russian assaults in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and claimed Ukrainian forces destroyed a battalion tactical group (BTG) of the seventieth Motorized Rifle Regiment, killing the battalion commander and his Chief of Workers.[23] The Russian sixtieth Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade of the fifth Mixed Arms Army is probably going making ready to deploy into Donbas.[24] Russian forces proceed to redeploy from northeastern Ukraine to help operations in Donbas, and social media customers filmed a big column of Russian army tools reportedly withdrawn from the Kyiv axis transferring west towards Donetsk in Matveev Kurgan, Rostov Oblast on April 11.[25]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian goal: Advance southeast to help Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast, and repair Ukrainian forces round Kharkiv in place)
Russian forces continued to amass troops in Kharkiv Oblast to bolster offensive operations on the Izyum axis on April 11. Components of the sixth Mixed Arms Army and Northern Fleet continued operations to repair Ukrainian forces in place in Kharkiv metropolis and display screen Russian meeting areas.[26] Satellite tv for pc imagery confirmed doubtless parts of the 237th Tank Regiment accumulating in new camps in Russia’s Belgorod area, about 30km from the Ukrainian border.[27]
Russian troops strengthened ahead positions and carried out restricted assaults close to Izyum on April 11.[28] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that two Russian Battalion Tactical Teams (BTGs) unsuccessfully tried to take Dovhenke and Dmytrivka, about 26 and 35 km south of Izyum respectively.[29] Kharkiv Regional Administration Head Oleg Synegubov claimed that Ukrainian Armed Forces destroyed a big column of Russian tools and manpower heading towards Izyum on April 10, however ISW can’t independently affirm this declare.[30]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Goal: Defend Kherson in opposition to Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces didn’t make any vital advances in opposition to Ukrainian positions in Kherson Oblast and continued to aim to enhance their defensive positions on April 11.[31]
Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian goal: Withdraw fight energy in good order for redeployment to japanese Ukraine)
There was no vital exercise reported on this axis within the final 24 hours.
Fast gadgets to observe
- Russian forces will renew offensive operations within the coming days southeast from Izyum, presumably diverting first to the southwest to keep away from Ukrainian defensive positions, in an effort to succeed in and seize Slovyansk.
- Russian forces have bisected Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol and can proceed efforts to finish the seizure of the remaining pockets of Ukrainian resistance, presumably together with by using chemical weapons.
- Russian forces will doubtless proceed to conduct assaults to grab Rubizhne, Popasna, and Severodonetsk within the coming days, though they could watch for reinforcements and for Russian troops to finish the encirclement of this space alongside the Izyum-Slovyansk-Debaltseve highway.
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