This week, on the “Intelligence Issues” podcast, host Michael Morell speaks with terrorism analyst and Lengthy Conflict journal editor Invoice Roggio on the state of the counterterrorism struggle in Afghanistan a 12 months after the complete U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban regaining management of the nation. Roggio says that al Qaeda has a stronger international place in the present day than it had previous to 9/11. He notes that whereas the Islamic State is a extra quick risk, al Qaeda is the larger risk long-term. Roggio particulars the lead as much as the U.S. withdraw from Afghanistan and the way the Biden administration’s lack of a phased withdraw didn’t give an opportunity for Afghans to transition to “an Afghan manner.”
HIGHLIGHTS:
- Al Qaeda stronger than pre-9/11: “I believe that al Qaeda from Afghanistan and globally is in a a lot stronger place in the present day than it was previous to 9/11. Previous to 9/11, al Qaeda actually solely had a serious base in a single space in Afghanistan. Now it’s all through the Center East, all through all of Africa, just like the Sahel in West Africa, not simply North Africa, because it was within the early 2000s. It’s a corporation that adapts. It has its faults, it has its issues, however it’s been adaptive. And I solely see them rising stronger because the West seeks to disengage from this struggle and deal with Russia and China, which I completely perceive. These are key points, however we want to have the ability to stroll and chew gum on the similar time.”
- U.S. withdrawal didn’t permit transition to “Afghan manner”: “What we would have liked to do was to assist the Afghan authorities by having it consolidate its traces in Afghanistan, abandon the south and east, reorganize its army to struggle the Afghan manner, not the American manner. That’s an entire podcast in itself, that dialogue. Principally, kind dueling alliance 2.0, have them handle territory they will handle and take the struggle to the Taliban within the contested areas in and round Kabul and within the south and east. However as a substitute, the Biden administration simply pulls out, and there’s no phased withdrawal right here to provide the Afghans an opportunity to transition to an Afghan manner. “
- Al Qaeda larger long-term risk than ISIS: “To me, al Qaeda is the larger risk than the Islamic State. It’s due to its persistence. The Islamic State is a extra of a right away risk. It likes to conduct assaults for its propaganda and recruiting. However I don’t suppose it has an actual caliphate constructing plan. And al Qaeda does. Al Qaeda is affected person. Affected person and considerate enemies are what scares me.
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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS: BILL ROGGIO
PRODUCER: PAULINA SMOLINSKI
MICHAEL MORELL: Invoice, welcome to Intelligence Issues. It’s nice to have you ever on the present. It’s an honor to have you ever on the present.
BILL ROGGIO: Michael, the dignity is all mine. It actually is an honor and a pleasure to have a chance to talk to you about these necessary points.
MICHAEL MORELL: So thanks for becoming a member of us to speak about Afghanistan and the CT struggle there. One 12 months after the Taliban regained management of the nation and after the complete withdrawal of the U.S. presence from the nation, there’s tons to speak about right here, as you already know, together with a report that simply got here out from the Republicans on the Home Overseas Affairs Committee on the withdrawal itself, latest focused killing of the chief of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and a latest assertion from the White Home in regards to the terrorist risk emanating from Afghanistan. So tons to speak about.
However earlier than we get into the place issues stand in the present day in Afghanistan, I need to rewind to final 12 months and I’d like to have you ever stroll us by your understanding on how we acquired from President Biden’s resolution in April of final 12 months to withdraw all U.S. fight forces from Afghanistan to a collapse of the Afghan authorities, a Taliban takeover of the nation, and a hack and lethal finish to our presence there. I’ll return and say once more that the Republicans within the Home Overseas Affairs Committee, led by Congressman Mike McCaul, who I’ve deep respect for, simply launched a report that’s sharply vital of the coverage course of, notably on the State Division, and curiously, not so vital on the efficiency of the intelligence group, which stunned me slightly bit. However what’s your tackle what occurred? What went unsuitable?
BILL ROGGIO: To begin with, I abhor the partisan meals fights over points like Afghanistan, as a result of the truth is, this was a failure that was twenty years within the making and a bipartisan failure in that. And I’m going to get very briefly undergo the Bush administration after overthrowing the Taliban, the fault wasn’t not negotiating with the Taliban. The Taliban was all the time going to assist Al Qaeda. It sacrificed its Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to shelter bin Laden and others submit 9/11. In order that was destined to occur. Its failures was standing up an Afghan authorities and army that weren’t appropriately made for Afghanistan, centralized management over each organizations. Not coping with Pakistan correctly, after which additionally diverting sources to the battle in Iraq, and making Afghanistan the forgotten battle. Underneath the Obama administration, Afghanistan turned the nice battle, however there was a surge that was kneecapped in addition to it opened up negotiations with the Taliban. Once more, no effort to take care of Pakistan. The Trump administration minimize off Pakistan, all support from Pakistan and talked powerful. However then inside eight months started talks with the Taliban and signed the Doha deal, which was an absolute catastrophe.
This led to the seeds of the failure. I started monitoring the Taliban in 2014 when the U.S. ended its- the transition from a army operation to a prepare advise and help to the Afghans. I acknowledged the flaw within the counterinsurgency technique which was ‘we’ll give the Taliban the agricultural areas and we are going to defend the city areas or the constructed up or the necessary districts is what they name them.’ The Taliban stated, ‘hey, that’s simply effective. We’ll go together with this.’ So this started beneath the 2014 beneath the Obama administration. The Taliban slowly begin taking on territory, taking on territory or making territory contested. And we’ve up till the date of the deal is signed, then the Taliban are touting this deal as a victory. I signed, automobile mortgage agreements and insurance coverage paperwork that have been longer than this Doha settlement, three and a 3rd pages the place a lot of the textual content is written within the kind the place it says the Taliban, which calls itself the Islamic Emirate, however we don’t acknowledge, that’s repeated like 12 or 15 instances in a 3 and a half web page document-
MICHAEL MORELL: Taking over a lot of the three and a half pages.
BILL ROGGIO: I believe if I counted, I wound up saying it took up a few half a web page, Michael. There have been no circumstances placed on the Taliban. It was a fantastic settlement. For the Biden administration– that’s what we’ve to grasp — as soon as the Obama administration determined that the U.S. was leaving Afghanistan, that is the place all of our failure started. The coverage turns into ‘let’s discover a technique to depart.’ How will we depart? Properly, we will’t depart if al Qaeda is robust in Afghanistan. We will’t depart if the Taliban-al Qaeda relationship is robust. Each of these issues have been true. However we have been informed by successive administrations that they weren’t true. That was the excuse to go away. Keep in mind, President Biden, when he publicizes withdrawal, he says al Qaeda is completed, quote performed. Properly, you already know, why do we have to stay in Afghanistan? Lower than a 12 months later, we kill Ayman al Zawahiri, the top of al Qaeda there.
It’s 20 years of failure, of unhealthy coverage that led as much as this. I can’t simply blame President Biden, though he shoulders a big a part of the blame right here as a result of he finally made the choice to go away. The Nationwide Safety Council simply issued an- or there was a memo leaked. I don’t know if it’s official now, however Axios reported it. Their protection of the coverage in Afghanistan was, ‘let’s blame Donald Trump as a result of he signed the deal.’ The Obama administration, they gave us a false selection. Both we’ve to ramp up U.S. forces in Afghanistan to struggle the Taliban or we will depart. And that was unfaithful. There was a 3rd manner. They selected to not point out it or take it. What we would have liked to do was to assist the Afghan authorities by having it consolidate its traces in Afghanistan, abandon the south and east, reorganize its army to struggle the Afghan manner, not the American manner. That’s an entire podcast in itself, that dialogue. Principally kind dueling alliance 2.0, have them handle territory they will handle and take the struggle to the Taliban within the contested areas in and round Kabul and within the south and east.
However as a substitute, the Biden administration simply pulls out, and there’s no phased withdrawal right here to provide the Afghans an opportunity to transition to an Afghan manner. Inside three and a half months of saying the withdrawal, the final U.S. soldier leaves Afghanistan. Bagram, the important thing node for air operations in Afghanistan is closed down by the start of July, I imagine it was a few month and a half after withdrawal was introduced.
Not solely did the U.S. depart, it shut off the lights with out even telling the Afghans there that we have been leaving. The Trump administration set the circumstances to weaken the Afghan authorities, to permit the Taliban to subject a whisper marketing campaign saying the ‘People are leaving.’ The Biden administration merely struck the previous couple of nails within the coffin by saying withdrawal after which doing it in a fashion that ensured the Afghan authorities was going to break down. And yet one more fast story right here. I all the time inform this. Once I talked to Afghan officers earlier than President Trump signed the deal, earlier than Biden was elected, after he was elected, earlier than he introduced withdrawal and instantly and a few months, a few month, previous to the complete withdrawal on the finish of August, I talked to them and I informed them, you might want to discover your personal manner. It’s good to reorganize. It’s good to do this stuff. The People are leaving.
And right here’s what they informed me. This could be within the Afghan Protection Division, their Inside Ministry, presidential advisors, ambassadors. These are the folks I used to be chatting with. And their response was all the time this ‘we have been assured by, and you can fill within the clean right here, the U.S. State Division, the Division of Protection, CIA, by administration officers that the U.S. wasn’t leaving. They’re going to be right here for us. This can be a lot of politics, however it’s finally the U.S. will again us.’ They by no means internalized that the U.S. was going to withdraw. The velocity through which the US withdrawal didn’t even give them an opportunity to see what was taking place and to internalize this and reorganize. That’s in a 5 minutes nutshell, that’s what occurred in Afghanistan.
MICHAEL MORELL: Let’s bounce again to the current right here, and let’s begin with the Taliban’s rule of the nation. Quite a few observers promised us a extra tolerant Taliban. They really known as it Taliban 2.0. A 12 months in now, how does this Taliban rule evaluate to the group’s governance previous to 2001?
BILL ROGGIO: Taliban 2.0 was all the time Taliban 1.0. While you analyze who the highest leaders of the Taliban so-called interim authorities are a 12 months later, the interim authorities is the federal government, about 50 to 60% of them have been leaders of the Taliban simply previous to 9/11. They could have switched round positions. After which different necessary officers, just like the Taliban’s two deputy emirs, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Yaqoob. Sirajuddin was the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, who was a key minister throughout the Taliban authorities. And Mullah Yaqoob additionally, after all, is the son of Mullah Omar, the founder and first emir of the Taliban. That’s what we’re .
So once more, Taliban 2.0 is Taliban 1.0. They’re forcing girls to exit, with escorts, girls can’t work. Ladies need to cowl up. Ladies can’t go to high school. Individuals are being crushed, stoned for issues like adultery. It’s basically the Taliban of Afghanistan of pre-9/11. The Taliban is slightly bit extra slick on issues like social media and has information organizations. And it appears to be slightly bit extra permissive with issues like cell telephones, though they do confiscate these. And I believe there’s a motive for that, Michael. I believe they like folks to have cell telephones, as a result of then in the event that they do need to go after them, they will see what they’ve been on social media and issues like who they’re speaking to, get info on them to see in the event that they’re anti-Taliban resistance or simply folks they don’t like. So there’s no change. The brand new Taliban is identical because the outdated Taliban.
MICHAEL MORELL: How about their effectiveness, their efficacy in coping with Afghanistan’s issues, the problems the Afghan folks face on daily basis?
BILL ROGGIO: The Taliban’s major concern is ruling Afghanistan and imposing its harsh model of Sharia or Islamic regulation. Every little thing else is secondary to that. The Afghan folks, a big quantity, over 50% have meals insecurity. There’s shortages of drugs. There’s a drought and famine occurring in Afghanistan. Positive, the Taliban tries to take care of these points, however its primary precedence is Taliban management, and that’s army control- policing, securing the nation, its borders and propping up a Taliban regime. Every little thing is secondary to that. And the Afghan folks in the present day are struggling for this.
Zalmay Khalilzad, who was america negotiator with the Taliban, the particular consultant for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, he signed that Doha deal beneath the Trump administration and to this present day continues to be popping out flacking for the Taliban, saying we ought to be negotiating with them. They informed us that the Taliban would reasonable, the reasonable Taliban. Issues like this. And I all the time stated, present me a reasonable Taliban. And when you suppose that somebody like Mullah Baradar who was on the negotiating workforce.
There was a terrific New York Occasions article the place it mentions how he had to attract the shades in Doha as a result of he couldn’t take a look at the ladies on the pool and the way he insisted on not having girls within the room after they’re negotiating or having hallways cleared. That’s what a reasonable Taliban appears to be like like. Baradar is a killer. He’s an terrible individual. He’s only one that was prepared to sit down down with People with a view to get the U.S. withdrawal. As unhealthy as america mismanaged and NATO mismanaged Afghanistan, the Afghan folks didn’t need to reside beneath the deprivations of the Taliban as they’ve the final previous 12 months. That is a part of the ethical failure of Afghanistan, of the U.S. leaving Afghanistan.
MICHAEL MORELL: Is the Taliban have full management of the complete nation? Are there elements of the nation they don’t management? Do they face an insurgency from a choose group of former authorities officers? What’s occurring, on that entrance?
BILL ROGGIO: I might describe Afghanistan as being 100% Taliban managed at this second. There’s a nascent insurgency that’s starting. The one group that appears to be doing the majority of the preventing known as the Nationwide Resistance Entrance. It’s led by Ahmad Massoud, who’s the son of a mad Shah Massoud. He was the top of the Northern Alliance previous to 9/11. Al Qaeda killed him on September ninth, 2001, two days previous to 9/11. They killed him as a result of they recognized- and did it, clearly, with the bidding of the Taliban. They despatched in a information crew who have been truly members of al Qaeda who had a bomb contained in the digital camera. It’s led by the son of Massoud. I’m beginning to truly map this out proper now. It’s form of attention-grabbing seeing and it’s definitely not stunning to me who’s adopted Afghanistan all these years.
There’s some resistance that’s in Panjshir after which in some surrounding districts in neighboring provinces, primarily Takhar, Baghlan, and it appears to be like like Kapisa and maybe Parwan as effectively. It’s actually tough proper now to get info out of Afghanistan. Previous to the U.S. withdrawal, you a minimum of had international press. I all the time took what the Taliban stated about controlling and contesting districts very severely, as a result of we might often confirm that within the press. And then you definitely would have with the Afghan authorities or the U.S. army or NATO’s stated and you can put all this collectively, and also you additionally had a vibrant Afghan press previous to the U.S. withdrawal. That’s all gone now.
Now, you have got with the Nationwide Resistance Entrance is saying and another smaller teams, which I’m informed primarily smaller teams are appear to be– how do I put this delicately — a rip-off to boost cash, to extract cash from folks. However the Nationwide Resistance Entrance definitely is preventing. However proper now, it’s attainable they will contest a few districts. They reportedly have some bases in some districts. And I believe by my technical dictionary definition, meaning they management some distant territory, as distant as it’s. They’re actually launching guerrilla assaults in opposition to Taliban army forces, convoys, or if the Taliban attempt to enterprise in areas the place their bases are, they’ll strike onerous. Panjshir is a really mountainous central area of Afghanistan. So it’s straightforward to be a mountain gorilla, so to talk. The attain may be very slender at this level. I describe it as nascent.
MICHAEL MORELL: Have you learnt in the event that they’re getting any exterior assist?
BILL ROGGIO: So the U.S. State Division, a few month in the past issued a press release saying, this was after some preventing between the 2 teams, saying the U.S. State Division doesn’t condone violent resistance to the Taliban. It prompt that the events ought to sit down and speak as a result of negotiations, Michael, works so effectively with the Taliban —
MICHAEL MORELL: –work so effectively with the Taliban.
BILL ROGGIO: Proper. We must always belief them to barter in good religion with a nascent resistance group who the Taliban completely hate. So the U.S. authorities’s official coverage is to not assist them, whether or not the CIA is offering some assist. I can’t reply that query. I’ve no info that they’re.
MICHAEL MORELL: I doubt it. Given the place U.S. coverage is.
BILL ROGGIO: I strongly, I by no means low cost it, I strongly doubt it. The State Division formally says that. So if it’s found that the CIA was truly offering assist, that’s only a large black eye. I additionally suppose that the Biden administration actually needs to maintain Afghanistan on the again pages or off the of the newspaper interval. Something talked about with Afghanistan with respect to the Biden administration merely factors to their failures there.
Supporting a resistance could be a tacit admission that its coverage to go away was a failure. In nations like Tajikistan, very seemingly, they’re a minimum of permitting the Nationwide Resistance Entrance’s management to be primarily based there. Additionally, it’s very seemingly a rustic like India is offering covert assist to the Nationwide Resistance Entrance, even because it’s flirting with conducting talks with the Taliban. However I might suspect India- it will make quite a lot of sense for India, to be supporting the Nationwide Resistance Entrance.
MICHAEL MORELL: Let’s flip to terrorism now and let’s take ISIS and al Qaeda separately for causes that you already know effectively and for causes that can turn out to be apparent to our listeners right here. Let’s begin with ISIS. The place does ISIS in Afghanistan stand in the present day in comparison with a 12 months in the past?
BILL ROGGIO: The Islamic State in Afghanistan is estimated to have a number of thousand fighters. That is in response to the United Nations sanctions monitoring workforce. I believe that’s most likely proper. The Islamic State mainly is made up of castoffs from the Taliban and al Qaeda and another teams that had a difficulty with how the loss of life of Mullah Omar was dealt with. The Taliban hid that for 2 years and that was an actual catastrophe, truly led to the dissolution of the Taliban. They have been sad with that. And in addition these are most likely extra of what I might describe because the red-blooded jihadists, if there’s such a factor.
I all the time describe the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State in quite simple phrases. The Islamic State is caliphate now. With an apostrophe on the finish, they need to declare the caliphate and that’s precisely what they did. They declared their caliphate and fought for it. Al Qaeda was all the time ‘we don’t declare the caliphate till we get defend it.’ So it’s a extra patient- we construct it and they’ll come emirate by emirate.’ And that’s the true distinction in my thoughts between the 2. The Islamic State in Afghanistan, you get these ones who’re anxious, don’t actually agree with al Qaeda’s affected person technique. There’s a core assist there. I describe them because the Islamic state Khorasan province, as they’re recognized, to be like a tertiary risk that emanates from Afghanistan. It’s that Taliban-al Qaeda alliance that’s actually the risk. The Islamic State is ready to conduct assaults within Afghanistan and so they largely goal delicate targets like Shia Hazara, who they hate as a result of they think about them to be apostates.
The Islamic State’s downside is it doesn’t construct coalitions. It’s my manner or the freeway. You swear allegiance to our emir or our caliph or we’ll kill you. That’s mainly the Islamic State’s message. Whereas the Taliban and al Qaeda, they band with all of those different teams, Central Asian and Pakistani terror teams, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Islamic Motion Uzbekistan. I might go on and on with the alphabet soup of teams that function in each Pakistan in addition to many are primarily based in Afghanistan in the present day. So the Islamic State doesn’t construct these coalitions. It gained’t take state sponsorship. For example, the Taliban and Al Qaida takes state sponsorship from Iran, Pakistan offers state sponsorship from the Taliban. The Islamic State simply wouldn’t try this. To me it’s a far much less of a risk to us and the West and within the area as effectively as a result of they simply don’t play effectively with others.
MICHAEL MORELL: How a lot of a risk are they to the Taliban?
BILL ROGGIO: I might describe them as, in the mean time, as a nuisance risk. The Taliban survived twenty years of U.S. airstrikes, of an Afghan army that was educated to struggle them, of raids by Afghan commandos or U.S. particular forces, of NATO’s Special Forces. The Islamic State can pull off some occasional suicide bombings, assassinations. However these are a pinprick in comparison with what the Taliban skilled simply previous to taking on the nation on August fifteenth, 2021.
MICHAEL MORELL: And is it principally Afghans or are there some foreigners combined in there?
BILL ROGGIO: It’s a combination. A few of them are Afghan Taliban, former Afghan Taliban, former Pakistani Taliban. A few of them are Central Asian jihadist teams from the Islamic motion, Uzbekistan. That group mainly break up in half. It’s non secular chief was very upset about how the Taliban hid Mullah Omar’s loss of life, and he took a big contingent to affix the Islamic State. There’s some Uyghurs from China. They was members of the Turkistan Islamic Occasion. There’s additionally Indians and others from Southeast Asia.
MICHAEL MORELL: And have they proven any curiosity in assaults exterior Afghanistan?
BILL ROGGIO: I believe they’re concerned about conducting assaults exterior of Afghanistan, however I don’t suppose they’ve the capability to take action as a result of they don’t have protected haven. They’re consistently on the run. They’re working on the mobile stage. And the Taliban has been taking the struggle to them. Now, lots of people will say this makes Taliban an efficient counterterrorism accomplice. However I might wildly disagree. Due to the Taliban’s assist for Al Qaida and the opposite teams. The Taliban are solely focusing on the Islamic State as a result of the Islamic State opposes Taliban rule. I simply haven’t seen any indication that the Islamic States Khorasan Province is ready to do something however conduct a localized terrorist assault both in opposition to the Taliban or in opposition to delicate civilian targets.
MICHAEL MORELL: Let’s flip to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the risk it poses to america and our pursuits worldwide. I need to begin by asking you a few set of speaking factors that the White Home put out this weekend on Al Qaida in Afghanistan. The White Home stated that the speaking factors have been a abstract of a simply accomplished intelligence group evaluation that will be launched quickly. I don’t suppose we’ve seen that but. Simply give folks a way of what these speaking factors stated and what your take is on them.
BILL ROGGIO: One of many large speaking factors is that there was solely a dozen or so legacy al Qaeda leaders/operatives who have been primarily based in Afghanistan. And it is a direct quote, ‘most likely in Kabul.’ They’re not a risk to america. They will’t conduct plot assaults in opposition to the U.S. I might argue when you knew that there was 12 legacy al Qaeda leaders and have been in Kabul whereas we have been there. Why didn’t we take them out earlier than exiting Afghanistan? If that’s true. I might argue the numbers are unsuitable. And Michael, I’m going to inform an actual fast story. We heard from 2010 to 2015 that there have been solely 50 to 100 core al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and so they have been ineffective. That quantity by no means modified for six straight years up till the U.S. killed a prime al Qaeda chief in Paktika province. He was a member of al Qaeda Shura. After which throughout that raid, they found that al Qaeda was operating two coaching camps in Kandahar, the place the U.S. intelligence was saying al Qaeda was solely 50 to 100 and confined in northeastern Afghanistan. Kandahar is within the southeast. They raid the camp, kill 150 Al Qaida operatives and leaders. One of many U.S. generals who was concerned within the raid stated it was the biggest camp that they had seen post-9/11. I took that to imply the biggest camp they’ve seen on the earth post-9/11. However even when it was Afghanistan, that was fairly putting as a result of we’ve raided some important camps in Afghanistan whereas we have been there.
I’m very, very, very skeptical relating to assessments from the U.S. intelligence group about al Qaeda’s power and presence within Afghanistan. As soon as that camp was rated in Kandahar, it was known as shorabak. As soon as the camp was raided, the U.S. intelligence group upped the evaluation. Properly, now it’s 200. Look, I didn’t imagine 50 to 100. Why didn’t I imagine that quantity? The U.S. army was reporting on raids of al Qaeda from 2007 to 2013. They usually have been reporting that about 25 to 75 al Qaeda fighters and commanders and operatives and trainers for the Taliban, and so on., and so on., have been killed within Afghanistan yearly. And but we’ve a 50 to 100 quantity. So none of this made sense to me. I used to be in a position to monitor raids in 24 of 36 of 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces. So that you’re telling me you solely manned one or two man al Qaeda guys in in these provinces. That’s how al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan was tracked out.
I’m extremely skeptical after I see the intelligence group come out– I believe this is a matter that’s been extremely politicized. It will get again to why is that this a difficulty that’s extremely politicized? The U.S. can’t depart Afghanistan if al Qaeda has a big presence there and the U.S. can’t depart Afghanistan if the Taliban-al Qaeda relationship is robust. So how will we downplay that to realize a coverage finish of getting out of Afghanistan? We downplay al Qaeda’s significance and relationship with the Taliban.
On this case, I believe the administration, the Biden administration is telling us about al Qaeda’s insignificance in Afghanistan to justify their reasoning for withdrawal. One other key half in that report was they stated al Qaeda doesn’t have the capability to launch assaults in opposition to the U.S. from Afghanistan. The 9/11 Fee report may be very clear, protected haven is the lifeblood, in addition to state sponsorship, is the lifeblood for terrorist teams. What does al Qaeda have in the present day in Afghanistan? We all know it does as a result of Zawahiri was there, and he wasn’t alone. He comes with a employees. He comes with a safety element. And he’s not the one one there. Al Qaeda has a protected haven inside Afghanistan. Sure.
The U.S. was in a position to launch one strike in a single 12 months to kill him, however they’ve it in Afghanistan, and so they have state sponsorship. The Taliban is the Afghan state. What that protected haven and state sponsorship provides al Qaeda is it provides the power for its management to arrange, to relaxation. They’re not being actively hunted like they have been. Sure, there was a one drone strike, however present me ten of them within the subsequent 12 months and then you definitely would possibly get my consideration as a result of killing one senior chief who’s been round since 9/11, that doesn’t impress me. It’s a formidable particular person strike, however it’s not a marketing campaign to take al Qaeda aside.
They’ve the power to relaxation, to regroup, to refit, to get medical consideration. They will transfer their households in. They will start to recruit. It’s a boon. The Taliban managed Afghanistan with al Qaeda’s assist is a boon for recruiting. They will recruit, they will prepare, they may open up coaching camps. They will indoctrinate, they will plot. After which in the event that they resolve to execute and assault, they’ve every little thing sitting proper there for them to do it. If I’m al Qaeda, I don’t launch an assault in opposition to america as a result of I don’t need to poke the bear. Folks suppose that the specter of al Qaeda is launching a 9/11 type or perhaps a lesser type assault. That’s merely a tactic of al Qaeda. It’s a tactic to realize its overarching aim. What’s that aim? It’s to determine a world caliphate.
It launches terror assaults in opposition to america, forces us to withdraw from nations and areas, to allow them to launch their insurgencies and take them over. They’ve the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, that’s one emirate inside al Qaeda’s hoped for caliphate, and that provides them protected haven. It provides all of them the capability to do the issues to advertise its aim of constructing the caliphate. And in doing that, they’re going to proceed to assault us to assist drive us out of this. They imagine that the U.S. is weak. They imagine that that the U.S. will finally will tire of those wars. And Afghanistan confirmed that we did tire of that battle.
MICHAEL MORELL: Are you suggesting that we’re extra prone to see al Qaeda assaults in locations just like the Center East and North Africa than we’re america? Given what you simply stated?
BILL ROGGIO: Sure, I do. And that doesn’t make them any much less of a risk to us. We nonetheless have U.S. army personnel abroad, U.S. companies, U.S. civilians, expats, in addition to our allies. Our mates and allies, Europe and India and internationally. To me, al Qaeda is the larger risk than the Islamic State. It’s due to its persistence. The Islamic State is a extra of a right away risk. It likes to conduct assaults for its propaganda and recruiting. However I don’t suppose it has an actual caliphate constructing plan. And al Qaeda does. Al Qaeda is affected person. Affected person and considerate enemies are what scares me.
Let’s face it, they have been affected person for 20 years together with the Taliban to get the U.S. to go away. Now that the U.S. is out of Afghanistan, they will focus their energies within the Center East, in Africa, Somalia or Mali. I might put every title on a coin and flip it. A good portion of those nations can turn out to be the following al Qaeda managed areas. Be mindful, Shabaab took management of southern and central Somalia from I imagine 2007-2008 to about 2011-2012 earlier than america and the African Union and Kenya joined collectively to eject them. And now they fought again and so they management about, we estimate, 40%. An American normal two years in the past stated 25% of Somalia is beneath Shabaab management. I’d put that quantity nearer to 40, given what I’ve seen or given analysis on this subject.
These are important issues. Simply because our want right here within the West, amongst U.S. policymakers, is to finish the so-called countless wars. What meaning is we’re ending our involvement in these wars. However our enemy isn’t. They’re persevering with the struggle. They need to drive us out of Somalia. The Biden administration simply despatched extra troops again in there after the Trump administration withdrew them in an effort to finish the so-called countless wars. The French are leaving Mali. Truly, I imagine they’ve left at this level. However the French are in different areas. They’re going to proceed to focus on us and our curiosity till they get what they need. Again to the problem of protected havens, now they’ve the power to plot this– not simply plot terrorist assaults, however plot and execute their technique for caliphate constructing.
MICHAEL MORELL: One of many ideas I had after I learn the White Home speaking factors was that they have been making what I name adverse assessments. They have been saying what’s not as opposed to what’s. And a what’s not evaluation, as somebody having been an analyst for 33 years, you want quite a lot of info, quite a lot of intelligence to make a not assertion versus an is assertion. And I simply don’t see how we’ve that quantity of intelligence provided that we don’t have a presence in that nation.
BILL ROGGIO: That is a superb level, Michael. Be mindful, Basic Mackenzie, the earlier commander of U.S. Central Command, I imagine in December when he testified to Congress, he stated our visibility in Afghanistan is 1 to 2% of what it was once we had boots on the bottom earlier than the U.S. withdrawal. And anybody who is aware of the army is aware of that that’s the best-case state of affairs. That’s essentially the most optimistic evaluation. The actual quantity might be about 0.5 to 1%. How can the White Home and the nationwide safety say with such authority in regards to the whatnots right here.
Afghanistan has turn out to be an info black gap. We should assume the worst, not the perfect. We should assume that the al Qaeda-Taliban relationship has been strengthened and cast with 20 years of blood and fireplace. We should assume, provided that Zawahiri was there, that lesser however no much less necessary, al Qaeda leaders have begun to hunt protected haven in Afghanistan. We’ve to imagine that that variety of an estimate of 200 al Qaeda in Afghanistan is blooming and never shrinking after the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban takeover. I couldn’t agree with you extra, Michael.
MICHAEL MORELL: Speak slightly bit in regards to the loss of life of Zawahiri. How necessary from a CT perspective. And much more importantly, discuss seemingly successors. Can they convey extra life again to this group?
BILL ROGGIO: First, it was fairly an accomplishment to kill Zawahiri, to seek out him and to kill him. I believe al Qaeda, his safety detachment acquired slightly complacent. Zawahiri himself most likely acquired complacent. The U.S. army stated they believed in, I imagine it was2020, that they thought he was in jap Afghanistan.
MICHAEL MORELL: They did.
BILL ROGGIO: I’m sure that he’s been on the run for twenty years and doubtless was taking the sneakers off and rubbing his toes within the carpet slightly bit to calm down. He most likely thought all as effectively.
MICHAEL MORELL: It tells you ways snug he felt with the Taliban.
BILL ROGGIO: It does, proper. I imply, that’s definitely a superb level, Michael. He felt he was snug. He felt he was protected. He felt the U.S. didn’t have the power. The US did. However once more, one strike doesn’t make a profitable counter-terrorism marketing campaign, show the success of it. It’s one strike. He been accountable for al Qaeda for 11 years now for the reason that loss of life of Osama bin Laden. He was a deputy emir for the reason that founding of al Qaeda. I all the time say, title me a president or vp, a American cupboard member or a 3 or 4 star normal who was there on 9/11 whose nonetheless in authorities or continues to be within the army? The reply to that’s zero. High al Qaeda leaders, fighters, they don’t retire. They both die of outdated age or they’re killed in army or counter-terrorism operations.
That’s what occurred to Zawahiri. He put his stamp on al Qaeda for 4 plus many years. I dismiss the concept that he was insignificant, divisive and whatnot. Except for the problem with the Islamic State that– we don’t know if Osama bin Laden himself would have been in a position to handle relations with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which finally was kicked out of al Qaeda. That’s the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. There have been issues between the 2 organizations for I can recall going again to when Zarqawi was alive. So he’s useless. Who’s subsequent in line? Within the United Nations sanctions and monitoring report. I put quite a lot of credit score in that. Edmond Fitton-Brown, the director of that. He’s a top-notch analyst. They are saying that it’s very seemingly Saif al-Adel or Abdur Rehman Al-Maghribi. These are each legacy al Qaeda leaders. Saif al-Adel, needed, former Egyptian army officer, been with al Qaeda since on the very least the early 1990’s was their head of their army committee. He’s been Zawahiri’s deputy chief. He’s the very seemingly selection. Abdur Rehman Al-Maghribi held quite a few positions inside al Qaeda, together with the top of its Al-Sahab, which is its media arm. It’s a really important department of al Qaeda, in addition to the army chief for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
MICHAEL MORELL: Zawahiri, son in regulation as effectively.
BILL ROGGIO: Precisely. His son in regulation. And that is attention-grabbing, however not stunning when you observe this. The top of al Qaeda within the Islamic Maghreb and the top of Shabab, which is al Qaeda’s department in East Africa. They’re very seemingly within the line of succession. They’re most likely not going to take over. Properly, folks maintain this up as, ‘wow, look, that’s fascinating.’ Besides it isn’t. The top of al Qaeda within the Arabian Peninsula was Nasser al-Wuhayshi earlier than we killed him within the mid 2010s. He was al Qaeda’s normal supervisor and was believed to be within the line of succession.
Al Qaeda has type of diversified its management in response to the drone marketing campaign. Folks suppose that it is a weak point of al Qaeda, however I believe it’s a power. It makes it tough to speak. Sure. But it surely provides purchase in to the branches. Folks need to say these associates, which I want to name branches, which al Qaeda describes as their theaters. And al Qaeda doesn’t describe itself as a core, however a normal command. This offers purchase in from the group, from the branches, it permits al Qaeda to guard itself from its management being concentrated in a single space. So we’re going to seek out out. You realize, individuals are additionally saying, ‘oh, al Qaeda hasn’t even introduced his loss of life.’ There’s a mourning interval after which there’s a consultative interval the place they’re going to select their new management. That’s very seemingly what’s taking place. We’ll discover out who that new chief is. I wouldn’t be shocked if it was a darkish horse, if it was somebody we didn’t realize it. There may be quite a lot of members of al Qaeda who aren’t public names we aren’t even conscious of.
MICHAEL MORELL: Invoice, your backside line on the finish of this dialogue is that we’ve not heard the final of al Qaeda from Afghanistan.
BILL ROGGIO: No, we haven’t. I believe that al Qaeda from Afghanistan and globally is in a a lot stronger place in the present day than it was previous to 9/11. Previous to 911, al Qaeda actually solely had a serious base in a single space in Afghanistan. Now it’s all through the Center East, all through all of Africa, just like the Sahel in West Africa, not simply North Africa, because it was within the early 2000s. It’s a corporation that adapts. It has its faults, it has its issues, however it’s been adaptive. And I solely see them rising stronger because the West seeks to disengage from this struggle and deal with Russia and China, which I completely perceive. These are key points, however we want to have the ability to stroll and chew gum on the similar time.
MICHAEL MORELL: Invoice, thanks a lot for becoming a member of us.
BILL ROGGIO: Thanks. Michael. It’s actually a pleasure. Thanks once more for having me on.
