This week, on the “Intelligence Issues” podcast, host Michael Morell speaks with terrorism analyst and Lengthy Warfare journal editor Invoice Roggio on the state of the counterterrorism combat in Afghanistan a yr after the total U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban regaining management of the nation. Roggio says that al Qaeda has a stronger world place in the present day than it had previous to 9/11. He notes that whereas the Islamic State is a extra rapid risk, al Qaeda is the higher risk long-term. Roggio particulars the lead as much as the U.S. withdraw from Afghanistan and the way the Biden administration’s lack of a phased withdraw didn’t give an opportunity for Afghans to transition to “an Afghan means.”
HIGHLIGHTS:
- Al Qaeda stronger than pre-9/11: “I believe that al Qaeda from Afghanistan and globally is in a a lot stronger place in the present day than it was previous to 9/11. Previous to 9/11, al Qaeda actually solely had a significant base in a single space in Afghanistan. Now it’s all through the Center East, all through all of Africa, just like the Sahel in West Africa, not simply North Africa, because it was within the early 2000s. It’s a company that adapts. It has its faults, it has its issues, however it’s been adaptive. And I solely see them rising stronger because the West seeks to disengage from this combat and concentrate on Russia and China, which I completely perceive. These are key points, however we’d like to have the ability to stroll and chew gum on the identical time.”
- U.S. withdrawal didn’t permit transition to “Afghan means”: “What we wanted to do was to help the Afghan authorities by having it consolidate its traces in Afghanistan, abandon the south and east, reorganize its navy to combat the Afghan means, not the American means. That’s a complete podcast in itself, that dialogue. Principally, type dueling alliance 2.0, have them handle territory they will handle and take the combat to the Taliban within the contested areas in and round Kabul and within the south and east. However as a substitute, the Biden administration simply pulls out, and there’s no phased withdrawal right here to offer the Afghans an opportunity to transition to an Afghan means. “
- Al Qaeda higher long-term risk than ISIS: “To me, al Qaeda is the higher risk than the Islamic State. It’s due to its endurance. The Islamic State is a extra of a direct risk. It likes to conduct assaults for its propaganda and recruiting. However I don’t assume it has an actual caliphate constructing plan. And al Qaeda does. Al Qaeda is affected person. Affected person and considerate enemies are what scares me.
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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS: BILL ROGGIO
PRODUCER: PAULINA SMOLINSKI
MICHAEL MORELL: Invoice, welcome to Intelligence Issues. It’s nice to have you ever on the present. It’s an honor to have you ever on the present.
BILL ROGGIO: Michael, the respect is all mine. It really is an honor and a pleasure to have a possibility to talk to you about these vital points.
MICHAEL MORELL: So thanks for becoming a member of us to speak about Afghanistan and the CT combat there. One yr after the Taliban regained management of the nation and after the total withdrawal of the U.S. presence from the nation, there’s tons to speak about right here, as , together with a report that simply got here out from the Republicans on the Home International Affairs Committee on the withdrawal itself, latest focused killing of the chief of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and a latest assertion from the White Home concerning the terrorist risk emanating from Afghanistan. So tons to speak about.
However earlier than we get into the place issues stand in the present day in Afghanistan, I wish to rewind to final yr and I’d like to have you ever stroll us by means of your understanding on how we obtained from President Biden’s resolution in April of final yr to withdraw all U.S. fight forces from Afghanistan to a collapse of the Afghan authorities, a Taliban takeover of the nation, and a hack and lethal finish to our presence there. I’ll return and say once more that the Republicans within the Home International Affairs Committee, led by Congressman Mike McCaul, who I’ve deep respect for, simply launched a report that’s sharply crucial of the coverage course of, notably on the State Division, and apparently, not so crucial on the efficiency of the intelligence neighborhood, which shocked me a bit bit. However what’s your tackle what occurred? What went improper?
BILL ROGGIO: To begin with, I abhor the partisan meals fights over points like Afghanistan, as a result of the truth is, this was a failure that was twenty years within the making and a bipartisan failure in that. And I’m going to get very briefly undergo the Bush administration after overthrowing the Taliban, the fault wasn’t not negotiating with the Taliban. The Taliban was all the time going to help Al Qaeda. It sacrificed its Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to shelter bin Laden and others put up 9/11. In order that was destined to occur. Its failures was standing up an Afghan authorities and navy that weren’t appropriately made for Afghanistan, centralized management over each organizations. Not coping with Pakistan correctly, after which additionally diverting sources to the conflict in Iraq, and making Afghanistan the forgotten conflict. Below the Obama administration, Afghanistan turned the nice conflict, however there was a surge that was kneecapped in addition to it opened up negotiations with the Taliban. Once more, no effort to cope with Pakistan. The Trump administration minimize off Pakistan, all help from Pakistan and talked powerful. However then inside eight months started talks with the Taliban and signed the Doha deal, which was an absolute catastrophe.
This led to the seeds of the failure. I started monitoring the Taliban in 2014 when the U.S. ended its- the transition from a navy operation to a prepare advise and help to the Afghans. I acknowledged the flaw within the counterinsurgency technique which was ‘we’ll give the Taliban the agricultural areas and we’ll defend the city areas or the constructed up or the vital districts is what they name them.’ The Taliban stated, ‘hey, that’s simply effective. We’ll go along with this.’ So this started below the 2014 below the Obama administration. The Taliban slowly begin taking over territory, taking on territory or making territory contested. And we now have up till the date of the deal is signed, then the Taliban are touting this deal as a victory. I signed, automotive mortgage agreements and insurance coverage paperwork that have been longer than this Doha settlement, three and a 3rd pages the place a lot of the textual content is written within the type the place it says the Taliban, which calls itself the Islamic Emirate, however we don’t acknowledge, that’s repeated like 12 or 15 occasions in a 3 and a half web page document-
MICHAEL MORELL: Taking over a lot of the three and a half pages.
BILL ROGGIO: I believe if I counted, I wound up saying it took up a few half a web page, Michael. There have been no situations placed on the Taliban. It was a whimsical settlement. For the Biden administration– that’s what we now have to know — as soon as the Obama administration determined that the U.S. was leaving Afghanistan, that is the place all of our failure started. The coverage turns into ‘let’s discover a option to depart.’ How will we depart? Effectively, we are able to’t depart if al Qaeda is robust in Afghanistan. We are able to’t depart if the Taliban-al Qaeda relationship is robust. Each of these issues have been true. However we have been informed by successive administrations that they weren’t true. That was the excuse to depart. Bear in mind, President Biden, when he broadcasts withdrawal, he says al Qaeda is completed, quote achieved. Effectively, , why do we have to stay in Afghanistan? Lower than a yr later, we kill Ayman al Zawahiri, the top of al Qaeda there.
It’s 20 years of failure, of unhealthy coverage that led as much as this. I can’t simply blame President Biden, though he shoulders a big a part of the blame right here as a result of he finally made the choice to depart. The Nationwide Safety Council simply issued an- or there was a memo leaked. I don’t know if it’s official now, however Axios reported it. Their protection of the coverage in Afghanistan was, ‘let’s blame Donald Trump as a result of he signed the deal.’ The Obama administration, they gave us a false selection. Both we now have to ramp up U.S. forces in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban or we are able to depart. And that was unfaithful. There was a 3rd means. They selected to not point out it or take it. What we wanted to do was to help the Afghan authorities by having it consolidate its traces in Afghanistan, abandon the south and east, reorganize its navy to combat the Afghan means, not the American means. That’s a complete podcast in itself, that dialogue. Principally type dueling alliance 2.0, have them handle territory they will handle and take the combat to the Taliban within the contested areas in and round Kabul and within the south and east.
However as a substitute, the Biden administration simply pulls out, and there’s no phased withdrawal right here to offer the Afghans an opportunity to transition to an Afghan means. Inside three and a half months of asserting the withdrawal, the final U.S. soldier leaves Afghanistan. Bagram, the important thing node for air operations in Afghanistan is closed down by the start of July, I consider it was a few month and a half after withdrawal was introduced.
Not solely did the U.S. depart, it shut off the lights with out even telling the Afghans there that we have been leaving. The Trump administration set the situations to weaken the Afghan authorities, to permit the Taliban to challenge a whisper marketing campaign saying the ‘People are leaving.’ The Biden administration merely struck the previous few nails within the coffin by asserting withdrawal after which doing it in a fashion that ensured the Afghan authorities was going to break down. And yet one more fast story right here. I all the time inform this. Once I talked to Afghan officers earlier than President Trump signed the deal, earlier than Biden was elected, after he was elected, earlier than he introduced withdrawal and instantly and a few months, a few month, previous to the total withdrawal on the finish of August, I talked to them and I informed them, you’ll want to discover your individual means. You have to reorganize. You have to do these items. The People are leaving.
And right here’s what they informed me. This is able to be within the Afghan Protection Division, their Inside Ministry, presidential advisors, ambassadors. These are the individuals I used to be talking to. And their response was all the time this ‘we have been assured by, and you can fill within the clean right here, the U.S. State Division, the Division of Protection, CIA, by administration officers that the U.S. wasn’t leaving. They’re going to be right here for us. This can be a lot of politics, however it’s finally the U.S. will again us.’ They by no means internalized that the U.S. was going to withdraw. The velocity by which the US withdrawal didn’t even give them an opportunity to see what was occurring and to internalize this and reorganize. That’s in a 5 minutes nutshell, that’s what occurred in Afghanistan.
MICHAEL MORELL: Let’s soar again to the current right here, and let’s begin with the Taliban’s rule of the nation. Plenty of observers promised us a extra tolerant Taliban. They really referred to as it Taliban 2.0. A yr in now, how does this Taliban rule evaluate to the group’s governance previous to 2001?
BILL ROGGIO: Taliban 2.0 was all the time Taliban 1.0. Whenever you analyze who the highest leaders of the Taliban so-called interim authorities are a yr later, the interim authorities is the federal government, about 50 to 60% of them have been leaders of the Taliban simply previous to 9/11. They might have switched round positions. After which different vital officers, just like the Taliban’s two deputy emirs, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Yaqoob. Sirajuddin was the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, who was a key minister inside the Taliban authorities. And Mullah Yaqoob additionally, in fact, is the son of Mullah Omar, the founder and first emir of the Taliban. That’s what we’re taking a look at.
So once more, Taliban 2.0 is Taliban 1.0. They’re forcing girls to exit, with escorts, girls can’t work. Ladies need to cowl up. Women can’t go to highschool. Individuals are being crushed, stoned for issues like adultery. It’s primarily the Taliban of Afghanistan of pre-9/11. The Taliban is a bit bit extra slick on issues like social media and has information organizations. And it appears to be a bit bit extra permissive with issues like cell telephones, though they do confiscate these. And I believe there’s a motive for that, Michael. I believe they like individuals to have cell telephones, as a result of then in the event that they do wish to go after them, they will see what they’ve been taking a look at on social media and issues like who they’re speaking to, get info on them to see in the event that they’re anti-Taliban resistance or simply individuals they don’t like. So there’s no change. The brand new Taliban is identical because the previous Taliban.
MICHAEL MORELL: How about their effectiveness, their efficacy in coping with Afghanistan’s issues, the problems the Afghan individuals face each day?
BILL ROGGIO: The Taliban’s main concern is ruling Afghanistan and imposing its harsh model of Sharia or Islamic legislation. Every little thing else is secondary to that. The Afghan individuals, a big quantity, over 50% have meals insecurity. There’s shortages of medication. There’s a drought and famine occurring in Afghanistan. Positive, the Taliban tries to cope with these points, however its primary precedence is Taliban management, and that’s navy control- policing, securing the nation, its borders and propping up a Taliban regime. Every little thing is secondary to that. And the Afghan individuals in the present day are struggling for this.
Zalmay Khalilzad, who was the USA negotiator with the Taliban, the particular consultant for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, he signed that Doha deal below the Trump administration and to at the present time remains to be popping out flacking for the Taliban, saying we needs to be negotiating with them. They informed us that the Taliban would average, the average Taliban. Issues like this. And I all the time stated, present me a average Taliban. And in the event you assume that somebody like Mullah Baradar who was on the negotiating staff.
There was an amazing New York Instances article the place it mentions how he had to attract the shades in Doha as a result of he couldn’t take a look at the ladies on the pool and the way he insisted on not having girls within the room once they’re negotiating or having hallways cleared. That’s what a average Taliban appears to be like like. Baradar is a killer. He’s an terrible particular person. He’s only one that was prepared to take a seat down with People to be able to get the U.S. withdrawal. As unhealthy as the USA mismanaged and NATO mismanaged Afghanistan, the Afghan individuals didn’t need to reside below the deprivations of the Taliban as they’ve the final previous yr. That is a part of the ethical failure of Afghanistan, of the U.S. leaving Afghanistan.
MICHAEL MORELL: Is the Taliban have full management of the whole nation? Are there elements of the nation they don’t management? Do they face an insurgency from a choose group of former authorities officers? What’s occurring, on that entrance?
BILL ROGGIO: I might describe Afghanistan as being 100% Taliban managed at this second. There’s a nascent insurgency that’s starting. The one group that appears to be doing the majority of the combating is known as the Nationwide Resistance Entrance. It’s led by Ahmad Massoud, who’s the son of a mad Shah Massoud. He was the top of the Northern Alliance previous to 9/11. Al Qaeda killed him on September ninth, 2001, two days previous to 9/11. They killed him as a result of they recognized- and did it, clearly, with the bidding of the Taliban. They despatched in a information crew who have been truly members of al Qaeda who had a bomb contained in the digital camera. It’s led by the son of Massoud. I’m beginning to truly map this out proper now. It’s sort of attention-grabbing seeing and it’s definitely not shocking to me who’s adopted Afghanistan all these years.
There’s some resistance that’s in Panjshir after which in some surrounding districts in neighboring provinces, primarily Takhar, Baghlan, and it appears to be like like Kapisa and maybe Parwan as effectively. It’s actually troublesome proper now to get info out of Afghanistan. Previous to the U.S. withdrawal, you at the least had overseas press. I all the time took what the Taliban stated about controlling and contesting districts very critically, as a result of we might often confirm that within the press. And you then would have with the Afghan authorities or the U.S. navy or NATO’s stated and you can put all this collectively, and also you additionally had a vibrant Afghan press previous to the U.S. withdrawal. That’s all gone now.
Now, you have got with the Nationwide Resistance Entrance is saying and another smaller teams, which I’m informed primarily smaller teams are appear to be– how do I put this delicately — a rip-off to lift cash, to extract cash from individuals. However the Nationwide Resistance Entrance definitely is combating. However proper now, it’s doable they will contest a few districts. They reportedly have some bases in some districts. And I believe by my technical dictionary definition, meaning they management some distant territory, as distant as it’s. They’re actually launching guerrilla assaults in opposition to Taliban navy forces, convoys, or if the Taliban attempt to enterprise in areas the place their bases are, they’ll strike laborious. Panjshir is a really mountainous central area of Afghanistan. So it’s simple to be a mountain gorilla, so to talk. The attain could be very slim at this level. I describe it as nascent.
MICHAEL MORELL: Are you aware in the event that they’re getting any outdoors help?
BILL ROGGIO: So the U.S. State Division, a few month in the past issued an announcement saying, this was after some combating between the 2 teams, saying the U.S. State Division doesn’t condone violent resistance to the Taliban. It advised that the events ought to sit down and speak as a result of negotiations, Michael, works so effectively with the Taliban —
MICHAEL MORELL: –work so effectively with the Taliban.
BILL ROGGIO: Proper. We must always belief them to barter in good religion with a nascent resistance group who the Taliban completely hate. So the U.S. authorities’s official coverage is to not help them, whether or not the CIA is offering some help. I can’t reply that query. I’ve no info that they’re.
MICHAEL MORELL: I doubt it. Given the place U.S. coverage is.
BILL ROGGIO: I strongly, I by no means low cost it, I strongly doubt it. The State Division formally says that. So if it’s found that the CIA was truly offering help, that’s only a huge black eye. I additionally assume that the Biden administration actually needs to maintain Afghanistan on the again pages or off the of the newspaper interval. Something talked about with Afghanistan with respect to the Biden administration merely factors to their failures there.
Supporting a resistance can be a tacit admission that its coverage to depart was a failure. In international locations like Tajikistan, very probably, they’re at the least permitting the Nationwide Resistance Entrance’s management to be based mostly there. Additionally, it’s very probably a rustic like India is offering covert help to the Nationwide Resistance Entrance, even because it’s flirting with conducting talks with the Taliban. However I might suspect India- it will make loads of sense for India, to be supporting the Nationwide Resistance Entrance.
MICHAEL MORELL: Let’s flip to terrorism now and let’s take ISIS and al Qaeda separately for causes that effectively and for causes that may turn into apparent to our listeners right here. Let’s begin with ISIS. The place does ISIS in Afghanistan stand in the present day in comparison with a yr in the past?
BILL ROGGIO: The Islamic State in Afghanistan is estimated to have a number of thousand fighters. That is in keeping with the United Nations sanctions monitoring staff. I think that’s in all probability proper. The Islamic State mainly is made up of castoffs from the Taliban and al Qaeda and another teams that had a problem with how the demise of Mullah Omar was dealt with. The Taliban hid that for 2 years and that was an actual catastrophe, truly led to the dissolution of the Taliban. They have been sad with that. And likewise these are in all probability extra of what I might describe because the red-blooded jihadists, if there’s such a factor.
I all the time describe the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State in quite simple phrases. The Islamic State is caliphate now. With an apostrophe on the finish, they wish to declare the caliphate and that’s precisely what they did. They declared their caliphate and fought for it. Al Qaeda was all the time ‘we don’t declare the caliphate till we get defend it.’ So it’s a extra patient- we construct it and they’re going to come emirate by emirate.’ And that’s the true distinction in my thoughts between the 2. The Islamic State in Afghanistan, you get these ones who’re anxious, don’t actually agree with al Qaeda’s affected person technique. There’s a core help there. I describe them because the Islamic state Khorasan province, as they’re identified, to be like a tertiary risk that emanates from Afghanistan. It’s that Taliban-al Qaeda alliance that’s actually the risk. The Islamic State is ready to conduct assaults inside Afghanistan and so they largely goal mushy targets like Shia Hazara, who they hate as a result of they take into account them to be apostates.
The Islamic State’s downside is it doesn’t construct coalitions. It’s my means or the freeway. You swear allegiance to our emir or our caliph or we’ll kill you. That’s mainly the Islamic State’s message. Whereas the Taliban and al Qaeda, they band with all of those different teams, Central Asian and Pakistani terror teams, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Islamic Motion Uzbekistan. I might go on and on with the alphabet soup of teams that function in each Pakistan in addition to many are based mostly in Afghanistan in the present day. So the Islamic State doesn’t construct these coalitions. It received’t take state sponsorship. For example, the Taliban and Al Qaida takes state sponsorship from Iran, Pakistan supplies state sponsorship from the Taliban. The Islamic State simply wouldn’t try this. To me it’s a far much less of a risk to us and the West and within the area as effectively as a result of they simply don’t play effectively with others.
MICHAEL MORELL: How a lot of a risk are they to the Taliban?
BILL ROGGIO: I might describe them as, in the mean time, as a nuisance risk. The Taliban survived twenty years of U.S. airstrikes, of an Afghan navy that was educated to combat them, of raids by Afghan commandos or U.S. particular forces, of NATO’s Special Forces. The Islamic State can pull off some occasional suicide bombings, assassinations. However these are a pinprick in comparison with what the Taliban skilled simply previous to taking on the nation on August fifteenth, 2021.
MICHAEL MORELL: And is it largely Afghans or are there some foreigners blended in there?
BILL ROGGIO: It’s a mixture. A few of them are Afghan Taliban, former Afghan Taliban, former Pakistani Taliban. A few of them are Central Asian jihadist teams from the Islamic motion, Uzbekistan. That group mainly cut up in half. It’s spiritual chief was very upset about how the Taliban hid Mullah Omar’s demise, and he took a big contingent to hitch the Islamic State. There’s some Uyghurs from China. They was members of the Turkistan Islamic Get together. There’s additionally Indians and others from Southeast Asia.
MICHAEL MORELL: And have they proven any curiosity in assaults outdoors Afghanistan?
BILL ROGGIO: I believe they’re fascinated with conducting assaults outdoors of Afghanistan, however I don’t assume they’ve the capability to take action as a result of they don’t have protected haven. They’re continually on the run. They’re working on the mobile degree. And the Taliban has been taking the combat to them. Now, lots of people will say this makes Taliban an efficient counterterrorism associate. However I might wildly disagree. Due to the Taliban’s help for Al Qaida and the opposite teams. The Taliban are solely concentrating on the Islamic State as a result of the Islamic State opposes Taliban rule. I simply haven’t seen any indication that the Islamic States Khorasan Province is ready to do something however conduct a localized terrorist assault both in opposition to the Taliban or in opposition to mushy civilian targets.
MICHAEL MORELL: Let’s flip to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the risk it poses to the USA and our pursuits worldwide. I wish to begin by asking you a few set of speaking factors that the White Home put out this weekend on Al Qaida in Afghanistan. The White Home stated that the speaking factors have been a abstract of a simply accomplished intelligence neighborhood evaluation that may be launched quickly. I don’t assume we’ve seen that but. Simply give individuals a way of what these speaking factors stated and what your take is on them.
BILL ROGGIO: One of many huge speaking factors is that there was solely a dozen or so legacy al Qaeda leaders/operatives who have been based mostly in Afghanistan. And it is a direct quote, ‘in all probability in Kabul.’ They’re not a risk to the USA. They will’t conduct plot assaults in opposition to the U.S. I might argue in the event you knew that there was 12 legacy al Qaeda leaders and have been in Kabul whereas we have been there. Why didn’t we take them out earlier than exiting Afghanistan? If that’s true. I might argue the numbers are improper. And Michael, I’m going to inform an actual fast story. We heard from 2010 to 2015 that there have been solely 50 to 100 core al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and so they have been ineffective. That quantity by no means modified for six straight years up till the U.S. killed a prime al Qaeda chief in Paktika province. He was a member of al Qaeda Shura. After which throughout that raid, they found that al Qaeda was operating two coaching camps in Kandahar, the place the U.S. intelligence was saying al Qaeda was solely 50 to 100 and confined in northeastern Afghanistan. Kandahar is within the southeast. They raid the camp, kill 150 Al Qaida operatives and leaders. One of many U.S. generals who was concerned within the raid stated it was the most important camp they’d seen post-September 11. I took that to imply the most important camp they’ve seen on the planet post-September 11. However even when it was Afghanistan, that was fairly putting as a result of we’ve raided some important camps in Afghanistan whereas we have been there.
I’m very, very, very skeptical in relation to assessments from the U.S. intelligence neighborhood about al Qaeda’s energy and presence inside Afghanistan. As soon as that camp was rated in Kandahar, it was referred to as shorabak. As soon as the camp was raided, the U.S. intelligence neighborhood upped the evaluation. Effectively, now it’s 200. Look, I didn’t consider 50 to 100. Why didn’t I consider that quantity? The U.S. navy was reporting on raids of al Qaeda from 2007 to 2013. And so they have been reporting that about 25 to 75 al Qaeda fighters and commanders and operatives and trainers for the Taliban, and many others., and many others., have been killed inside Afghanistan yearly. And but we now have a 50 to 100 quantity. So none of this made sense to me. I used to be in a position to monitor raids in 24 of 36 of 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces. So that you’re telling me you solely manned one or two man al Qaeda guys in in these provinces. That’s how al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan was tracked out.
I’m extremely skeptical once I see the intelligence neighborhood come out– I believe this is a matter that’s been extremely politicized. It will get again to why is that this a problem that’s extremely politicized? The U.S. can’t depart Afghanistan if al Qaeda has a big presence there and the U.S. can’t depart Afghanistan if the Taliban-al Qaeda relationship is robust. So how will we downplay that to attain a coverage finish of getting out of Afghanistan? We downplay al Qaeda’s significance and relationship with the Taliban.
On this case, I believe the administration, the Biden administration is telling us about al Qaeda’s insignificance in Afghanistan to justify their reasoning for withdrawal. One other key half in that report was they stated al Qaeda doesn’t have the capability to launch assaults in opposition to the U.S. from Afghanistan. The 9/11 Fee report could be very clear, protected haven is the lifeblood, in addition to state sponsorship, is the lifeblood for terrorist teams. What does al Qaeda have in the present day in Afghanistan? We all know it does as a result of Zawahiri was there, and he wasn’t alone. He comes with a workers. He comes with a safety element. And he’s not the one one there. Al Qaeda has a protected haven inside Afghanistan. Sure.
The U.S. was in a position to launch one strike in a single yr to kill him, however they’ve it in Afghanistan, and so they have state sponsorship. The Taliban is the Afghan state. What that protected haven and state sponsorship provides al Qaeda is it provides the power for its management to arrange, to relaxation. They’re not being actively hunted like they have been. Sure, there was a one drone strike, however present me ten of them within the subsequent yr and you then would possibly get my consideration as a result of killing one senior chief who’s been round since 9/11, that doesn’t impress me. It’s a powerful particular person strike, however it’s not a marketing campaign to take al Qaeda aside.
They’ve the power to relaxation, to regroup, to refit, to get medical consideration. They will transfer their households in. They will start to recruit. It’s a boon. The Taliban managed Afghanistan with al Qaeda’s help is a boon for recruiting. They will recruit, they will prepare, they may open up coaching camps. They will indoctrinate, they will plot. After which in the event that they resolve to execute and assault, they’ve the whole lot sitting proper there for them to do it. If I’m al Qaeda, I don’t launch an assault in opposition to the USA as a result of I don’t wish to poke the bear. Folks assume that the specter of al Qaeda is launching a 9/11 type or perhaps a lesser type assault. That’s merely a tactic of al Qaeda. It’s a tactic to attain its overarching aim. What’s that aim? It’s to ascertain a worldwide caliphate.
It launches terror assaults in opposition to the USA, forces us to withdraw from international locations and areas, to allow them to launch their insurgencies and take them over. They’ve the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, that’s one emirate inside al Qaeda’s hoped for caliphate, and that offers them protected haven. It provides all of them the capability to do the issues to advertise its aim of constructing the caliphate. And in doing that, they’re going to proceed to assault us to assist drive us out of this. They consider that the U.S. is weak. They consider that that the U.S. will finally will tire of those wars. And Afghanistan confirmed that we did tire of that conflict.
MICHAEL MORELL: Are you suggesting that we’re extra more likely to see al Qaeda assaults in locations just like the Center East and North Africa than we’re the USA? Given what you simply stated?
BILL ROGGIO: Sure, I do. And that doesn’t make them any much less of a risk to us. We nonetheless have U.S. navy personnel abroad, U.S. companies, U.S. civilians, expats, in addition to our allies. Our associates and allies, Europe and India and the world over. To me, al Qaeda is the higher risk than the Islamic State. It’s due to its endurance. The Islamic State is a extra of a direct risk. It likes to conduct assaults for its propaganda and recruiting. However I don’t assume it has an actual caliphate constructing plan. And al Qaeda does. Al Qaeda is affected person. Affected person and considerate enemies are what scares me.
Let’s face it, they have been affected person for 20 years together with the Taliban to get the U.S. to depart. Now that the U.S. is out of Afghanistan, they will focus their energies within the Center East, in Africa, Somalia or Mali. I might put every identify on a coin and flip it. A good portion of those international locations can turn into the following al Qaeda managed areas. Be mindful, Shabaab took management of southern and central Somalia from I consider 2007-2008 to about 2011-2012 earlier than the USA and the African Union and Kenya joined collectively to eject them. And now they fought again and so they management about, we estimate, 40%. An American common two years in the past stated 25% of Somalia is below Shabaab management. I’d put that quantity nearer to 40, given what I’ve seen or given analysis on this challenge.
These are important issues. Simply because our want right here within the West, amongst U.S. policymakers, is to finish the so-called countless wars. What meaning is we’re ending our involvement in these wars. However our enemy isn’t. They’re persevering with the combat. They wish to drive us out of Somalia. The Biden administration simply despatched extra troops again in there after the Trump administration withdrew them in an effort to finish the so-called countless wars. The French are leaving Mali. Really, I consider they’ve left at this level. However the French are in different areas. They’re going to proceed to focus on us and our curiosity till they get what they need. Again to the difficulty of protected havens, now they’ve the power to plot this– not simply plot terrorist assaults, however plot and execute their technique for caliphate constructing.
MICHAEL MORELL: One of many ideas I had once I learn the White Home speaking factors was that they have been making what I name damaging assessments. They have been saying what’s not as opposed to what’s. And a what’s not evaluation, as somebody having been an analyst for 33 years, you want loads of info, loads of intelligence to make a not assertion versus an is assertion. And I simply don’t see how we now have that quantity of intelligence provided that we don’t have a presence in that nation.
BILL ROGGIO: That is a wonderful level, Michael. Be mindful, Normal Mackenzie, the earlier commander of U.S. Central Command, I consider in December when he testified to Congress, he stated our visibility in Afghanistan is 1 to 2% of what it was after we had boots on the bottom earlier than the U.S. withdrawal. And anybody who is aware of the navy is aware of that that’s the best-case state of affairs. That’s essentially the most optimistic evaluation. The actual quantity might be about 0.5 to 1%. How can the White Home and the nationwide safety say with such authority concerning the whatnots right here.
Afghanistan has turn into an info black gap. We should assume the worst, not one of the best. We should assume that the al Qaeda-Taliban relationship has been strengthened and solid with 20 years of blood and hearth. We should assume, provided that Zawahiri was there, that lesser however no much less vital, al Qaeda leaders have begun to hunt protected haven in Afghanistan. We’ve got to imagine that that variety of an estimate of 200 al Qaeda in Afghanistan is blooming and never shrinking after the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban takeover. I couldn’t agree with you extra, Michael.
MICHAEL MORELL: Discuss a bit bit concerning the demise of Zawahiri. How vital from a CT perspective. And much more importantly, speak about probably successors. Can they carry extra life again to this group?
BILL ROGGIO: First, it was fairly an accomplishment to kill Zawahiri, to seek out him and to kill him. I believe al Qaeda, his safety detachment obtained a bit complacent. Zawahiri himself in all probability obtained complacent. The U.S. navy stated they believed in, I consider it was2020, that they thought he was in jap Afghanistan.
MICHAEL MORELL: They did.
BILL ROGGIO: I’m sure that he’s been on the run for twenty years and doubtless was taking the footwear off and rubbing his toes within the carpet a bit bit to loosen up. He in all probability thought all as effectively.
MICHAEL MORELL: It tells you the way comfy he felt with the Taliban.
BILL ROGGIO: It does, proper. I imply, that’s definitely a superb level, Michael. He felt he was comfy. He felt he was protected. He felt the U.S. didn’t have the power. The US did. However once more, one strike doesn’t make a profitable counter-terrorism marketing campaign, show the success of it. It’s one strike. He been in control of al Qaeda for 11 years now for the reason that demise of Osama bin Laden. He was a deputy emir for the reason that founding of al Qaeda. I all the time say, identify me a president or vice chairman, a American cupboard member or a 3 or 4 star common who was there on 9/11 whose nonetheless in authorities or remains to be within the navy? The reply to that’s zero. High al Qaeda leaders, fighters, they don’t retire. They both die of previous age or they’re killed in navy or counter-terrorism operations.
That’s what occurred to Zawahiri. He put his stamp on al Qaeda for 4 plus many years. I dismiss the concept he was insignificant, divisive and whatnot. Except for the difficulty with the Islamic State that– we don’t know if Osama bin Laden himself would have been in a position to handle relations with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which finally was kicked out of al Qaeda. That’s the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. There have been issues between the 2 organizations for I can recall going again to when Zarqawi was alive. So he’s lifeless. Who’s subsequent in line? Within the United Nations sanctions and monitoring report. I put loads of credit score in that. Edmond Fitton-Brown, the director of that. He’s a top-notch analyst. They are saying that it’s very probably Saif al-Adel or Abdur Rehman Al-Maghribi. These are each legacy al Qaeda leaders. Saif al-Adel, needed, former Egyptian navy officer, been with al Qaeda since on the very least the early 1990’s was their head of their navy committee. He’s been Zawahiri’s deputy chief. He’s the very probably selection. Abdur Rehman Al-Maghribi held quite a few positions inside al Qaeda, together with the top of its Al-Sahab, which is its media arm. It’s a really important department of al Qaeda, in addition to the navy chief for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
MICHAEL MORELL: Zawahiri, son in legislation as effectively.
BILL ROGGIO: Precisely. His son in legislation. And that is attention-grabbing, however not shocking in the event you comply with this. The top of al Qaeda within the Islamic Maghreb and the top of Shabab, which is al Qaeda’s department in East Africa. They’re very probably within the line of succession. They’re in all probability not going to take over. Effectively, individuals maintain this up as, ‘wow, look, that’s fascinating.’ Besides it isn’t. The top of al Qaeda within the Arabian Peninsula was Nasser al-Wuhayshi earlier than we killed him within the mid 2010s. He was al Qaeda’s common supervisor and was believed to be within the line of succession.
Al Qaeda has form of diversified its management in response to the drone marketing campaign. Folks assume that it is a weak point of al Qaeda, however I believe it’s a energy. It makes it troublesome to speak. Sure. However it provides purchase in to the branches. Folks wish to say these associates, which I want to name branches, which al Qaeda describes as their theaters. And al Qaeda doesn’t describe itself as a core, however a common command. This provides purchase in from the group, from the branches, it permits al Qaeda to guard itself from its management being concentrated in a single space. So we’re going to seek out out. You realize, persons are additionally saying, ‘oh, al Qaeda hasn’t even introduced his demise.’ There’s a mourning interval after which there’s a consultative interval the place they’re going to select their new management. That’s very probably what’s occurring. We’ll discover out who that new chief is. I wouldn’t be shocked if it was a darkish horse, if it was somebody we didn’t realize it. There may be loads of members of al Qaeda who aren’t public names we aren’t even conscious of.
MICHAEL MORELL: Invoice, your backside line on the finish of this dialogue is that we now have not heard the final of al Qaeda from Afghanistan.
BILL ROGGIO: No, we haven’t. I believe that al Qaeda from Afghanistan and globally is in a a lot stronger place in the present day than it was previous to 9/11. Previous to 911, al Qaeda actually solely had a significant base in a single space in Afghanistan. Now it’s all through the Center East, all through all of Africa, just like the Sahel in West Africa, not simply North Africa, because it was within the early 2000s. It’s a company that adapts. It has its faults, it has its issues, however it’s been adaptive. And I solely see them rising stronger because the West seeks to disengage from this combat and concentrate on Russia and China, which I completely perceive. These are key points, however we’d like to have the ability to stroll and chew gum on the identical time.
MICHAEL MORELL: Invoice, thanks a lot for becoming a member of us.
BILL ROGGIO: Thanks. Michael. It’s actually a pleasure. Thanks once more for having me on.
