In a typical Indian account of the liberation of Bangladesh on December 16, 1971, the crucial and heroic position performed by Bangladesh’s Mukti Bahini guerillas and their Indian trainers will get solely a passing point out.
These lungi kurta-clad, lightly-armed teams of Bengali youth from the villages of East Pakistan had taken on Pakistani military items throughout the nation for 9 months previous to December 16, when Pakistani resistance capitulated to the Indian military and 93,000 troops had been taken as POWs, the most important haul of POWs for the reason that Battle of Stalingrad in World Battle II, in line with Gen.M.M.Naravane, a former Indian military chief.
The guerillas and common Bengali troopers who had defected from the Pakistani military, inflicted heavy injury to Pakistani morale and logistics.
Dr Ahmad Ahsan, Director within the Coverage Analysis Institute of Bangladesh wrote in The Each day Star of Dhaka on December 26, 2020, that the 83,000-strong Mukti Bahini destroyed or broken 231 bridges and 122 railway strains, disrupting the Pakistan military’s provide strains and mobility. The guerillas not solely focused military detachments within the countryside however took on targets within the city areas, together with Dhaka.
Cities throughout Bangladesh plunged into darkness as guerrillas blew up 90 energy substations and transmission towers. “Probably the most important assaults happened in Dhaka on June 6, 1971 when the East Pakistan Governor, Tikka Khan, was internet hosting a dinner for a visiting high-powered World Financial institution mission that had come to judge the state of affairs. Simply when the Governor and his officers had been making the case that on a regular basis life had resumed, the Mukti Bahini launched coordinated assaults across the Authorities Home, Ahsan recalled.
He quoted Hassan Zaheer, later Pakistan’s Cupboard Secretary, as saying that bomb explosions and machine-gun fireplace at common intervals drowned out any try by Pakistani authorities officers to steer the visiting mission that issues had been regular.
By November 1971, 237 Pakistani officers and greater than 3,695 troopers had been killed or wounded in Mukti Bahini assaults, Ahsan says. Quoting from Gen. Shaukat Riza’s e-book entitled: The Pakistan Army 1966-71, he says: “Pakistani troops going through the enemy in a single course discovered themselves outflanked, their rear blocked. Troops shifting from one place to a different received disoriented after which encountered hostile fireplace once they anticipated pleasant succor. By November 1971 most of our troops had fought for 9 months in a completely hostile atmosphere. By November 1971, many of the troops had been dwelling in waterlogged bunkers, their ft rotted by slime, the skins ravaged by vermin, their minds clogged by an incomprehensible battle.”
In response to Ahsan, Mukti Bahini assaults broke the Pakistan Army’s morale; compelled the Pakistanis to unfold their forces thinly over the nation and keep put of their bases with out dependable provide strains. Lower off from the inhabitants, the troops had been denied area intelligence.
The Mukti Bahini was arrange by an order of Indian military chief, Gen.Sam Maneckshw by an order dated Could 1, 1971. In a December 26, 2021 article in The Hindu entitled India’s Secret Battle in Bangladesh, Praveen Swami mentioned that the Indian Army Operational Instruction No. 52 formally advised the Japanese Commander, Lt.Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora, to “help the Provisional Authorities of Bangladesh to rally the individuals of East Bengal in assist of the liberation motion,” and “to lift, equip and practice East Bengal cadres for guerrilla operations in their very own homeland.”
The Japanese Command was to make sure that the guerrilla forces labored in the direction of “tying down the Pak [Pakistan] Navy forces” and “sap and corrode the morale of the Pak forces within the Japanese theatre and concurrently to impair their logistic functionality for endeavor any offensive in opposition to Assam and West Bengal.” Lastly, the guerillas had been for use together with the common Indian troops “within the occasion of Pakistan initiating hostilities in opposition to us.”
The Japanese command was instructed to offer coaching services and logistical and operational assist for the liberation of Bangladesh on the premise of an evaluation by Gen. Aurora. In response to Praveen Swami, the duty was then handed over to Brig.Sujan Singh Uban of the Particular Frontier Pressure (SFF), a unit initially put collectively for operations in Chinese language-held Tibet. Sleuths of the Analysis and Evaluation (RAW) underneath R.N.Kao, had been a key a part of the operations all through.
The choice of Bangladeshi recruits, self-discipline, motivation, planning and execution of operations had been an unique prerogative of the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Bangladesh, Gen.M.A.G Osmani, previously of the Pakistan military.
The recruits had been educated within the Indian Army’s “Operation Jackpot” camps, every led by a Brigadier. The camps had been in West Bengal, Tripura, Assam and Bihar with the Indian authorities assembly all bills together with salaries. Coaching for 4 to 6 weeks was on dealing with small arms, gentle computerized weapons, mortars, and explosives. Superior management coaching was to be given by instructors underneath the command of the C-in-C Bangladesh, Gen.Osmani.
An article written by Indian military Brigadier R.P.Singh in The Each day Staron Could 24, 2021, entitled: How the Mukti Bahini was educated, says that the Mukti Bahini had two wings – a daily drive (Niyomito Bahini) and a guerrilla drive (Gano Bahini). The Niyomito Bahini comprised provides and males who had defected from the Pakistan military. The Gano Bahini, a drive of irregulars, had a separate unit referred to as Mujib Bahini, composed of youths loyal to Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. When there was a severe rift between the Mujib Bahini and the remainder of the guerillas, the Indian military and RAW led to reconciliation.
R.P. Singh says that Gen. Osmani had divided Bangladesh into 11 instructions. To politically motivated the fighters, Bengladeshi politicians had been employed. Broad political instructions had been issued to the sector commanders by the leaders of the Provisional Authorities of Bangladesh headed by Prime Minster Tajuddin Ahmad positioned at Mujib Nagar in Kolkata.
Singh says that at a convention in July 1971, the Provisional Authorities and the Indian military determined that (i) a lot of guerrillas have to be inducted inside Bangladesh to strike at each conceivable place by raids and ambushes, (ii) industries wouldn’t be allowed to run; their electrical energy provide can be minimize off by blowing electrical sub-stations, poles and so forth., (iii) Pakistanis wouldn’t be allowed to export any uncooked materials or completed product from Bangladesh, (iv) automobiles, railways, river crafts and ferries which enemy used for provides to their troops had been to be systematically destroyed, and (v) after isolating the enemy, guerrillas would strike lethal blows on the remoted teams.
In August, 80 Bengali troopers from Pakistan’s artillery regiments crossed over into Tripura and had been organized into Quantity One (Mujib) Discipline Battery. They had been geared up with 3.7-inch weapons transferred from Indian regiments. Later, it was geared up with 105mm Italian area weapons.
By November 1971, battalions of East Bengal Regiment had been grouped into three infantry brigades named after their commanders. ‘Z’ Pressure was commanded by Main Ziaur Rahman, ‘Okay’ Pressure was commanded by Main Khaled Mosharraf and ‘S’ Pressure was commanded by Main Shafiullah. Bengali officers from the Pakistan Air Pressure and Navy additionally joined. The naval personnel and the guerillas inflicted heavy injury on Pakistani boats.
By November 1971, the Mukti Bahini numbered 83,000, out of which 51,000 had been working inside Bangladesh. As well as, 10,000 robust Mujib Bahini cadres had been educated by the Particular Safety Bureau (SSB) of the RAW, Brig.R.P.Singh says.
At the price of simply 56 lifeless and 190 wounded, Brig. Uban’s guerillas had performed a number of injury. After the conflict, some 580 members of his covert drive had been awarded money, medals and prizes by the Authorities of India, Swami factors out.
“On December 3, Pakistan tried to alleviate the strain on its jap wing by finishing up strikes on main Indian airbases. India retaliated with an offensive of extraordinary pace that has been described as a blitzkrieg with out tanks,” Swami concludes.
