Army counter-intelligence of the Safety Service uncovered two brokers of the Major Directorate of the Basic Workers of the Russian Federation (higher often known as the GRU) as a result of a particular operation in Odessa.
The attackers gathered intelligence about attainable places and actions of air protection items of the Armed Forces of Ukraine within the area. Nevertheless, the staff of the Safety Service well timed uncovered the Russian company and established management over it even on the preliminary stage of subversive actions.
Ultimately, the SSU detained each spies after they tried to move categorized info to the Russian Federation.
Each of the detainees – a person (born in Odessa, however later served within the Russian military and took part in hostilities on the territory of Chechnya) and a spouse – had been residents of the Russian Federation. They had been despatched to Ukraine early in 2018 and obtained a residence allow. On this manner, Russian army intelligence deliberate to create its personal intelligence equipment south of Ukraine.
Earlier than a full-scale invasion, a household of brokers collected knowledge on the socio-political state of affairs within the area and expanded their circle of acquaintances, making ready for the primary duties.
And after February 24, to start with, they tried to determine the fight positions of the “Crotale” anti-aircraft missile techniques and the situation of subject artillery depots with ammunition for Anti-aircraft missile complexes. The occupiers wanted intelligence info to hold out airstrikes with Kalibr or Kinzhal class missiles towards Ukrainian army services.
Subsequently, the attackers started actively gathering details about items of the Protection Forces within the Kherson space.
The brokers despatched the collected info to a “liaison” – a resident of Sevastopol, a former Russian particular forces officer who secretly cooperates with the GRU, and makes use of the place of the top of a charity fund for “protecting”. He handed the knowledge on to his supervisor, a Russian army intelligence employees member.
The brokers used a beforehand developed nameless Telegram channel to speak with representatives of the Russian particular service.
Throughout searches of the brokers’ residences, legislation enforcement officers discovered cell phones and pc tools with proof of hidden correspondence with the aggressor.
The particular operation to show enemy brokers was carried out by the SSU Army Counterintelligence Division’s workers and the investigators of the Safety Service of the Odessa area with the participation of the SSU Counterintelligence Division and the procedural management of the regional prosecutor’s workplace.
