August 21, 9:30 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date each day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Russian forces’ momentum from territorial good points round Bakhmut and Avdiivka in late July is probably going exhausted, and Russian assaults in japanese Ukraine are doubtless culminating though very small Russian advances will doubtless proceed. Russian forces seized Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirska Thermal Energy Plant (TPP) southeast of Bakhmut on July 25 and 26, respectively, consolidating Russian management round tough water options after many weeks of preventing. Russian sources celebrated these good points as a major army victory with out noting that Ukrainian army Ukrainian forces efficiently broke contact and withdrew from the world.[i] Russian forces additionally celebrated the seize of Ukrainian fortifications across the Butivka Coal Mine air flow shaft southwest of Avdiivka, after Ukrainian forces withdrew from the world on July 30.[ii] Russian forces capitalized on these good points to a restricted extent and have been attacking towards Bakhmut from the northeast and southeast, and round Avdiivka, however these assaults at the moment are stalling. Russian forces haven’t made vital territorial good points round Bakhmut or Avdiivka since their advances by way of Novoluhanske, the ability plant, the Butivka Coal Mine, and some small settlements close to these areas.
Russian forces’ failure to capitalize on prior good points round Bakhmut and Avdiivka is an instance of a extra elementary Russian army drawback—the demonstrated incapacity to translate tactical good points into operational successes. Russian forces have constantly did not make the most of tactical breakthroughs to maneuver into Ukrainian rear areas or unhinge vital components of the Ukrainian defensive strains. They due to this fact frequently give the Ukrainians time to disengage tactically and re-establish defensible positions in opposition to which the Russians should then launch new deliberate assaults. This phenomenon helps clarify the extraordinarily sluggish fee of Russian advances within the east and strongly means that the Russians can be unable to take far more floor within the coming months except the state of affairs develops in unexpected methods. Russian forces will doubtless stay unable to commit sufficient assets to anyone offensive operation to regain the momentum obligatory for vital territorial advances that translate to operational successes. Russian forces may even must generate and commit extra assault teams, gear, and morale to renew even these restricted territorial advances yielding small tactical good points.
Russian forces doubtless face points repairing fight plane attributable to Western sanctions and could also be trying to bypass these sanctions by leveraging Belarusian connections with much less extreme sanctions. The Ukrainian Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) said that the Russian and Belarusian Protection Ministries signed “pressing” contracts on August 20 to restore and restore Russian army aviation gear on Belarusian territory reportedly for additional use in Ukraine.[iii] Western sanctions in opposition to Russia have largely banned the switch of kit to the state of Russia as a complete, whereas sanctions in opposition to Belarus largely goal particular person Belarusian entities.[iv] Western nations have beforehand sanctioned Belarusian industrial-military complicated entities producing radar methods, cars, and repairing tracked automobiles, however it’s unclear to what extent the sanctions impacted Belarusian import of aviation restore components.[v] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces transferred some unspecified air protection gear to Belarus from Russia on August 21. The Ukrainian Common Employees additionally reported that Russian forces will shut sure sections of Russian airspace within the Lipetsk, Voronezh, and Belgorod Oblasts from August 22-25.[vi] The Russian-Belarusian settlement might counsel that Russian officers are trying to bypass sanctions on Russia, as it could be simpler to import restore components to Belarus than to Russia.
Key Takeaways
- Russian offensive operations in japanese Ukraine have doubtless exhausted the restricted momentum they gained on the finish of July and are doubtless culminating. The Russian army has proven a continuing incapacity to translate small tactical good points into operational successes, a failing that can doubtless stop Russia from making vital territorial advances within the coming months barring main adjustments on the battlefield.
- Ukrainian army intelligence stories that Russia and Belarus have reached an “pressing” settlement for Belarus to restore broken Russian aviation gear for re-use in Ukraine. This settlement might be a part of a Russian effort to make use of the looser sanctions regime on Belarus to bypass sectoral sanctions on Russia.
- Russian forces tried a number of unsuccessful floor assaults southwest and southeast of Izyum.
- Russian forces launched a floor assault southeast of Siversk and northeast and south of Bakhmut.
- Russian forces made restricted good points west of Donetsk Metropolis however didn’t conduct any floor assaults on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border.
- Russian forces tried unsuccessful floor assaults southwest of Donetsk Metropolis and continued attacking settlements northwest and southwest of Avdiivka.
- Russian forces performed a number of assaults on the Kherson-Mykolaiv frontline and made partial advances east of Mykolaiv Metropolis.
- Russian forces are doubtless not coaching new recruits in self-discipline, creating an entitled pressure participating in disorderly conduct in Russia and unlawful conduct in Ukraine.
- Russian occupation authorities intensified filtration measures and abductions in occupied territories forward of Ukraine’s Independence Day on August 24.
We don’t report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to judge and report on the results of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity though we don’t describe them in these stories.
- Important Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Subordinate Important Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops within the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv Metropolis
- Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
- Mobilization and Pressure Technology Efforts
- Actions in Russian-occupied Areas
Important Effort—Japanese Ukraine
Subordinate Important Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian goal: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Japanese Ukraine and seize the whole thing of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces performed a number of assaults southwest and southeast of Izyum on August 21, doubtless in an effort to reverse Ukrainian counterattacks or regain management over Ukraine-liberated territories within the space. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully performed a reconnaissance-in-force operation within the course of Pasika-Bohorodychne and launched a failed assault within the course of Dovhenke-Dolyna, each instructions southeast of Izyum.[vii] Russian forces additionally launched an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force try within the course of Petropillia-Dmytrivka and did not advance within the instructions of Nova Dmytrivka, Dibrivne, and Kranaukhivka (all southwest of Izyum).[viii] ISW beforehand assessed that Ukrainian forces liberated Bohorodychne, Dmytrivka, and Dibrivne, and Russian assaults in these instructions might point out that Russian forces are trying to regain misplaced territories and forestall Ukrainian forces from advancing from these liberated positions additional into Russian-held territory.
Russian forces launched a floor assault southeast of Siversk however did not advance in the direction of the settlement on August 21. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to advance from Berestove to Ivano-Daryivka, roughly 17km and 12km southeast of Siversk, respectively.[ix] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces shelled Siversk, Hryhorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, and Ivano-Daryivka.[x]
Russian forces continued to wage battles northeast and south of Bakhmut on August 21. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian floor assaults on Bakhmutske (about 11km northeast of Bakhmut) and Zaitseve (about 8km southeast of Bakhmut).[xi] Russian forces additionally launched airstrikes close to Zaitseve, Bakhmut, and Soledar (roughly 13km northeast of Bakhmut).[xii] Geolocated footage printed on August 20 confirmed Ukrainian artillery placing Russian infantry within the southeastern outskirts of Soledar, which doubtless signifies that Russian forces are nonetheless working within the neighborhood of the Knauf Gips Donbas gypsum manufacturing facility.[xiii] The Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) Territorial Protection claimed that Ukrainian forces are shelling Zaitseve from their positions southwest of the settlement, after DNR officers beforehand claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement on August 20.[xiv] Russian and DNR sources have claimed to manage main areas of Zaitseve since August 10, and ISW can’t independently verify these claims.[xv] Geolocated footage additionally confirmed fireplace and smoke reportedly after Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot in Horlivka.[xvi]
Russian forces made restricted territorial good points west of Donetsk Metropolis and continued attacking settlements northeast and southwest of Avdiivka on August 21. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces had been “partially profitable” when advancing within the course of Lozove-Pisky, 12km west and northwest of Donetsk Metropolis, respectively.[xvii] Russian forces additionally tried to advance to Nevelske (about 18km due northwest of Donetsk Metropolis) however retreated. Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to enhance their tactical positions within the course of Novoselivka Druha-Krasnohorivka (northeast of Avdiivka) and performed a failed reconnaissance-in-force try within the course of Opytne (about 4 kilometers southwest of Avdiivka).[xviii] Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Russian forces consolidated management over Pisky and are at present clearing the settlement of Ukrainian mines.[xix] Kadyrov additionally claimed that Russian forces are persevering with to advance with “minimal threat to civilian inhabitants and infrastructure,” regardless of geolocated footage beforehand displaying Russian forces firing TOS-1A thermobaric artillery methods at Pisky.[xx] The Russian Protection Ministry has additionally claimed that Russian forces “absolutely liberated” Pisky on August 13.[xxi]
Russian forces tried to advance southwest of Donetsk Metropolis and didn’t conduct offensive operations on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border on August 21. Russian forces launched unsuccessful assaults on Mariinka (about 24km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis) and Pobieda, roughly 4 kilometers west of Mariinka.[xxii] Russian forces continued to launch airstrikes on Novomykhailivka and Pavlivka, roughly 30km and 52km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis, respectively.[xxiii] Social media footage confirmed the destruction of civilian infrastructure in Vuhledar (about 49km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis) following Russian artillery fireplace on the settlement.[xxiv]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv Metropolis (Russian goal: Defend floor strains of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and forestall Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces didn’t conduct any confirmed floor assaults alongside the Kharkiv Metropolis Axis on August 21. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces performed an airstrike close to Staryi Saltiv, roughly 45km northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis.[xxv] Russian forces continued utilizing tank, tube, and rocket artillery to shell Kharkiv Metropolis and settlements to the north, northeast, and southeast and performed aerial reconnaissance close to Velyki Prokhody, roughly 28km north of Kharkiv Metropolis.[xxvi]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts in opposition to Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces performed a number of assaults on the Mykolaiv-Kherson line on August 21. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces once more tried and did not advance to Tavryiske, about 38km northwest of Kherson Metropolis, and to Potomkyne, south of Kryvyi Rih on the T2207 freeway.[xxvii] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces made partial advances in the direction of Blahodatne, east of Mykolaiv Metropolis.[xxviii] Russian sources made varied claims that Russian forces management half or all of Blahodatne.[xxix] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck industrial and army infrastructure in Mykolaiv Metropolis with S-300 anti-aircraft missiles.[xxx] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces performed not less than seven airstrikes alongside the road of contact, together with close to Lozove and Bila Krynytsia, doubtless concentrating on the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River.[xxxi] Ukrainian forces shot down three Russian UAVs in unspecified areas of Kherson Oblast.[xxxii] Russian forces continued shelling all through the Kherson-Mykolaiv line of contact.[xxxiii]
Russian forces are utilizing barges to move gear throughout the Dnipro River in occupied Kherson Oblast. Geolocated satellite tv for pc imagery exhibits that Russian forces have repaired barges and are utilizing them to move unknown supplies throughout the Dnipro River near Kherson Metropolis, confirming ISW’s August 17 evaluation.[xxxiv] Russian forces have needed to resort to different strategies of sustaining floor strains of communication (GLOCs) throughout the Dnipro after constant Ukrainian strikes have efficiently rendered unusable each highway bridges into western Kherson Oblast. These massive barges doubtless require devoted dock infrastructure to load and unload on either side of the Dnipro River, which Ukrainian forces will doubtless goal with additional HIMARS strikes.[xxxv]
Russian forces didn’t try any reported floor assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast on August 21. Russian forces performed airstrikes on Hulyaipole and east of town close to Olhivske and Chervone.[xxxvi] The Russian Protection Ministry claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Charivne, southwest of Hulyaipole.[xxxvii] Russian forces additionally focused Nikopol, Marhanets, Vyshchetarasivka, and Illinka on the appropriate financial institution of the Dnipro River, Myrivske on the northern outskirts of Kryvyi Rih, and the Zelendolsk and Apostolove hromadas, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in a single day on August 20-21 with heavy MLRS fireplace.[xxxviii] Russian forces continued heavy shelling all through the road of contact.[xxxix]
Ukrainian officers expressed continued concern a couple of potential Russian provocation on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP) within the coming days. Ukrainian nuclear vitality firm Energoatom reported that Russian forces once more shelled the ZNPP on August 20, damaging a personnel overpass into the ability items.[xl] Energoatom additionally warned on August 21 that the ZNPP stays susceptible to radiation leakage however said that the plant continues to function.[xli] Ukraine’s Important Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian occupation authorities prolonged a short-term break for Ukrainian ZNPP staff and have introduced in Russian nuclear vitality firm Rosatom staff and extra army gear to the ZNPP grounds.[xlii] GUR warned that Russian forces could also be making an attempt to disconnect the ZNPP from Ukrainian energy methods, which GUR claims may improve the danger of a catastrophe on the plant.[xliii] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov said on August 20 that Russian forces transported powerlines and oil barrels to Melitopol to organize to attach the ZNPP to the Russian vitality system, stealing vitality from Ukraine.[xliv]
Russian forces launched 5 Kalibr missiles towards Odesa Oblast in a single day on August 20-21. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian air defenses intercepted two missiles and that the remaining three missiles struck open land and didn’t begin fires.[xlv] The Russian Protection Ministry claimed that Russian forces struck complexes containing HIMARS in Maiorske, Odesa Oblast, however there isn’t any proof that the missiles struck army targets.[xlvi]
Mobilization and Pressure Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Increase fight energy with out conducting common mobilization)
Russian army recruiters are doubtless permitting Russian volunteers to behave in a lawless and disorderly means throughout their coaching and previous to their deployment to Ukraine in order to not discourage the restricted variety of recruits. Russian opposition outlet Verstka interviewed 12 residents of Mulino, Nizhny Novgorod, and compiled social media complaints from locals who mentioned volunteers’ conduct across the city. Mulino is house to an enormous Russian army coaching space and reportedly is the bottom for the brand new 3rd Army Corps.[xlvii] Locals advised Verstka that ”a number of thousand servicemen” arrived in Mulino previous to deploying to Donbas and 6 teams of unspecified dimension have already rotated out of coaching (and presumably into Ukraine) since July.[xlviii] Locals said that these volunteers are largely between the ages of 40 to 50, which confirms ISW’s earlier observations that some recruits gave the impression to be older than the normal age for brand spanking new and uncooked recruits.[xlix] Mulino residents reported that volunteers are committing robberies, harassing ladies, instigating fights, and closely abusing alcohol after their coaching days finish at seven o’clock at evening.[l] Mulino authorities reportedly started patrolling the city as of final week, however residents speculate that the native police are doubtless releasing arrested volunteers as a result of they’re wanted for deployment to Ukraine. One resident said that these volunteers are ”meat” for deployment, whereas different social media customers expressed concern that rowdy and lawless volunteers will hurt Russian servicemen on the frontlines.
Verstka’s report doubtless signifies that Russian army authorities are unwilling to self-discipline these new recruits, lured into service at nice price and energy. Indiscipline and de facto immunity from self-discipline throughout coaching will very doubtless translate right into a poorly educated and entitled volunteer pressure that’s used to committing crimes and getting away with it. Such conduct amongst volunteers might result in conflicts with fellow Russian servicemen, disobedience, alcohol and drug abuse, looting, and potential victimization of Ukrainians in occupied areas. The report additionally additional confirms that Russian forces have deployed some unspecified teams of volunteers to Ukraine after a brief coaching interval. The ages of volunteers and reported legal and addictive behaviors additionally point out that Russian army recruiters are scrambling for any volunteers no matter legal background, age, or army expertise. The unfavorable feedback by locals concerning the recruits may also hurt public notion of the Russian Armed Forces by Russians sooner or later, probably additional decreasing the already-low proclivity to serve amongst Russians.
Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported that 33 Russian federal topics are forming 52 volunteer battalions and army items. Novaya Gazeta additionally discovered that the Kremlin is forming 10 different army formations – inside non-public army corporations (PMC) Wagner and Redut, Cossack detachments, the Donetsk and Luhansk Folks’s Republics (DNR and LNR), and Russian Fight Army Reserve (BARS) – which might be competing for volunteers.[li] Novaya Gazeta reported that the Russian Protection Ministry is overseeing the recruitment for regional volunteer battalions, the BARS program (which incorporates the items ”Rusich,” ”Imperskiy Legion,” ”Russkiy Legion,” and ”Soyuz Dobrovoltsev Donbassa”), and Redut (which incorporates the ”Veterany” Battalion and the ”Don” Cossack Brigade). Wagner can be selectively recruiting volunteers, whereas the DNR and LNR are forming the ”Sparta” Volunteer Battalion and the ”Pyatnashka” Volunteer Brigade. The report recognized that Russian volunteer items are coaching within the following areas: Olgino, Severyanin, and Luga (all close to St.Petersburg); Mulino; Kazan Greater Tank Command Faculty coaching floor; southeast of Tambov; Totskoye; and Bambyrovo and Ussuriyskiy Zaliv (each in Primorsky Krai). PMC volunteers endure coaching close to Rostov-on-Don, Molkino (Krasnodar Krai), and on the SPETSNAZ College in Chechnya.
Russian army recruiters continued to vow extravagant rewards to males who signal army contracts to combat and are a part of items that make territorial good points in Ukraine. Armavir Metropolis Army Recruitment Heart in Krasnodar Krai posted an commercial that calculated {that a} non-public may earn 1.9 million rubles (about $32,000) in a single month if the unit he’s in advances one kilometer per day in Ukraine.[lii] The recruiters promised every serviceman 50,000 rubles (about $840) for every kilometer that the recruit advances on the frontline. Russian federal topics on common search to recruit a volunteer unit composed of 350 folks, and if the entire hypothetical unit advances by a kilometer (and everybody in it survives) the Kremlin would owe cost of 17.5 million rubles (about $294,000) to your entire unit. This advert reveals a number of necessary issues about how Russia is preventing this warfare and looking for to search out troopers to proceed doing so. First, it assumes each day charges of advance much like World Warfare I patterns -30 kilometers advance in a month is an extremely sluggish fee of ahead progress for a mechanized pressure, however in keeping with the speed of advance Russian forces have sustained in current months after they have superior in any respect. Second, it exhibits how desperately recruiters try to lure males to affix volunteer items and the way laborious they’re discovering it. Third, it exhibits that the Kremlin remains to be making an attempt to resolve its manpower issues by throwing cash at them to incentivize voluntary service reasonably than by contemplating coercion.
Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of occupied areas; set situations for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or another future political association of Moscow’s selecting)
Russian occupation authorities escalated measures to extend management of occupied areas in Ukraine by way of elevated filtration and the kidnapping of civilians. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Head Yaroslav Yanushevych warned on August 21 that Russian occupation authorities have intensified filtration efforts in Kherson Oblast forward of Ukraine’s Independence Day on August 24.[liii] The Ukrainian Resistance Heart reported that Russian forces have elevated kidnappings and abductions all through the occupied territories, emphasizing that Russian forces are concentrating on volunteers and native Ukrainian officers who refuse to cooperate with occupation authorities.[liv]
Russian occupation authorities continued efforts to strengthen management of the youth inhabitants in occupied areas of Ukraine in assist of broader efforts to increase administrative management of occupied territories. Head of Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin claimed on August 21 that Russian authorities have already delivered greater than 200,000 of the deliberate 3.3 million textbooks to occupied cities in Donetsk Oblast in preparation for the upcoming college yr.[lv] Luhansk Folks’s Republic (LNR) officers reported on August 21 that Novoderkul, Luhansk Oblast, hosted the primary oath-taking ceremony of the Russian Younger Army Cadets Nationwide Motion (Yunarmia) within the occupied territories.[lvi] ISW beforehand assessed on July 17 that new Yunarmia formations are unlikely to enter fight for a while because the group recruits volunteers ages eight to eighteen.[lvii]
Russian officers continued encountering widespread resistance from Ukrainian academics and oldsters who refuse to take part within the Russian-controlled training system. Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan said on August 21 that Kherson Oblast academics and oldsters have elevated stress on Russian occupation authorities and proceed to disrupt plans to combine the area into the Russian Federation.[lviii] Deputy of the Nova Kakhovka Metropolis Council Irena LePen reported on August 20 that just one little one and one tutor had been current on the “Ivonka” kindergarten’s opening ceremony in Nova Kakhovka.[lix]
Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported on August 20 that Russian occupation authorities have but to conduct full-fledged preparations for the Kherson Oblast pseudo-referendum to affix Russia (reportedly to happen in precisely three weeks as of August 20).[lx] Khlan said that Russian officers might reschedule the referendum for the fourth time attributable to lack of satisfactory preparations.[lxi]
Observe: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these stories. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
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