North Korea on October 10 revealed the primary direct commentary on its ballistic missile actions in over six months,[1] specializing in the interval between September 25 and October 9 and together with a rating of images.[2] The assertion had 4 details:
- Foot-stomping “tactical nukes.” The majority of the assertion makes the case that Pyongyang has an operationally deployed, dependable, and assorted supply functionality for “tactical” nuclear weapons—now together with the KN-23 and KN-25 short-range ballistic missile (SRBMs). We nonetheless have no idea the dimensions, yield, or variety of the “tactical nukes” being touted, however the North clearly sees substantial propaganda and deterrent worth in brandishing them.
- Deterring preemption by threatening a brand new basing mode. Essentially the most surprising reveal within the assertion was that the SRBM launched on September 25 was a KN-23 fired from an “underwater silo” situated “beneath” an inland reservoir. More than likely, the launch got here from a submersible barge/platform containing the “silo” that was submerged beneath the waters of the reservoir. It stays to be seen whether or not such a functionality really is deployed because it makes little sense for SRBMs. Whereas technically it could present extra promise for longer-range missiles or as an alternative choice to submarines, it’s extra vital within the near-term as one other demonstration that North Korean missiles can survive in opposition to revived South Korean threats of “decapitation” and “preemption.”
- Revealing a “new-type” Intermediate-Vary Ballistic Missile (IRBM). The assertion and images additionally revealed that the missile launched over Japan on October 4 was a “new-type” IRBM. It presently is unclear whether or not the missile is a modified model of the previously-tested Hwasong-12 or completely new, however the launch underscored North Korea’s potential to focus on Japan and Guam.
- Making a “robust army response warning” to the Alliance. The assertion places the latest missile actions squarely within the political and deterrent context of purportedly reacting to a sequence of latest and ongoing US-ROK mixed army drills. The North is making clear that it’s not intimidated by, and needs to point out it has a reputable deterrent in opposition to, the alliance’s army strikes and capabilities.
In contrast to North Korean statements on missile actions earlier within the yr, which targeted largely on technical points somewhat than coverage/political ones, the October 10 assertion had substantial political and deterrent content material and its technical particulars have been meant to convey such messages. Because the assertion itself notes, North Korea clearly is just not curious about negotiations on its nuclear or missile packages anytime quickly.
Foot-Stomping “Tactical Nukes”
The majority of the North Korean assertion is devoted to creating the case that Pyongyang has an operationally deployed, dependable, and assorted supply functionality for “tactical” nuclear weapons. It pointedly described the missile launches from September 25 to October 9 as “army drills” of “items for the operation of tactical nukes…beneath the simulation of an precise conflict at completely different ranges.” The North beforehand had solely related the brand new, small SRBM first examined in April 2022 with “tactical nukes. The October 10 assertion and accompanying pictures now additionally so affiliate the KN-23, the bigger KN-23 variant, and KN-25 SRBMs, all of which Western analysts beforehand assessed have been nuclear-capable. (Curiously, the North didn’t acknowledge any additional launches of the brand new, small SRBM as a part of the drills, or any of the nuclear-capable KN-24 SRBM final identified to be examined in January.)
We nonetheless have no idea if the “tactical nukes” Pyongyang is touting are related in dimension and yield to these meant for its longer-range techniques, simply deployed on shorter-range techniques, or if it seeks or possesses a lot smaller-yield warheads akin to US and Soviet/Russian “tactical nuclear weapons.” (The latter in all probability would require further nuclear explosive testing.) Nor do we all know what number of nuclear weapons are or might be allotted to “items for the operation of tactical nukes.” What is obvious is that North Korea’s SRBMs will proceed to have vital typical warfighting missions, which would require arsenals of a number of lots of of missiles to be efficient.
North Korea clearly sees substantial propaganda and deterrent worth in brandishing “tactical nukes,” no matter their precise quantity and capabilities. That is additional underscored by the North linking the take a look at of two long-range land-attack cruise missiles on October 12 to “the items of the Korean Individuals’s Army for the operation of tactical nukes.”[3] Such weapons uniquely threaten South Korea. On the similar time, Pyongyang in all probability relishes the frequent notion that “tactical” nukes indicate extra technical sophistication. The North in all probability additionally hopes that touting a considerable tactical nuclear functionality, in live performance with its functionality to threaten the US homeland with strategic nuclear weapons, will assist dissuade US escalation in a disaster or provocation and erode Seoul’s confidence within the credibility of US prolonged deterrence.
Deterring Preemption by Threatening a New Basing Mode
Essentially the most surprising facet of the October 10 assertion was its revelation that the SRBM launched on September 25 got here from an “underwater silo” situated “beneath” an inland reservoir. The accompanying images confirmed a KN-23 SRBM launching out of an inland physique of water, akin to the earlier launch of this technique from the submerged Gorae-class submarine off North Korea’s east coast in October 2021. The brand new “missile launching drill” was stated to have confirmed “the orientation of constructing a deliberate silo beneath the reservoir.”
The assertion might be interpreted as claiming the North had, or will, dig a missile launch silo into the lakebed of the reservoir. More likely, nonetheless, is that the September 25 launch got here from a submersible barge/platform containing a number of missile launch tubes (the “silos” referred to within the assertion) that was emplaced on the floor of the reservoir, submerged beneath the waters of the reservoir (somewhat than beneath the reservoir itself), carried out the launch, after which surfaced for reuse or removing. North Korea and different international locations use such barges as a part of their submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) take a look at packages to develop the ejection and launching of SLBMs to the purpose the place testing from an precise submarine is deemed protected.
It stays to be seen whether or not North Korea continues to develop and deploy a submerged inland-water launch functionality. It has lengthy deployed SRBMs rather more cost-effectively, with excessive survivability, on road-mobile launchers. As with the sooner effort to deploy the KN-23 from a rail-mobile launcher, the submerged inland-water launch functionality could have extra promise for IRBMs and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which might be bigger and tougher to maneuver round on land-mobile launchers. Even rail-mobility could be cheaper for such techniques whereas nonetheless being survivable. A submerged inland-water launch functionality would, nonetheless, be less expensive than constructing ballistic missile submarines—which the North has seemingly been engaged on for a number of years now with out producing any—a lot much less lake-bed silos, and immune from anti-submarine warfare assaults. It could, nonetheless, nonetheless probably be susceptible to detection and assault when surfaced or by recognizing any related land-based infrastructure/exercise.
Within the close to time period, the revelation of this new SRBM launch mode is extra vital politically and in deterrence phrases than technically or operationally because it displays how the North Koreans are attempting to show that their missiles are survivable and sign to the South Koreans that methods to “decapitate” or “preempt” North Korean forces in a disaster or battle are doomed to fail. It bolstered messaging within the North’s new regulation “on the state coverage on the nuclear forces” introduced on September 8 that contained repeated references to the need to make use of nuclear weapons if an assault “on the state management and the command group of the state’s nuclear forces was launched or drew close to.”[4] The October 10 assertion likewise emphasised “that our nuclear fight forces holding an vital mission of conflict deterrent keep excessive alert of fast and proper operation response capabilities and nuclear response posture in surprising scenario at any time.”
Revealing a “New-Sort” IRBM
The North Korean assertion additionally revealed that the missile launched over Japan on October 4 to a variety of about 4,600 km was a “new-type” IRBM. The related images confirmed a missile with: 1) a completely different engine configuration and thrust-vector management (steering) system than the previously-tested Hwasong-12 IRBM, 2) a differently-shaped and presumably shorter nosecone or reentry automobile, and three) presumably a barely longer second stage.
That stated, it presently is unclear whether or not the missile or its propulsion system are a modification of the Hwasong-12 or completely new. Though the new-type missile flew farther than the beforehand longest-range Hwasong-12 flight of three,700 km (already enough to hit US bases in Guam), the Hwasong-12 was assessed to be able to 4,500 km, which doesn’t add a lot in the best way of recent targets.
Along with proving out a brand new or modified missile kind, the launch served to underscore North Korea’s potential to focus on Guam—vital each as US territory and as a key hub for projecting US army energy in opposition to the Peninsula, particularly throughout a traditional battle. Overflying Japan additionally was vital as an act of political defiance and as emphasizing the flexibility to strike Japanese and US forces there as nicely. Curiously, the October 10 assertion additionally included the IRBM launch as one of many “seven instances of launching drills of the tactical nuclear operation items” carried out from September 25 to October 9. It’s unclear whether or not the North Koreans regard IRBMs as “tactical” or in the event that they inadvertently swept the new-type missile up into their ballyhooing of “tactical nukes.”
Making a “Robust Navy Response Warning” to the Alliance
The October 10 assertion places “tactical nukes” and the entire latest missile actions squarely within the political and deterrent context of purportedly reacting to the “ongoing harmful army drills” of the US and South Korea and their “regular, intentional and irresponsible acts of escalating the strain.” Pyongyang’s steps are “an apparent warning and clear demonstration of informing the enemies of our nuclear response posture and nuclear assault capabilities.” The North is making clear that it’s not intimidated by, and needs to point out it has a reputable deterrent in opposition to, US-ROK alliance army strikes and capabilities. Though statements from US and ROK officers and Western press protection have portrayed the North’s latest flurry of actions as aspiring to “increase the stakes in future negotiations,” the October 10 assertion reiterated the notion that Pyongyang has no inclination to take action.
