Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, January 18, 2023

January 18, 8:00 pm ET

Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date each day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech commemorating the Soviet forces’ breaking of the siege of Leningrad illustrated that he stays unsure about his capability to considerably form the Russian data area. Putin used his January 18 speech to reiterate customary and longstanding Kremlin rhetoric that falsely maintains that Russia launched the invasion of Ukraine to guard residents within the Donbas from neo-Nazis who, the Kremlin claims, seized management of the Ukrainian authorities in 2014.[1] Putin didn’t use the publicity of the occasion to make any bulletins regarding the struggle in Ukraine, corresponding to a brand new mobilization wave or a proper declaration of struggle, which some Russian milbloggers had floated.[2] Putin has notably declined to make use of a number of high-profile public addresses, together with his annual New 12 months’s Speech and his canceled annual deal with to the Russian Federation Meeting, to make any notable new bulletins concerning the struggle.[3] Putin seemingly reiterated customary Kremlin rhetoric as a result of it has resonated nicely with the Russian ultra-nationalist pro-war group, components of which have been more and more vital of his conduct of the struggle.[4] Putin could search to form the Russian data area over time, however he seems to be unwilling or unable to try a dramatic speech that represents a major inflection in his rhetoric.

Putin’s speech is probably going half of a bigger and comparatively new informational effort to wrap the “particular army operation” contained in the larger Russian nationwide mythos of the Nice Patriotic Battle (the Second World Battle) to extend Russian help for a protracted struggle and rising mobilization. Putin’s speech was symbolically important for the Russian home viewers. Putin is keen on utilizing symbolic dates and historic analogies to deal with the Russian folks and delivered this speech in St. Petersburg to commemorate the eightieth anniversary of Soviet forces breaking the Nazi siege of Leningrad. Putin stated that Soviet forces defeated Nazi Germany’s “genocide of Leningrad” and drew comparisons with how up to date Russia is combating “Ukrainian neo-Nazis” in Donbas—the place Putin beforehand accused Ukraine of conducting a genocide to justify his 2022 invasion.[5] Putin seemingly seeks to form the data area over time to regenerate help for the invasion and for sustaining a protracted struggle by reintroducing pre–February 24 narratives about “Ukrainian neo-Nazis” and “genocide of Russians” to regain management over struggle protection after having largely ceded this area to a wide range of quasi-independent actors.[6]

Russian Overseas Minister Sergei Lavrov augmented these efforts to extend Russian help for a protracted struggle by explicitly claiming that Ukraine and the West are pursuing the genocide of the Russian folks. Lavrov accused the West of assembling a coalition of European nations to make use of Ukraine as a proxy in a struggle that goals to resolve the “Russian query” in the identical approach that Adolf Hitler had sought a “ultimate answer” to eradicate Europe’s Jewish inhabitants.[7] Lavrov argued that Western officers’ want for the strategic defeat of Russia is tantamount to the genocide of the Russian folks.[8] Lavrov seemingly made the feedback to set extra specific data circumstances for a protracted struggle by framing the struggle in Ukraine as simply as existential for Russians as Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union within the Second World Battle. Lavrov’s feedback are way more noteworthy than Putin’s speech, which can recommend that the Kremlin is instructing high-ranking officers to try to considerably form the Russian data area for a protracted struggle, and open themselves to criticism, as an alternative of getting Putin achieve this himself.

Lavrov’s equations of the West with Nazi Germany and its help for Ukraine with an effort to exterminate the Russian persons are ludicrous and nearly actually geared toward a home Russian viewers. Ukraine has by no means threatened to invade or seize territory past the internationally acknowledged borders of 1991. Neither NATO as an alliance nor any particular person member state has threatened to invade Russia, not to mention to pursue the destruction of Russians as a folks. The aim of Lavrov’s outrageous and absurd comparability was very seemingly meant to enhance Putin’s rhetoric and different Russian efforts to steer the Russian those who Ukraine and its Western backers pose an actual and imminent menace to Russian territory and to the Russian folks of their houses. Russian governments, the Wagner Non-public Navy Firm, and the Russian army have dug trenches and established militias in areas bordering Ukraine for months, ostensibly to defend towards the nonexistent menace of a Ukrainian invasion.[9] These efforts, along with Putin’s and Lavrov’s statements wrapping themselves within the banners of the Pink Army waging the Nice Patriotic Particular Navy Operation, are supposed to provoke help for protracted mobilization and struggling in pursuit of Putin’s unprovoked aggression and seek for territorial conquest.

Putin and Lavrov proceed to disclaim Ukrainian sovereignty and outright reject direct negotiations with Ukraine. Putin emphasised in his speech that Russia is combating to guard individuals who reside in its “historic territories” in Ukraine, a continuation of Kremlin rhetoric that rejects Ukrainian sovereignty and seeks to justify Putin’s maximalist targets of territorial acquisition in Ukraine.[10] Lavrov explicitly said that “there will be no discuss of negotiations with [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky” and argued that Western insistence on Ukraine’s involvement in negotiations is “nonsense” because the West is in control of making selections in Ukraine.[11] Lavrov said that the Kremlin would reply severely to any noteworthy proposals from the US.[12] Lavrov’s and Putin’s statements are indicative of ongoing Russian data operations that goal to reject Ukraine’s sovereignty and delegitimize Kyiv’s proper to barter, shifting the onus for negotiations onto Western officers, whom the Kremlin believes to be extra prepared to supply concessions that Ukraine couldn’t settle for and will search to compel Ukrainian officers to barter on phrases extra favorable to Russia.[13]

Putin continues efforts to reinvigorate Russia’s protection industrial base to help a protracted struggle in Ukraine. Putin visited employees on the Obukhov State Plant—a part of the Almaz-Antey Russian state-owned protection industrial firm—on January 18.[14] Putin said that the Russian protection business at the moment can produce greater than it might beforehand in an unspecified previous timeframe and said that Russia will obtain the protection industrial manufacturing degree that Russia wants.[15] Putin acknowledged that employees on the Obukhov manufacturing facility work three shifts a day and reiterated that protection business employees have been exempted from mobilization, seemingly as a result of Putin must hold specialised employees in Russia’s protection industrial base.[16] Putin additionally used this go to to attract historic parallels between the Nice Patriotic Battle and the present struggle in Ukraine. Putin and Obukhov employees mentioned how over 6,500 employees on the Obukhov plant died throughout the Nice Patriotic Battle and the way Russia is “completely justified” in combating towards neo-Nazis in Ukraine right this moment.[17]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is turning into more and more daring in his verbal assaults towards the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD). Prigozhin criticized the MoD’s new pointers for Russian troops in Ukraine that limit using sure private digital gadgets in fight zones and set stricter pointers for males’s grooming requirements on January 18.[18] Prigozhin defended Russian line troopers who don’t adhere to grooming requirements (Prigozhin noticed that beards are customary for a lot of Muslim and Orthodox Christian fighters) and claimed that troopers’ use of smartphones and tablets is critical for contemporary warfare.[19] Prigozhin said that “struggle is the time of the lively and brave, and never of the clean-shaven who turned in telephones to the warehouse.”[20] Prigozhin additional criticized out-of-touch Russian MoD officers who should “develop together with the event of contemporary warfare, discover ways to successfully kill the enemy and seize territories,” and never “comb everybody underneath your ridiculous guidelines, rules and whims.”[21] Prigozhin’s assertion was the most recent of a number of designed to undermine confidence within the MoD and promote Prigohzin because the face of the Russian “particular army operation” in Ukraine.[22] Prigozhin’s feedback mirror a cowboy strategy to struggle that’s unsuited to the event and upkeep of an efficient large-scale and disciplined fashionable army.

Prigozhin instantly attacked Russian President Vladimir Putin’s presidential administration and insinuated that some officers working there are traitors who need Russia to lose the struggle in Ukraine—one in every of Prigozhin’s boldest assaults towards the Kremlin so far.[23] Prigozhin weighed in on an ongoing Russian coverage debate about banning YouTube and said that some officers within the Kremlin presidential administration oppose banning YouTube as a result of it might undermine their effort to have the US and Russia reestablish relations after Russia loses the struggle in Ukraine.[24] Prigozhin said that such officers assume that the US will “forgive [Russia] its sins” of supporting “pro-Russian pursuits” and “supporting Putin” if Russia begs for Western forgiveness after dropping the struggle.[25] Prigozhin known as these officers “traitors of the folks” who proclaim exalted pro-Russian values however however reside and trip overseas and “help the West in each attainable approach.”[26]

Prigozhin and different notable voices in Russia are carving out a brand new area to criticize Russian President Vladimir Putin with out concern of retribution. Prigozhin and different outstanding Russian nationalists corresponding to Igor Girkin, a former Russian militant commander and outstanding vital voice within the Russian milblogger data area, have been opening a brand new sector within the Russian data area the place sure figures can criticize Putin and the very best echelons of the Russian authorities with none obvious retribution. Igor Girkin closely implied that he would help the removing of Russian President Vladimir Putin from workplace in his most direct criticism of Putin so far on January 10, for instance.[27] Putin has determined to not censor these voices for much.

A helicopter transporting Ukrainian Ministry of Inner Affairs officers crashed in a residential space in Brovary, Kyiv Oblast on January 18. Ukraine’s State Emergency Service introduced that the crash killed 16, together with Ukrainian Inside Minister Denys Monastyrsky and three youngsters, and injured 30, together with 16 youngsters.[28] The crash broken an area kindergarten and a big residential constructing.[29] Ukrainian authorities haven’t but specified the reason for the crash.[30]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech commemorating the siege of Leningrad continued as an instance that Putin stays unsure about his capability to considerably form the Russian data area.
Putin’s speech is probably going half of a bigger informational effort to wrap the “particular army operation” contained in the larger Russian nationwide mythos of the Nice Patriotic Battle (the Second World Battle) to extend Russian help for a protracted struggle and mobilization.
Russian Overseas Minister Sergei Lavrov augmented these efforts to extend Russian help for a protracted struggle by explicitly and ludicrously claiming that Ukraine and the West are pursuing the genocide of the Russian folks.
Putin continues efforts to reinvigorate Russia’s protection industrial base to help a protracted struggle in Ukraine.
Putin and Lavrov proceed to disclaim Ukrainian sovereignty and outright reject direct negotiations with Ukraine.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is turning into more and more daring in his verbal assaults towards the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) and the Kremlin.
Prigozhin and different notable voices in Russia are carving out a brand new area to criticize Russian President Vladimir Putin with out concern of retribution.
Russian forces continued restricted counterattacks to regain misplaced positions close to Kreminna.
Russian forces continued offensive operations close to Soledar, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Donetsk Metropolis.
The Russian MoD continues to try to downplay the position of the Wagner Group in claimed tactical advances within the Soledar space.
Ukrainian officers have indicated that Russian forces are concentrating in Zaporizhia Oblast, probably for a big defensive or offensive effort.
Russian forces’ rising use of incendiary munitions to conduct what look like in any other case routine strikes in southern Ukraine helps ISW’s latest evaluation that Russian forces seemingly face a scarcity of typical artillery rounds.
Ukrainian and Russian sources continued to point that Russian authorities are seemingly getting ready for a second wave of mobilization.

We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in these reviews.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Jap Ukraine
Russian Major Effort—Jap Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and one supporting effort);
Russian Subordinate Major Effort—Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Drive Technology Efforts
Actions in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Jap Ukraine: (Jap Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued restricted counterattacks to regain misplaced positions close to Kreminna on January 18. Geolocated footage printed on January 18 signifies that Russian forces have made marginal advances south of Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna).[31] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai said on January 18 that Russian forces tried to counterattack close to Kreminna however that Russian forces are unlikely to launch a counteroffensive within the space within the close to future.[32] Haidai additionally said that Russian forces are transferring gear to the opposite facet of the Krasna River, which flows by means of Kreminna, in preparation for defensive operations and that Russian forces are persevering with to maneuver reserves to the Svatove-Kreminna line.[33] Geolocated footage printed on January 17 reveals Russian forces transferring reserves and army gear close to Severodonetsk (15km southeast of Kreminna).[34] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault close to Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[35]

Russian Major Effort—Jap Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Major Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations round Soledar on January 18. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces tried to advance in direction of Verkhnokamianske (20km northeast of Soledar), Spirne (18km northeast of Soledar), and Krasnopolivka (3km north of Soledar).[36] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault close to Sil (3km northwest of Soledar).[37] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian “volunteers of assault detachments” captured Sil, though ISW nonetheless can’t independently confirm Russian claims that Russian forces management the settlement.[38] The UK Ministry of Protection (UK MoD) reported that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Soledar by the tip of January 16 and that they proceed to defend towards Russian forces on the outskirts of the settlement.[39] Geolocated footage posted on January 18 signifies that Russian forces have seemingly superior additional west of Soledar in Dvorichchia (2km west of Soledar).[40] The Ukrainian Common Employees additionally reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault close to Krasna Hora (5km southwest of Soledar).[41]

The Russian MoD continues to try to downplay the position of the Wagner Group in claimed tactical advances within the Soledar space. The Russian MoD’s use of “volunteers of assault detachments” to explain the formations that supposedly captured Sil seemingly refers to Wagner Group fighters. The Kremlin beforehand challenged Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s declare that Wagner Group forces have been solely accountable for capturing Soledar.[42] The Russian MoD confronted important backlash when it failed initially to acknowledge the Wagner Group in its announcement of the seize of Soledar.[43] The Russian MoD is probably going utilizing odd language to concurrently defend itself from criticism that it’s not acknowledging the Wagner Group whereas additionally downplaying the Wagner Group’s position in tactical advances within the Soledar space.

Russian forces continued offensive operations round Bakhmut on January 18. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults close to Bakhmut itself and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters tried to advance to the western outskirts of Klishchiivka and are engaged in fierce battles with Ukrainian forces close to the settlement.[45] The Russian milblogger additionally claimed that Russian forces tried to advance in direction of Pivnichne (22km southwest of Bakhmut).[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis space on January 18. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults inside 32km southwest of Avdiivka close to Vodyane, Nevelske, Marinka, and Pobieda.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to chop a street that runs by means of a part of Ukrainian-controlled Marinka.[48] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that an Akhmat Special Forces Regiment efficiently stormed a Ukrainian stronghold within the path of Marinka.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that the stronghold was positioned south of Marinka close to Novomyhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[50] One other Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces carried out a floor assault close to Kamianske (5km northeast of Avdiivka), the place Ukrainian forces reportedly nonetheless management the H-20 freeway.[51] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces continued routine oblique fireplace alongside the road of contact in Donetsk and jap Zaporizhia oblasts.[52]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian officers have indicated that Russian forces are concentrating in Zaporizhia Oblast, probably for a big defensive or offensive effort. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported on January 18 that Russian forces carried out unspecified offensive actions close to Hulyaipole and Orkhiv, an inflection from the Common Employees’s regular reporting of the Zaporizhia Oblast entrance.[53] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Navy Administration Head Oleksandr Starukh said just lately that Russian forces are concentrating in Zaporizhia Oblast and later intensified shelling in Zaporizhia Oblast, as ISW has beforehand reported.[54] Different Ukrainian officers have just lately reported that Russian forces are transporting massive convoys of army personnel, gear, and defensive fortifications alongside vital logistics traces all through Zaporizhia Oblast.[55] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Navy Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan said that Russian forces prepare mobilized personnel on the Arabat Spit in Crimea after which transport them to unspecified areas east, which might embrace Zaporizhia Oblast.[56] It’s at the moment unclear which effort Russian forces goal to help by concentrating in Zaporizhia Oblast. Nevertheless, Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on January 13 that new pro-Russian volunteers from Serbia arrived in Zaporizhia Oblast to “defend the entrance traces,” suggesting that Russian forces could also be getting ready for a defensive effort.[57] Russian milbloggers and minor occupation officers, together with Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov, have claimed for months that Ukrainian forces are getting ready for an offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast.[58] Rogov claimed on January 18 that Ukrainian forces within the Zaporizhia path started getting ready for a defensive slightly than offensive effort, suggesting that Rogov could goal to organize the data area for a battle within the Zaporizhia path with out inciting panic over a attainable future Ukrainian counteroffensive.[59]

Russian forces’ rising use of incendiary munitions to conduct what look like in any other case routine strikes in southern Ukraine helps ISW’s latest evaluation that Russian forces seemingly face a scarcity of typical artillery rounds.[60] Footage reveals that Russian forces used incendiary munitions to strike Kherson Metropolis in a single day on January 17-18, the second noticed occasion of Russian forces utilizing incendiary munitions in Kherson Metropolis inside 24 hours and the third noticed occasion of Russian forces utilizing incendiary munitions in Ukraine throughout the previous two weeks.[61] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Administration Head Oleksandr Starukh said that Russian forces fired incendiary munitions at an unspecified space alongside the Zaporizhia Oblast entrance line on January 18.[62] Ukrainian strikes towards Russian army belongings alongside vital floor traces of communication (GLOCs) in southern Ukraine seemingly exacerbated an current scarcity.

Russian forces continued defensive operations in east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast on January 18. A outstanding Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Southern Navy District tank components in Kherson Oblast fired at unspecified targets on the east (left) financial institution of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast and prevented Ukrainian forces from touchdown on the east financial institution of the Dnipro River.[63] This report means that Ukrainian forces sometimes attain east financial institution Kherson Oblast, assuming that the milblogger meant to say east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast, (which Russian forces management), slightly than the Ukrainian-controlled west (proper) financial institution. Russian forces continued routine fireplace towards areas in west (proper) financial institution Kherson Oblast on January 18, together with Kherson Metropolis and its environs.[64] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian pressure concentrations in Ahaimany on January 12-16 and Velyka Lepetikha on January 18.[65]

Mobilization and Drive Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Increase fight energy with out conducting normal mobilization)

Ukrainian and Russian sources continued to point that Russian authorities are seemingly getting ready for a second wave of mobilization. Pskov Oblast Deputy Artur Gaiduk claimed on January 16 that the Kremlin responded to his inquiry on the standing of mobilization, stating that the call-up of mobilized individuals has ended however that Putin’s preliminary partial mobilization decree stays lively.[66] The Ukrainian Major Navy Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 18 that army recruitment facilities are rising recruitment efforts amongst older males and migrants from former Soviet republics.[67] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle that Russian army recruiters in North Ossetia are mobilizing individuals who battle with drug habit.[68] Russian lawmakers submitted a invoice to the Russian State Duma on January 16 to defer mobilization for farmers, entrepreneurs, and different small enterprise house owners.[69]

Russian authorities proceed to battle with and crack down on insubordination and desertion inside Russian forces. A Russian supply reported on January 18 that Russian authorities carried out a manhunt for a Russian army servicemember who escaped from his unit and traveled by means of Voronezh to Lipetsk Oblast.[70] The supply claimed that the soldier opened fireplace on police and died within the shootout.[71]Russian authorities charged eight mobilized personnel from Kaliningrad Oblast with desertion after the personnel traveled from Luhansk Oblast to Podolsk, Russia, by way of taxi and bus with their weapons.[72] An Omsk Oblast army courtroom sentenced one mobilized servicemember to 6 years in a strict regime penal colony for assaulting and threatening to kill his commander.[73] A Russian supply claimed that police in Lipetsk Oblast needed to intervene with 200 army personnel who rioted because of the lack of warmth on the prepare transporting them to the entrance traces.[74] Radio Free Kavkaz reported on January 15 that Dagestani contract personnel of the 136th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 58th Mixed Arms Army of the Southern Navy District refused to struggle in Ukraine or observe their commander’s orders, and left Ukraine for his or her everlasting base in Buynaksk, Dagestan.[75]

Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of and annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance techniques)

Russian occupation authorities are intensifying efforts to consolidate financial management of occupied territories. Russian-appointed Governor of Sevastopol Mikhail Razvozhaev introduced on January 18 that Russian state-owned Sberbank started operations in Russian-controlled Crimea and claimed that numerous Sberbank ATMs will activate inside one yr.[76] A Russian milblogger complained about Sberbank’s incapability to open ATMs in Crimea any sooner and advised that it’ll take eight years for Sberbank to function in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported on January 18 that Russian occupation authorities have levied a 15-20% price when Ukrainian residents withdraw the hryvnia (Ukraine’s nationwide forex) and have artificially inflated costs of the hryvnia in occupied territories to advertise a societal transition to the Russian ruble.[78] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle additionally reported on January 18 that Russian occupation authorities are raiding small companies and forcing Ukrainian enterprises to simply accept the ruble.[79] Russian forces and occupation authorities continued intensifying regulation enforcement measures to establish pro-Ukrainian civilians and partisans in occupied territories on January 18. A Kherson Oblast Telegram channel reported on January 18 that Russian forces and occupation authorities are looking for partisans underneath the guise of anti-terrorist operations in occupied Hola Prystan, Kherson Oblast.[80] The Telegram channel amplified reviews that Russian occupation forces and authorities plan to go looking Hola Prystan residents’ cell telephones and suggested locals to purge their knowledge.[81] A Russian supply reported on January 18 that Russian forces detained 4 folks in an unspecified space in Kherson Oblast underneath costs of being a Ukrainian Safety Service (SBU) sabotage group.[82] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov said on January 18 that Russian state media is boasting about reported Russian successes at figuring out and expelling alleged Ukrainian partisans from occupied territories.[83] A Russian supply claimed on January 18 that Russian officers are transferring counterintelligence officers from Russia to occupied territories as occupation authorities proceed to face persistent challenges in sustaining sufficient counterintelligence operations in occupied territories.[84]

Russian occupation authorities are persevering with efforts to consolidate administrative management of occupied territories. Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan said on January 18 that Russian occupation authorities gave residents in occupied Ivanivka Hromada, Kherson Oblast, a three-day deadline to submit documentation to reregister homes and land underneath Russian regulation.[85] Russian media outlet “MVD Media” said on January 18 that the Russian State Site visitors Directorate has opened 21 registration and examination divisions in occupied territories and has facilitated over 55,000 public administration transactions in occupied territories since December 14.[86] MVD Media said that the State Site visitors Directorate will not require that drivers move an examination with a view to obtain Russian driver’s licenses, noting that the particular process for offering public providers in occupied territories is legitimate till January 1, 2026.[87]

Russian occupation authorities are persevering with to limit civilian motion from Russian-occupied Ukraine. Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan said on January 18 that Russian occupation authorities haven’t but honored earlier guarantees to reopen the Vasylivka checkpoint, beforehand the one exit from occupied Kherson Oblast, on January 15.[88] Khlan additionally reported that Russian forces are persevering with to incessantly shell Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, and evacuating residents to Russia.[89] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov said on January 18 that Russian occupation authorities in Zaporizhia Oblast are deporting Ukrainian residents with out warning, forcing them out of their houses with little to no belongings.[90]

Russian occupation authorities proceed to face bureaucratic points in sustaining a adequate pro-Russia workforce in occupied territories. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported on January 18 that Russian officers are importing civilians from Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea to carry out administrative duties as occupation authorities proceed to face resistance from Ukrainian employees and battle to recruit collaborators in occupied territories.[91]

ISW will proceed to report each day noticed indicators in step with the present assessed most harmful plan of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine probably geared toward Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast a couple of potential Russian offensive towards northern Ukraine in winter 2023 stays a worst-case state of affairs throughout the forecast cone. ISW at the moment assesses the danger of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, however attainable, and the danger of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new part within the each day replace will not be in itself a forecast or evaluation. It lays out the each day noticed indicators we’re utilizing to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we anticipate to replace usually. Our evaluation that the MDCOA stays unlikely has not modified. We’ll replace this header if the evaluation modifications.

Noticed indicators for the MDCOA up to now 24 hours:

Nothing important to report.

Noticed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA up to now 24 hours:

A neighborhood Russian media outlet within the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug reported on January 17 that mobilized troopers from Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug deployed to Belarus for coaching.[92]
The Belarusian Ministry of Protection reported that Russian and Belarusian pilots continued conducting joint fight coaching duties as a part of the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) on January 18.[93] The Belarusian Ministry of Protection introduced that Commander of the Belarusian Air Drive and Air Protection Forces Colonel Andrey Lukyanovich is presiding over these workouts.[94]
Belarusian mechanized components proceed conducting workouts in Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Protection introduced that components of the Belarusian sixth Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade carried out unspecified duties in an unspecified location as a part of a fight readiness examine on January 18.[95]

Noticed counter-indicators for the MDCOA up to now 24 hours:

The Ukrainian Common Employees reiterated that it has not noticed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 18 and reported that Russian and Belarusian forces are conducting workouts on interactions between airforce and floor pressure components throughout offensive operations.[96]

Notice: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/70367

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011723

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121422

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/ISWpercent20Ukrainepercent20Indicatorspercent20Update.pdf

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2023

[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lavrov-likens-us-actions-those-hitler-napoleon-2023-01-18/

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lavrov-likens-us-actions-those-hitler-napoleon-2023-01-18/

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120622 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112222 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110722; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19

[10] kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/70367

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-zelenskiy-peace-plan-absurd-no-serious-proposal-table-2023-01-18/ ; https://tass dot com/politics/1564139

[12] https://tass dot com/politics/1564139

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122722 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122922 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122822 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120222

[14] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/70368

[15] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/70368

[16] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/70368

[17] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/70368

[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023; https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/2427

[19] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/2427

[20] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/2427

[21] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/2427

[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/Russianpercent20Operationspercent20Assessmentspercent20Januarypercent2010percent202023.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5; https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/Russianpercent20Offensivepercent20Campaignpercent20Assessmentpercent2Cpercent20Octoberpercent2031percent20PDF.pdf

[23] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/288

[24] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/288

[25] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/288

[26] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/288

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/Russianpercent20Operationspercent20Assessmentspercent20Januarypercent2011percent202023.pdf;

[28] https://dsns.gov.ua/en/information/nadzvicaini-podiyi/oficiina-informaciia-dsns-shhodo-nadzvicainoyi-situaciyi-poviazanoyi-iz-aviaciinoiu-katastrofoiu-na-kiyivshhini

[29] https://dsns.gov.ua/information/nadzvicaini-podiyi/oficiina-informaciia-dsns-shhodo-nadzvicainoyi-situaciyi-poviazanoyi-iz-aviaciinoiu-katastrofoiu-na-kiyivshhini

[30] https://dsns.gov.ua/information/nadzvicaini-podiyi/oficiina-informaciia-dsns-shhodo-nadzvicainoyi-situaciyi-poviazanoyi-iz-aviaciinoiu-katastrofoiu-na-kiyivshhini

[31] https://twitter.com/blinzka/standing/1615684858742771716
https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/standing/1615656358996594691

[32] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/8041 ; https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/9195

[33] ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/8041;

[34] https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/standing/1615429565064810496
https://twitter.com/Danspiun/standing/1615481192639352832

[35] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHsXWekkSgj8F7B7KGtppKG4AtJqFNBxLzScguHBLpKorCuSHQjCa9G8N9RdRbF9l

[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/10395

[37] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHsXWekkSgj8F7B7KGtppKG4AtJqFNBxLzScguHBLpKorCuSHQjCa9G8N9RdRbF9l

[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/23542

[39] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/standing/1615596581473976320?s=20&t=mmk56gJ2Xv3Px_yMolPXBQ

[40] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/standing/1615709694227537923?s=20&t=hnMtBLNS9TwZar65ZGgAiQ; https://twitter.com/Noobieshunta_/standing/1615711065383309312?s=20&t=hnMtBLNS9TwZar65ZGgAiQ

[41] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHsXWekkSgj8F7B7KGtppKG4AtJqFNBxLzScguHBLpKorCuSHQjCa9G8N9RdRbF9l

[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011623

[43] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011323

[44] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHsXWekkSgj8F7B7KGtppKG4AtJqFNBxLzScguHBLpKorCuSHQjCa9G8N9RdRbF9l

[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/10395

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/10395

[47] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHsXWekkSgj8F7B7KGtppKG4AtJqFNBxLzScguHBLpKorCuSHQjCa9G8N9RdRbF9l

[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/10395

[49] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3278

[50] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7053

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/10395

[52] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fUaMz6ojTQGVqtBqKG5ZhYDArGCDfTG7cNTBy4toXJJqsjeXreKWAFiCV7JFTx2dl ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHsXWekkSgj8F7B7KGtppKG4AtJqFNBxLzScguHBLpKorCuSHQjCa9G8N9RdRbF9l

[53] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fUaMz6ojTQGVqtBqKG5ZhYDArGCDfTG7cNTBy4toXJJqsjeXreKWAFiCV7JFTx2dl

[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/16019; https://t.me/starukhofficial/4582; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2023

[55] ttps://t.me/andriyshTime/5970; https://t.me/andriyshTime/5926; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1167; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/11492

[56] https://www.fb.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0WwCVaoL2NeQXiXw818gY3ea1L371MjBM6syGewtbWqmHbbbwCDK1jcGGEDvCQGt7l?__cft__[0]=AZXnxAW1ANij5lL9Wir8JPJZn5kggZ4MSfAZDQiW9ydIbBdhmh_48c7j0RIF2Vv0ayKtnFfnLZ4nCu-c2JZ31R6WQO8YjYNY0_Dt0huXCQ5XHg5VfdkevIZtCT1zOHw__2E9QdNHb4LKyRgNtcSb4ONBBt9SkuJ4BNJKwSwwVFqz6Q&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R

[57] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/680

[59] https://t.me/vrogov/7177

[60] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31

[61] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/standing/1615684160475078657?s=20&t=Q95tH4rbOiWiQvGpmb342Q; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/Russianpercent20Offensivepercent20Campaignpercent20Assessmentpercent2Cpercent20Januarypercent209percent2Cpercent202023percent20PDF.pdf

[62] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/16079

[63] https://t.me/rybar/42803

[64] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fUaMz6ojTQGVqtBqKG5ZhYDArGCDfTG7cNTBy4toXJJqsjeXreKWAFiCV7JFTx2dl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHsXWekkSgj8F7B7KGtppKG4AtJqFNBxLzScguHBLpKorCuSHQjCa9G8N9RdRbF9l; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/3132; https://t.me/hueviyherson/33144

[65] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/27256; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/standing/1615694033476804609?s=20&t=Ckie0ByF9ZAwnoEIj7hYPw

[66] https://t.me/arturgaiduk/107

[67] https://gur.gov dot ua/content material/v-rf-hotuiutsia-do-novoi-khvyli-mobilizatsii-pid-prytsilom-viiskkomativ-zhyteli-moskvy-vvodytsia-zaborona-zbyratysia-hrupamy-ponad-20-liudei.html

[68] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/18/rosiyany-mobilizuyut-do-vs-rf-narkozalezhnyh/

[69] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/enterprise/articles/2023/01/16/959198-otsrochku-ot-mobilizatsii; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/63c66c6c9a794738d0bb50f1; https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/invoice/278782-8

[70] https://t.me/bazabazon/15414; https://t.me/bazabazon/15422

[71] https://t.me/bazabazon/15422; https://t.me/bazabazon/15423; https://t.me/bazabazon/15426

[72] https://meduza dot io/information/2023/01/18/na-vosmeryh-mobilizovannyh-uehavshih-s-oruzhiem-na-taksi-iz-lnr-v-podolsk-zaveli-delo-o-dezertirstve

[73] https://meduza dot io/information/2023/01/18/mobilizovannogo-iz-omskoy-oblasti-prigovorili-k-shesti-godam-po-obvineniyu-v-napadenii-na-komandira

[74] https://t.me/vchkogpu/35976

[75] https://www.kavkazr.com/a/kontraktniki-iz-dagestana-otkazalisj-voevatj-v-ukraine-i-vernulisj-v-chastj/32224381.html ; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-jan-16-17

[76] https://t.me/readovkanews/50922

[77] https://t.me/sashakots/38130

[78] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/17/okupanty-zagostryuyut-gumanitarnu-kryzu-na-tot-aby-zmusyty-lyudej-otrymuvaty-rosijski-pasporty/

[79] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/17/okupanty-zagostryuyut-gumanitarnu-kryzu-na-tot-aby-zmusyty-lyudej-otrymuvaty-rosijski-pasporty/

[80] https://t.me/hueviyherson/33146

[81] https://t.me/hueviyherson/33146

[82] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7058

[83] https://www.fb.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0FsX19TT1R4GWsvZMsUPgkjdwi3ZhWV55taVfdskVRTwPAp7oHzeK29zJ3fFshZgHl?__cft__[0]=AZW7CDvhQJFmOM3DZgGc8qu3rwx_axdcZ-xQqaiwTYP5XcqJ3B4CQE5_CQBlf3zh9vU3wPEIPiTIWak2ZK-Bux4kOChF-jPZfv-OXgcb75WIIS0WNJjbsvoVGqRQdwYluOkJpG2Cdzwqm6BdmiYKJO3K&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R;%20https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1213

[84] https://t.me/notes_veterans/7524

[85] https://www.fb.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0cgBRkjWryExt66dWV7FAKRknxtMGzwtqb7SpuFDRVNTVbDZWUJxSeE3j5qQH3enZl?__cft__[0]=AZWxbA-DU3YjV1pKGbI4mkijWbmxLsfRa-wq-q6M5uKKKKCknhPRR3jlmx5PoBvGpY8BK2g4_K-0fSiwXoQzXqzjqINIQD1g4toI4KVI_fGjWrBT6CMv-DiHn5D9xrNQn3PwEdCUjDb5vBw-UJp5QyLT&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R

[86] https://t.me/mediamvd/16045; https://t.me/mediamvd/16044

[87] https://t.me/mediamvd/16045; https://t.me/mediamvd/16044

[88] https://www.fb.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0FsX19TT1R4GWsvZMsUPgkjdwi3ZhWV55taVfdskVRTwPAp7oHzeK29zJ3fFshZgHl?__cft__[0]=AZVmwjPQcN-YO0rq2CU4wNnxLONOvwihL9GX-x8RUFdfd2IIFoTRxcJjgUIGCTfMxShMSHMkZiX_SROynCuF_DBdpjm3nmUweBr3QissPb6gYhDJy6QDfCKG4jgcaTssURHKBi-faCTGqDHFE8wHSBnL&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R

[89] https://www.fb.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0FsX19TT1R4GWsvZMsUPgkjdwi3ZhWV55taVfdskVRTwPAp7oHzeK29zJ3fFshZgHl?__cft__[0]=AZVmwjPQcN-YO0rq2CU4wNnxLONOvwihL9GX-x8RUFdfd2IIFoTRxcJjgUIGCTfMxShMSHMkZiX_SROynCuF_DBdpjm3nmUweBr3QissPb6gYhDJy6QDfCKG4jgcaTssURHKBi-faCTGqDHFE8wHSBnL&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R

[90] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1213

[91] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHsXWekkSgj8F7B7KGtppKG4AtJqFNBxLzScguHBLpKorCuSHQjCa9G8N9RdRbF9l

[92] https://muksun dot fm/information/2023-01-17/posledniy-zalp-mobilizovannye-yugorchane-iz-omska-otpravilis-v-belarus-2639125

[93] https://t.me/modmilby/21799; https://t.me/modmilby/21800

[94] https://t.me/modmilby/21799

[95] https://t.me/modmilby/21814

[96] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHsXWekkSgj8F7B7KGtppKG4AtJqFNBxLzScguHBLpKorCuSHQjCa9G8N9RdRbF9l; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fUaMz6ojTQGVqtBqKG5ZhYDArGCDfTG7cNTBy4toXJJqsjeXreKWAFiCV7JFTx2dl

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