On Sept. 14 the Workplace of the United Nations Excessive Commissioner for Human Rights launched a assertion warning that, “Syria can’t afford a return to larger-scale preventing, however that’s the place it could be heading.” Syria’s frontlines have been frozen since March 2020, and whereas cross-line and rebel assaults proceed on a close to every day foundation, the extent of violence is considerably decreased in comparison with earlier years. Nevertheless, Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine has given rise to hypothesis that it’d totally withdraw from Syria, creating an influence vacuum that might ignite new widespread preventing. But these fears are possible misplaced, ignoring the considerably modified and diminished function of the Russian army now in comparison with 2015, and the truth that the battle as we speak is “frozen” as a result of different, extra essential exterior actors: Turkey and the US. A deeper examination of the present state of Syria and its fighters thus reveals distinctive alternatives for engagement from the worldwide group, whereas additionally underlining the important thing vulnerabilities to sustaining the frozen nature of the previous three years.
The only largest contributor to the Syrian stalemate is the northwest ceasefire deal imposed by Turkey on Russia in March 2020, which froze the final main frontline within the nation. Within the practically three years since, preventing has been confined to 5 areas: 1) Turkish drone strikes, shelling, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) assaults in northeast Syria; 2) cross-line shelling and bombing alongside the Idlib frontline; 3) insurgent infighting in northwest Syria, largely between the opposition factions backed by Turkey often called the Syrian Nationwide Army (SNA) however which not too long ago noticed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) involvement; 4) the insurgency in southern Syria between the regime, ex-rebels, and ISIS; and 5) the ISIS insurgency towards regime forces in central Syria and the SDF within the northeast.
Defining escalation
With regards to potential escalation there are just a few key triggers. First, and almost definitely, is the likelihood that Turkey conducts one other floor offensive towards the U.S.-backed SDF, which it views as a department of the designated terrorist group the Kurdistan Staff’ Get together (PKK). Because the summer time of 2022, Turkey has signaled that it intends to launch an offensive towards the area of Tal Rifaat, collectively held by the SDF, the regime, and the Iranians. Simply outdoors Aleppo, the area has in recent times turn into a staging floor for assaults towards Turkish forces and is essentially devoid of civilians. Nevertheless, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has prior to now said his want to grab the SDF-held cities of Manbij and Kobani, each densely populated with civilians and financial facilities for the northeast.
The second potential set off is alongside the HTS-regime entrance in Idlib. This frontline stays frozen as a result of Turkish army deployments on one aspect, and Russian restraint of Damascus on the opposite. However, each the rebels and the regime frequently trade hearth throughout the frontline, killing civilians in Idlib and militants on either side each week. In the meantime, Russia continues its intermittent bombing marketing campaign of civilian properties. There stays the likelihood {that a} important regime or Russian assault will ultimately set off a insurgent floor offensive, at which level preventing might escalate past Turkey or Russia’s management.
The insurgencies in southern and central Syria lack the power to shift the stability of energy in these areas, and in southern Syria has truly triggered a tightening of regime management over areas that had been beforehand semi-autonomous. Equally, the ISIS insurgency within the northeast, whereas progressively eroding SDF management within the Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa countryside, lacks the manpower and depth to set off a full governance collapse absent any important energy vacuum, such because the withdraw of coalition forces.
A Russian vacuum?
The central query at hand, then, is how the Russian invasion of Ukraine will impression Syria. Leaders within the northeast and northwest have been keen to debate the potential vacuum ensuing from a weakened and distracted Russia, obsessing over how they may use it to strengthen their positions. Likewise, worldwide organizations concern a weakened Russia might encourage new opposition or SDF escalations, because the armed teams search to extend their standing.
But such fears ignore key developments over the previous a number of years. Russia not serves because the army bulwark for Damascus it as soon as did, having withdrawn most of its fight forces from the nation in 2018 and 2019. Because the regime recapture of southern Syria in spring 2018, the Russians have targeted their efforts on coaching, equipping, and rebuilding the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) particularly in order that Damascus wouldn’t require direct Russian army intervention sooner or later. This rebuilding effort has pursued a number of paths, however most significantly has led to the renovation of the SAA’s Special Forces and a deal with extra cellular, fast-reaction items paired with mass artillery help. Over the past regime offensives in 2019 and early 2020, Russia’s direct involvement was largely confined to offering air help; its efforts in any other case centered on supplying, planning, and command and management of the assorted regime items. Within the practically three years since then, Russia has continued to methodically equip and prepare a variety of regime items stationed round Idlib with laser-guided Krasnopol artillery, and Russian officers routinely oversee SAA artillery coaching within the space. In the meantime, Damascus has, since 2018, launched into a concerted effort to rebuild its air power, whose diminished energy was closely supplemented by the Russian air power between 2015 and 2020.
All of those adjustments make the chance of collapsing regime strains in northwest Syria distant. The Russians and Damascus have constructed a regime firewall round Idlib, one in the end backed by numbers no actor outdoors of the SDF can hope to match. Whereas insurgent forces would little doubt achieve capturing some territory in a hypothetical offensive, there’s little risk they’d maintain it. Finally, in lieu of full Turkish army help, HTS’s preventing expertise are not any match for the sheer amount of regime troopers, artillery, and armor.
Turkey’s function
It’s Turkey’s function that’s most importantly impacted by the struggle in Ukraine. Ankara and Moscow have been locked in a fragile stability of bluffs and blows for the reason that Russian intervention in 2015. The 2020 Turkish offensive marked the primary severe shift in Ankara’s coverage towards Russia when it violently enforced the ceasefire the 2 international locations had negotiated years prior however which Russia had frequently ignored. The political and bodily prices of Turkey’s continued enforcement of the northwest ceasefire aren’t insignificant, chief amongst them the chance and useful resource drain positioned on Turkey’s military and the truth that Idlib is managed by HTS, a chosen terrorist group. Nonetheless, the only largest motivating issue for Turkish policymaking in northwest Syria is stopping refugee flows, a essential home subject for each the ruling and opposition political events. Ankara subsequently can’t enable a regime offensive, which might push tens of millions extra Syrians throughout the border, but additionally has little incentive to threat Turkish troopers’ lives to help rebels in retaking land from the regime.
Likewise, it’s home politics, not Russian energy, dictating Turkish army motion and inaction towards the SDF. Opposite to latest reporting, Turkish officers didn’t again down from a possible Tel Rifaat offensive this summer time as a result of Russian crimson strains in June’s Astana Convention. Russian stress poses even much less of an impediment east of the Euphrates, the place Turkey routinely targets the skinny line of regime forces stationed alongside its border with the SDF. Somewhat, Turkish choice making within the northeast is outlined by U.S. financial and political stress, and by SDF/PKK assaults inside Syria and Turkey. What occurs in Ukraine, subsequently, has little impression on the chance of escalation within the northeast. It’s the upcoming Turkish elections in mid-2023 and the chance of U.S. distraction that create probably the most uncertainty about Erdogan’s choices on Syria.
Implications for overseas engagement
Regardless of the frozen frontlines, civilians in northwest Syria are nonetheless topic to weekly shelling from regime forces, displacing 1000’s each month. Whereas HTS has used the relative calm to crack down on and dismantle many of the unbiased extremist teams working there, the worsening humanitarian situations depart a gap for ISIS and al-Qaeda cells to persist and rebuild. The identical dangers plague the northeast, the place the persistent risk of Turkish invasion, fears over a U.S. withdrawal and regime return, and safety and governance missteps by the Kurdish administration have fostered a super atmosphere for ISIS to recruit, fundraise, and function.
Each of those areas supply distinctive alternatives to enhance humanitarian situations and deal with potential nationwide safety threats for policymakers keen to suppose creatively concerning the battle. Worldwide help organizations have to be allowed to function in Idlib, and Western nations might discover attractive returns for personal engagement with HTS on choose matters. In the meantime, the coalition presence in northeast Syria serves as the first bulwark towards each the return of ISIS and makes an attempt by Ankara and Damascus to grab new territory from the SDF. American — not Russian — political and financial stress on Ankara has up to now prevented a brand new offensive in Manbij or Kobani, whereas indifference to the Turkish drone marketing campaign has given Ankara the area to degrade PKK management networks. But the U.S. and its allies should make investments extra assets and a focus within the social, political, and financial crises which are undermining the counter-ISIS marketing campaign and driving a wedge between Arabs and the Kurdish administration.
Russia has turn into a weak actor that has performed an more and more restricted function in Syria. Policymakers ought to acknowledge that Turkey and America have turn into the guarantors of semi-stability, and solely they’ve the ability to strengthen the resilience of present agreements. America should proceed to stress Ankara towards any floor offensive whereas concurrently working with it to make sure the northwest ceasefire is maintained throughout and after the 2023 elections. Whereas these could also be tough insurance policies to pursue, ignoring the true underlying causes of as we speak’s “frozen Syria” and their fragility all however ensures future escalations. Somewhat than develop complacent over the final quiet, Western international locations ought to re-examine the breadth of choices they now have for artistic policymaking to additional stabilize the areas outdoors of regime management and enhance the lives of tens of millions of Syrians.
Gregory Waters is a Non-Resident Scholar on the Center East Institute and a analysis analyst on the Counter Extremism Undertaking. His analysis focuses on the Syrian regime’s safety forces, primarily using open-source analysis to evaluate the capabilities and construction of the Syrian Arab Army and allied militias. You’ll be able to comply with him on Twitter @GregoryPWaters.
Photograph by BAKR ALKASEM/AFP through Getty Pictures
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